Suggs v. United States
| Decision Date | 30 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil 3:20cv634 (JBA) |
| Parties | JEROME SUGGS, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
RULING DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE
Petitioner Jerome Suggs was sentenced to life in prison under 18 U.S.C § 3559(c) (the Three Strikes Act) after this Court found that his Hobbs Act robbery conviction was a serious violent felony offense and that he had been convicted in the past of at least two additional serious violent felony offenses. He now moves to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), renders the residual clause in § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) unconstitutional, requiring his sentence to be vacated to the extent it relied on the residual clause's definition of “serious violent felony.” (Petition [Doc. # 1]). The Government opposes arguing that Petitioner's sentence remains sound even after Johnson because his conviction and prior offenses fall within one of the alternative definitions of “serious violent felony” laid out in § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i) or (ii), both of which were left untouched by the Supreme Court's ruling.
Petitioner was indicted on one count of Hobbs Act robbery “by demanding money and displaying, brandishing, and discharging a firearm” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 1); one count of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count 2); and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), § 924(a)(2), and § 924(e)(1) (Count 3). (Gov't's Mem. in Opp'n to § 2255 Petition, [Doc. # 5] at 4.) The Government timely filed prior to trial an information pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(4) and 21 U.S.C. § 851 informing Petitioner that Count One and/or Count Two were serious violent felony offenses, and that he would thus be subject to a mandatory life imprisonment sentence based on prior qualifying predicate felony convictions:
(Id. at 5.) Counts 1 and 2 were severed from Count 3 for trial; Petitioner was convicted of Count 1 and 2 by jury verdict on June 14, 2000, and pled guilty to Count 3 on June 20, 2000. (Id. at 4.) Based on the prior felony information filed by the Government, Court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for both Counts One and Two, and thirty years imprisonment on Count Three; both Counts Two and Three were ordered to run consecutively. (Id. at 5.) The Court did not specify at sentencing whether it found that his primary conviction or predicate offenses relied on the definition of serious violent felony offense found in the enumerated offense, elements, or residual clause, and the Presentencing Report was similarly silent on the issue. (See United States v. Suggs, 3:99-cr-00244-JBA, Sentencing Tr. [Doc. # 115]; Pet'r's Mem. in Support of § 2255 Petition, [Doc. # 12] at 4.)
Petitioner filed a direct appeal that primarily challenged the Court's ruling on his pretrial motions, certain jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence that money was stolen during the robbery. (Gov't's Mem. in Opp'n [Doc. # 5] at 5-6.) The Second Circuit rejected each challenge and affirmed the judgment. United States v. Suggs, 14 Fed. App'x. 54, 55-57 (2d Cir. July 5, 2001) (summary order). Following his direct appeal, Petitioner filed three petitions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The first challenged “the § 3559(c) sentencing enhancement imposed based on his prior convictions, the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, a portion of the government's closing argument, and the district court's suppression ruling.” (Gov't's Mem. in Opp'n [Doc. # 5] at 6.) This Court denied the motion, and neither this Court nor the Second Circuit issued a certificate of appealability. (Id.) The Second Circuit also denied authorization to file a second petition seeking to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and challenging the convictions serving as predicates for the sentencing enhancement under § 3559(c), and a third petition, which sought to construe an amended judgment issued to correct a typographical error as a new judgment allowing for the filing of another § 2255 petition without being subject to the successive petition restrictions. (Id. at 7.)
Petitioner filed a § 2255 petition on June 26, 2016, within one year of the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3). (See United States v. Suggs, 3:16-cv-1073, Mem. in Support of Pet. (“2016 Mem.”) [Doc. #1].)[1]At Petitioner's request, proceedings on the petition were stayed pending the Second Circuit's ruling on his motion to authorize a successive petition, which he filed on May 25, 2016. (See 3:16-CV-1073 (JBA), [Doc. # 4].) The Second Circuit in turn stayed its ruling on Petitioner's motion until it decided United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 60 (2d Cir. 2018), and United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2019), both of which addressed whether certain Hobbs Act convictions qualified as crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924. (Gov't's Mem. in Opp'n [Doc. # 5] at 8.) After both were decided, Petitioner filed another motion on February 28, 2019 to stay the proceedings while a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was pending in Barrett, and after a writ had been granted in the related case United States v. Davis. (Id. at 8-9.) On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Barrett to the Second Circuit in light of its decision in Davis. (Id. at 8.) The Second Circuit subsequently issued a new decision in Barrett on August 30, 2019. (Id.) On November 14, 2019, Suggs filed a brief with the Second Circuit in which he focused his arguments on the underlying Connecticut convictions that had served as predicates for his sentence enhancements. (Id. at 9.)
On May 5, 2020, the Second Circuit granted Petitioner's motion for leave to file a successive petition on three grounds:
First, the § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) risk-of-force clause may be unconstitutional after [Johnson, Dimaya, and Davis]. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 751 Fed.Appx. 1026, 1027 (9th Cir. 2019) (vacating denial of § 2255 motion and remanding to district court to reconsider whether § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague after Dimaya). Second, Petitioner's July 28, 1989 convictions identified in the § 3559(c) information likely cannot count as separate predicates. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(B) (providing that the second “violent felony or serious drug offense used as a basis for sentencing” must have been committed after conviction for the first). Third, his 1983 convictions may not satisfy the § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i) enumerated offenses clause or the § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) force-clause definition of “serious violent felony.” See United States v. Barrett, 937 F.3d 126, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2019) (); United States v. Moreno, 821 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2016) ().
Order, Suggs v. United States, No. 16-1671 (2d Cir. May 5, 2020) at 2. Petitioner filed a petition for relief on the above grounds on May 5, 2020. (Petition, [Doc. # 1].) However, on November 20, 2020, Petitioner moved to stay relief pending a ruling on his motion for sentencing relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which this Court granted. (See [Doc. # 19].) On June 28, 2021, the Court granted in part the motion for sentencing relief and reduced Petitioner's life sentence to 260 months, followed by eight years supervised release; his projected release date is now February 16, 2027. (Pet'r's Mem. [Doc. # 12] at 1.) Briefing on the petition concluded on October 14, 2022.
Section 2255 permits collateral challenges to the constitutionality of the imposition of a federal sentence and is the proper vehicle for such challenges. Walton v. Williams, No 3:18-CV-1993 (MPS), 2021 WL 3292650, at *1 (D. Conn. Aug. 2, 2021). Collateral relief under § 2255 is available “only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law or fact that constitutes ‘a fundamental defect which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'” United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir.1995) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). However, even constitutional errors will only serve as the basis for granting a § 2255 petition if they have a “substantial and injurious effect” that resulted in “actual prejudice” to the petitioner. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)[2]; Underwood v. United States, 166 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1999). While...
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