Suggs v. LaVallee, 137

• Decision Date: 27 January 1978
• Docket Number: No. 137,D,137
• Parties: John SUGGS, Appellee, v. J. Edwin LaVALLEE, Superintendent, Clinton State Correctional Institution, Appellant. ocket 77-2053.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 1092

570 F.2d 1092

John SUGGS, Appellee, v. J. Edwin LaVALLEE, Superintendent, Clinton State

Correctional Institution, Appellant.

No. 137, Docket 77-2053.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued Sept. 2, 1977.

Decided Jan. 27, 1978.

Henry J. Steinglass, Asst. Dist. Atty., New York County, New York City (Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty., New York County, Peter L. Zimroth, Asst. Dist. Atty., New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Judson A. Parson, Jr., New York City (Christopher B. Kende, New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

Before KAUFMAN, Chief Judge, and OAKES and MESKILL, Circuit Judges.

OAKES, Circuit Judge:

This case presents an all too familiar pattern of breakdown of societal, institutional, medical and legal failure adequately to cope with a person. Perhaps inability to solve an insoluble problem is a better description, since the intentions of those attempting to cope psychiatrists, psychologists, correction officers, judges and lawyers have in no case been untoward.

The John Suggses of life begin with an utterly crippling home environment. Early on they exhibit signs of unusual, bizarre and even destructive behavior, often the result of traumatic experiences. Society, with humanitarian motivation, institutionalizes them, ostensibly to protect itself or them, more probably because no alternative exists. The depth of the mental/emotional problem proves too great, the number of Suggses too large, the resources for positive assistance too few. When released into society, criminal behavior is probable, not merely possible. A rape, a robbery, a mugging or worse ensues.

The legal system then assumes jurisdiction over the problem. Somehow the rights of the individual must be protected, while the danger to society is removed. Questions of competency to stand trial and of criminal responsibility arise. The psychiatric experts and the judges who must rule disagree; both psychiatry and law are insufficiently advanced to attain the scientific precision necessary to resolve these questions. Yet decisions have to be made. After a period of years the case is just as insoluble as it was in the beginning.

The posture of John Suggs' case before us may be rather briefly stated. Its history is more complex. Its psychiatric background is extensive. Its resolution is, as one might suspect, hardly free from doubt.

I. POSTURE

The People of the State of New York appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Kevin Thomas Duffy, Judge, vacating Suggs' convictions for rape and robbery and granting a writ of habeas corpus to issue within sixty days unless Suggs is permitted to replead in state court ¹ on the basis that Suggs was never afforded the colloquy on voluntariness mandated by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), at a time when he was competent to stand trial. 430 F.Supp. 877, 884 (S.D.N.Y.1977); 390 F.Supp. 383 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated on other grounds, 523 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1975). The judgment was rendered after an evidentiary hearing in which Judge Duffy found Suggs incompetent at the time of his guilty pleas. 430 F.Supp. 877.

To consider the State's contentions adequately requires a detailed recounting of both the ten years of litigation preceding this appeal and the facts underlying this protracted judicial history. At the risk of some repetition, we first provide a skeletal, chronological summary of the prior state and federal proceedings with the goal of minimizing the confusion wrought by the complex and lengthy record.

After Suggs' arrest, he was psychiatrically examined by Dr. Emanuel Messinger in July, 1968, to aid in determining whether Suggs would be afforded Youthful Offender treatment. This report, which arguably found Suggs competent to stand trial, was lost. Thus, as subsequently revealed, none of the state judges who considered this case was aware of these psychiatric conclusions.

On September 13, 1968, Justice Emilio Nunez of the State Supreme Court, New York County, accepted Suggs' pleas of guilty to one count of rape and one count of robbery after a discussion with Suggs which evidently satisfied the judge of the pleas' voluntariness. As the colloquy continued, however, appellee's unusual responses prompted the court, sua sponte, to order a psychiatric examination. However, the court did not reject or otherwise mention the pleas of guilty accepted immediately preceding the commitment order. The parties differ on whether Justice Nunez ordered the examination solely for purposes of sentencing, or to determine competency as well.

