Suits v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America
| Decision Date | 01 February 1918 |
| Docket Number | 20,677 |
| Citation | 166 N.W. 222,139 Minn. 246 |
| Parties | CARRIE E. SUITS v. ORDER OF UNITED COMMERCIAL TRAVELERS OF AMERICA |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Lyon county to recover $6,300 upon an accident insurance policy. The answer alleged that at the time of the death of plaintiff's husband and long prior thereto he had failed to pay his dues and was not a member of defendant in good standing. The case was tried before Olsen J., who made findings and ordered judgment in favor of plaintiff. From an order denying its motion for amended findings or a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Mailing and receipt of letter -- finding sustained.
1. The trial court did not err, upon the evidence stated in the opinion, in finding that a letter offered in evidence by defendant was not mailed to or received by the person to whom it was addressed.
Mailing and receipt of letter -- when presumption of receipt applies.
2. The presumption that a properly mailed letter will in the due course of mail reach the person to whom it is addressed has application only where the act of mailing is unquestioned or conclusively shown.
Benefit insurance -- delayed payments -- waiver of by-law.
3. The practice and custom of defendant, an accident benefit insurance association, in permitting and receiving from its members the payment of dues and assessments after the due date thereof, held, following Mueller v. Grand Grove U.A.O.D. 69 Minn. 236, not only a waiver of the failure to pay within the time fixed by the laws of the order, but also a waiver of the by-laws declaring a forfeiture for the default and an estoppel to invoke the same in an action on the contract.
Benefit insurance -- reinstatement of suspended member -- by-law inapplicable.
4. The provisions of the laws of the association limiting its liability, where a suspended member has been restored or reinstated to good standing, to injuries thereafter suffered have no application where no suspension was declared, or where a suspension, occurring automatically by reason of the default, has been waived by the association.
Kerr, Fowler, Schmitt & Furber, for appellant.
Robinson & English, for respondent.
Action to recover upon an accident insurance policy in which plaintiff had judgment, and defendant appealed from an order denying its motion for an amendment of the findings of the trial court or a new trial.
Defendant is a mutual benefit accident insurance association organized under the laws of the state of Ohio, and, through local or subordinate councils, conducting its insurance business on the assessment plan in that and other states including South Dakota and Minnesota. The company possesses and exercises the power and authority usually granted by law to like associations. Its insurance contracts are formed through the local councils where applicants are received into membership in the association, subject to the laws, rules and regulations imposed by the grand council. Its revenues are derived wholly from dues and assessments levied upon the members and these are collected through the administrative officers of the local councils.
It appears without dispute that David M. Suits was received into the association and became a member of Local Council No. 111, located at Huron, South Dakota, on May 28, 1900. The usual certificate of membership was issued to him, and defendant thereby became obligated, in the event the insured lost his life solely by accidental means, to pay the beneficiary therein named, plaintiff herein, who was his wife, the sum of $6,300. On March 28, 1915, the insured lost his life by accidental means, and thereby defendant became liable for the full amount of the policy, unless the membership of insured and all rights under the contract were, prior to the accident, terminated and forfeited by his failure to pay an assessment and certain dues which fell due about a month prior to his death. The dues and assessment so in default were due on February 24, preceding the death, and the failure to pay the same is not questioned, and defendant by its answer interposed the default in defense to the action. Plaintiff in reply alleged a waiver of the default by a practice and custom of defendant during the preceding years of accepting and receiving dues and assessments from members, including decedent, at irregular periods after the due date thereof and not insisting upon a forfeiture as declared by the laws of the order. The trial court found that defendant waived the default and was estopped to insist upon a forfeiture, and judgment was ordered for plaintiff.
The assignments of error present two questions, namely: (1) Whether the court erred in denying defendant's motion for amended findings; and (2) whether there was a waiver of the forfeiture resulting from the failure to pay the dues and assessments referred to at or prior to the due date thereof.
1. It appears without substantial dispute that for several years prior to July, 1914, it had been the custom and practice of the association, acting through the local council of which decedent was a member, to overlook defaults in the payment of assessments and dues, and to accept and receive them at irregular periods of delinquency, without any attempt to enforce the by-laws declaring a forfeiture. The custom was recognized as detrimental to the best interests of the association and an attempt was made in July, 1914, to bring it to an end. With that purpose in view the local council of which decedent was a member formally ordered and directed the secretary thereof to notify all members that in the future the constitution and laws of the order must be complied with, payments of dues and assessments made within the time thereby required, in default of which the delinquent members would be suspended, and rights under the insurance contract forfeited as by such laws provided. In compliance with that order the secretary prepared a circular letter, stating therein that by order of the council the "practice of the secretary, in carrying members who had not remitted for their dues and assessments, must be discontinued," and that in the future the laws would be enforced and suspensions ordered when not complied with by the members.
It is contended by defendant that this letter was mailed to and received by each member of the local council, including decedent, and that it effectually terminated the practice of overlooking defaults, and fully restored the operation of the laws requiring a punctual payment of dues and assessments. It may be conceded that if the letter reached decedent it terminated the objectionable practice and restored the effectiveness of the laws of the order. But the court found that the letter was not mailed to or received by decedent. If the finding is sustained there is an end of this branch of the case, and there was no error in the refusal to amend or change the finding on defendant's motion.
The cause...
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