Sugrim v. Sugrim
| Decision Date | 10 February 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-1293,94-1293 |
| Citation | 649 So.2d 936 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D400 Babooram SUGRIM, Appellant, v. Sumattee SUGRIM, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Jose M. Chanfrau, IV of Law Offices of Jose M. Chanfrau, IV, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.
Neva M. Kelaher, Orlando, for appellee.
Babooram Sugrim, husband, appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage.
The parties essentially had three assets: the marital home valued by the parties at approximately $180,000, a small fast food restaurant which the wife was operating at the time of dissolution, and some jewelry which the husband valued at $50,000. In her petition, the wife prayed for temporary and permanent use, possession and ownership of the marital home and for equitable distribution of all the other marital assets, giving due regard for the contribution of both parties. In her pre-trial compliance, the wife specifically requested that the business be awarded to her.
No transcript exists of the final hearing on the dissolution petition. The final judgment awarded the wife sole parental responsibility 1 of the couple's two children and awarded her exclusive possession of the marital home as well as exclusive possession of the family business. The wife was ordered to turn over to the husband the various pieces of jewelry referenced in his pre-trial compliance.
The husband argues that the final judgment is flawed because the trial court failed to equitably distribute the chief assets of the marriage, the marital home and the family business. The wife responds that, in the absence of a transcript, there is no basis to overturn the final judgment of dissolution.
Issues concerning evidentiary sufficiency and the like are not reviewable where no transcript of the trial proceedings or stipulated statement of evidence exists. See, e.g., Walt v. Walt, 596 So.2d 761 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Carter v. Carter, 504 So.2d 418 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). An error which appears on the face of the final judgment, however, is reviewable. See Florida Public Service Commission v. Pruitt, Humphress, Powers & Munroe Advertising Agency, Inc., 587 So.2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The final judgment here awards the wife "sole and exclusive possession of the family business" and "sole and exclusive possession of the marital home."
In Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So.2d 949 (Fla.1980), the supreme court held that an award of exclusive possession of property subject to disposition in a dissolution proceeding is proper where such award is directly connected to the obligation to pay support or is temporarily necessary to prevent reduction in the value of the subject property. 379 So.2d at 952. The court explained:
... The award of "exclusive possession" of property subject to disposition in a dissolution proceeding should either be directly connected to the obligation to pay support or be temporarily necessary to prevent reduction in the value of the subject property. The critical question is whether the award is equitable and just given the nature of the cause. A grant of exclusive possession of property to one of the parties in a final judgment must serve a special purpose. See, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So.2d 1283 (Fla.1979) (); George v. George, 360 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (); Lange v. Lange, 357 So.2d 1035 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (); and Richardson v. Richardson, 315 So.2d 513 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (). In each of these instances, the exclusive possession is actually a facet of support and is clearly warranted because of the equity of the cause. We can foresee the need to grant temporary exclusive possession of a family business in order to ensure income for support and to avoid an immediate substantial reduction in value.
We reject the asserted inflexible rule that an award of exclusive possession of property must be limited to the home, that it benefit only a spouse with minor children, and that it must terminate when all children born of the marriage have attained the age of majority. McDonald v. McDonald.
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An award of exclusive use of property must be determined by the equity of the cause and should be for a specified period. It is always subject to modification whenever there...
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Musgrave v. Musgrave
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