Sugarman v. Lewis, 82-85-A

• Decision Date: 27 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 82-85-A,82-85-A
• Citation: 488 A.2d 709
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Parties: David P. SUGARMAN et al. v. Robert LEWIS et al. ppeal.

Page 709

488 A.2d 709

David P. SUGARMAN et al. v. Robert LEWIS et al.

No. 82-85-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 27, 1985.

Bruce A. Wolpert, Providence, for plaintiffs.

Donald M. Gregory II, Wickford, for defendants.

OPINION

BEVILACQUA, Chief Justice.

The plaintiffs brought this petition for declaratory judgment pursuant to the provisions of our Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, seeking a declaration that their property was not within the town's subdivision ordinance. They also sought a declaration that the Exeter Planning Commission exceeded its statutory authority by approving an amendment to the subdivision ordinance on August 11, 1976.

After a hearing before a justice of the Superior Court sitting without a jury, a decision was rendered and judgment was entered denying relief and declaring that (1) the division of land qualified as a subdivision within the meaning of the statute and was therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Exeter Planning Board and (2) that plaintiffs have no standing to question the enactment of the subdivision-ordinance amendment because they had not exhausted their administrative remedies. In the alternative the trial justice held that the town had the statutory authority to enact the amendment. The plaintiffs appeal.

The facts in this case are not in dispute. The plaintiffs are the owners of several substantial parcels of real estate in the town of Exeter. In February 1976 plaintiffs entered into certain sale agreements for a portion of the property. These agreements were conditioned upon the ability of the prospective purchaser to obtain building permits for single-family dwellings from the town of Exeter. Each of the parcels was divided for the purpose of sale into lots that were connected to Yawgoo Valley Road by a strip of land varying in width from ten to twenty feet.

The plaintiffs were "informally" told by the town that the plat would constitute an illegal subdivision and they would not be able to secure the necessary permits. The plaintiffs at this point petitioned the Superior Court for a declaratory judgment, which was heard and decided adversely to plaintiffs.

The issues presented are (1) whether the planning board has jurisdiction over the lots in question and (2) whether plaintiffs have standing to challenge an amendment to the town's subdivision ordinance.

I

Addressing the first issue, plaintiffs contend that the planning board does not have jurisdiction over the proposed plat because each of the lots is over one acre in size and each has some access to an existing public road. Consequently, they argue that the lots do not fall within the statutory definition of the term "subdivision" and therefore do not qualify as a subdivision under the ordinance. The plaintiffs claim that the planning board could exercise jurisdiction over the sale of land only if the transaction were to involve a subdivision of property.

However, defendants contend that the property in question does constitute a subdivision within the meaning of the statute requiring provision for a street notwithstanding the fact that access to a street is provided. To do otherwise would result in danger to the safety and welfare of the public, they claim.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that a planning board is vested with the authority over the sale of real estate if the sale constitutes a subdivision within the definition of G.L.1956 (1970 Reenactment) chapter 23 of title 45. Weaver v. United Congregational Church, 120 R.I. 419, 388 A.2d 11 (1978); Taylor v. Marshall, 119 R.I. 171, 376 A.2d 712 (1977); see also Slawson v. Zoning Board of Review of Barrington, 100 R.I. 485, 217 A.2d 92 (1966). In 1977, at the time the action was brought, § 45-23-1 defined the term "subdivision" in relevant part as follows:

"The word 'subdivision,' shall mean the division of a lot, tract, or parcel of land into two (2) or more lots, sites or other divisions of land in such a manner as to require provision for a street, for the purpose, whether immediate or future, of sale or building development.

"It also means the division of a lot, tract or parcel of land into three (3) or more lots, sites or other divisions of land of one (1) acre or less in area for such purpose. It also includes resubdivision and, when appropriate to the context, shall relate to the process of subdividing or to the land subdivided.

"The word 'street' includes street, avenue, highway, boulevard, parkway, road, lane, alley and other ways." ¹

In construing a statute, this court is guided by the oft-repeated canons of statutory construction. When language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is nothing left for interpretation and the statute must be read literally. Citizens for Preservation of Waterman Lake v. Davis, R.I., 420 A.2d 53, 57 (1980); North Providence School Committee v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 122 R.I. 415, 418, 408 A.2d 928, 929 (1979). An examination of the statute at issue here indicates that it is clear and unambiguous and only subjects the sale of real estate to the jurisdiction of the planning board "when access to the newly created parcels would require the construction of a street." Town of Coventry v. Glickman, R.I., 429 A.2d 440, 443 (1981); Taylor v. Marshall, 119 R.I. at 177-78, 376 A.2d at 715; see also Slawson v. Zoning Board of Review of Barrington, 100 R.I. at 492, 217 A.2d at 96. Standing alone, this interpretation would suggest that the proposed plat does not constitute a subdivision within the meaning of § 45-23-1 because the subject lots did have access to a public road.

A statute should not be interpreted literally, however, even though clear and unambiguous, when such a construction will lead to a result at odds with the legislative intent. Carrillo v. Rohrer, R.I., 448 A.2d 1282, 1284 (1982); Kingsley v. Miller, 120 R.I. 372, 376, 388 A.2d 357, 360 (1978). In an attempt to accomplish the purpose for which such acts are passed, we have said that "we will not allow ourselves to be blindly enslaved to the literal reading of statutes when to do so would defeat or frustrate the evident intendment of the legislature." Town of Scituate v. O'Rourke, 103 R.I. 499, 507, 239 A.2d 176, 181 (1968); see also Warren Education Association v. Lapan, 103 R.I. 163, 173, 235 A.2d 866, 872 (1967); Cabral v. Hall, 102 R.I. 320, 325, 230 A.2d 250, 252 (1967).

The Legislature has explicitly stated that the subdivision rules at issue here were intended to empower local governments to promote "the general health, safety, morals...