A second group of psychiatric examinations performed by Drs. Martin Lubin and Laszlo Kadar between September 19 and October 21, 1968, at Bellevue Psychiatric Hospital (Bellevue), pursuant to Justice Nunez' order, found Suggs incompetent to stand trial. On the basis of these reports, and without knowledge of the Messinger report, appellee was determined incompetent by Justice Samuel Gold on November 6, 1968, and was committed until competent to Matteawan State Hospital (Matteawan) on November 15, 1968.

When the authorities determined that appellee could stand trial, he was returned to Justice Mitchell Schweitzer, who required a second examination by Dr. Messinger, performed in May, 1969. This report substantially corroborated the earlier Messinger diagnosis and was also misplaced after the proceeding before Justice Schweitzer. Justice Schweitzer then certified Suggs as competent, and sentenced him on June 6, 1969, on the basis of his previous pleas of guilty before Justice Nunez without inquiring into the validity of or factual basis for the earlier pleas. The sentence was imposed after Suggs personally informed the court that while he did not wish to withdraw his previous pleas of guilty, and wished to accept sentence on those pleas, he felt that he had been incompetent when he originally pleaded guilty. A series of state appeals and state collateral attacks followed, which are not particularly important in resolving this appeal.

On February 25, 1975, Judge Duffy granted appellee's petition for a writ of habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing. He concluded that Suggs was denied due process of law because the state courts had never conducted a full and complete inquiry into voluntariness, as required by Boykin v. Alabama, supra, decided four days prior to the sentencing hearing before Justice Schweitzer. The district court first found Suggs incompetent when he entered his pleas of guilty on September 13, 1968, as judicially determined by Justice Gold. Thus the pleas were void under McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), and Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). It then held that the 1969 sentencing by Justice Schweitzer was not a valid substitute for a guilty plea because no Boykin colloquy had been conducted at this later time. 390 F.Supp. 383.

During the pendency of the State's appeal from Judge Duffy's decision, the two Messinger reports were discovered. We vacated Judge Duffy's order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing by either the state court or the district court on Suggs' competence at the time the guilty pleas were entered, in light of the newly discovered Messinger reports which contradicted the Lubin/Kadar reports. We left to Judge Duffy's discretion whether he or the state court would conduct the hearing. United States ex rel. Suggs v. LaVallee, 523 F.2d 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1975).

On remand, Judge Duffy ordered that a factual hearing be held in state court for the convenience of the state judges who would be required to testify. 400 F.Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y.1975). The scope of this reference is in dispute.

A full-blown hearing on Suggs' competency was conducted by Justice Anthony Melia, in the Supreme Court, New York County, on November 17 and December 1, 1975. He found that Suggs was competent when he entered his pleas and that in any case, contrary to Judge Duffy's prior decision, 390 F.Supp. 383, Suggs had ratified the pleas at sentencing. People v. Suggs, Nos. 3063/68, 3063A/68, 2251/68 (N.Y.County Sup.Ct., filed Dec. 3, 1975).

Judge Duffy then set aside Justice Melia's findings and ordered a federal hearing on the issue of competency. 422 F.Supp. 1042 (S.D.N.Y.1976). He again found Suggs incompetent on September 13, 1968, and followed his earlier opinion, 390 F.Supp. 383, granting the writ, 430 F.Supp. 877.

This appeal followed.

The State contends first that Judge Duffy was bound by, or erred in not following, the decision of Justice Melia holding Suggs competent at the time of his guilty plea. The State contends second that, if Suggs was incompetent at the time of his September 13, 1968, plea, he abandoned or waived the incompetency claim at the sentencing proceeding when he was competent and is therefore precluded from raising it in the habeas corpus proceedings under Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). ² Finally, the State argues that appellee ratified the pleas at the time of sentencing by not withdrawing them when given the opportunity. ³

The State does not contend that, if its arguments are insufficient, Judge Duffy's factual findings are clearly erroneous. However, in the course of addressing the State's arguments, which we believe cannot prevail, the validity of the district court's findings and decisions will become manifest. We begin with an in-depth recitation of the facts.

II. HISTORY OF THE CASE

A. Suggs' Preindictment History

1. Early Childhood History.

John Suggs evidently was born in New York in June of 1951, is black and has lived in New York City all of his life. Much of his personal history is unclear in the lengthy but still incomplete record that ten years of legal proceedings have produced. ⁴ The record vividly reveals an unstable home environment, devoid of parental supervision and...