Suits v. State

Decision Date11 April 2006
Docket NumberNo. 31444.,31444.
Citation139 P.3d 762,143 Idaho 160
PartiesCharles Wesley SUITS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals

Andrew Parnes, Ketchum, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Ralph R. Blount, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Ralph R. Blount argued.

PERRY, Chief Judge.

Charles Wesley Suits appeals from the district court's order denying his application for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE

Suits was an osteopathic physician. After a friend of Suits's was accused of violating her probation, the friend informed police that she and Suits used methamphetamine together and that Suits provided her with prescriptions for Vicodin, which she sold on the street. The friend agreed to assist police in apprehending Suits in exchange for leniency regarding her probation violation. In December 1998, the friend arranged for Suits to provide a Vicodin prescription to an undercover officer in exchange for methamphetamine. In the parking lot of the hospital where Suits worked, Suits gave a Vicodin prescription to the undercover officer and the officer gave Suits a baggie containing methamphetamine. Suits was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance.

At trial, the state introduced audio recordings of conversations between Suits, his friend, and the undercover officer. Suits asserted that those recordings had been altered to make it appear like he had committed a crime when he had not. Suits contended that he wrote a prescription to the undercover officer for the purpose of medical treatment and was unaware that the officer had given him methamphetamine. A jury found Suits guilty. The district court sentenced Suits to a unified term of three years, with a minimum period of confinement of eighteen months. The district court suspended the sentence and placed Suits on probation for three years. In 2002, this Court affirmed Suits's judgment of conviction in an unpublished opinion. State v. Suits, Docket No. 26663, 138 Idaho 125, 58 P.3d 109 (Ct.App.2002).

In June 2003, Suits filed an application for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Suits contended that counsel erroneously advised him that, in order to utilize an entrapment defense, he would have to admit possessing methamphetamine. At Suits's trial, two attorneys represented him. At the time of the evidentiary hearing held on Suits's application for post-conviction relief, the attorney who had acted as lead trial counsel was deceased. The second attorney, Suits, and an attorney with whom Suits consulted prior to trial testified at the evidentiary hearing. The district court concluded that Suits's defense counsel did not unreasonably interpret the law of entrapment. The district court also found Suits's conspiracy defense was inconsistent with a defense of entrapment and, thus, Suits failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice from trial counsel's failure to request an entrapment jury instruction. The district court therefore denied Suit's application for post-conviction relief. Suits appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In order to prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the applicant must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 801 P.2d 1216 (1990). When reviewing a decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, an appellate court will not disturb the lower court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 794 P.2d 654 (Ct.App.1990). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440 (Ct.App.1988). We exercise free review of the district court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct.App.1992).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct.App.1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct.App.1995); Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656; Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct.App.1989). To establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell, 118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 231, 233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct.App.1994).

III. ANALYSIS

Suits contends that his trial counsel erroneously concluded Suits was required to admit committing the elements of possession of methamphetamine, including that he knew he possessed the methamphetamine, as a prerequisite to claiming that he was entrapped. Suits urges that counsel's erroneous conclusion led them to perform incompetently by failing to request an entrapment jury instruction. Suits also contends that he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's deficient performance because the evidence at trial supported a defense of entrapment and, thus, had the jury been instructed on the law of entrapment there was a reasonable possibility Suits would have been found not guilty.

A defendant cannot be convicted of a crime he or she was entrapped into committing. State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 391, 924 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Ct.App.1996); State v. Mata, 106 Idaho 184, 186, 677 P.2d 497, 499 (Ct.App.1984). Historically, under the subjective test, the entrapment defense has been grounded upon the principle that, where criminal intent is an element of an offense, such intent must originate in the defendant's mind. Mata, 106 Idaho at 186, 677 P.2d at 499. Thus, entrapment occurs when an otherwise innocent person, not inclined to commit a criminal offense, is induced to do so by a state agent who, desiring grounds for prosecution, originates the criminal design and implants in the mind of the innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense. Canelo, 129 Idaho at 391, 924 P.2d at 1235; State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 519, 887 P.2d 57, 64 (Ct.App.1994). There is a distinction however, between originating the idea to commit the crime and merely furnishing the opportunity to commit it. Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 519, 887 P.2d at 64; Mata, 106 Idaho at 186, 677 P.2d at 499. Furnishing the opportunity is not entrapment but, rather, a legitimate means to ferret out crime. Canelo, 129 Idaho at 392, 924 P.2d at 1236; Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 519, 887 P.2d at 64; Mata, 106 Idaho at 186, 677 P.2d at 499.

Although it was once generally accepted that a defendant who denied perpetrating a crime could not alternatively rely on the subjective entrapment defense, that approach has eroded over time. State v. Buendia, 121 N.M. 408, 912 P.2d 284, 287 (Ct.App.1996). The United States Supreme Court held that, even if a federal criminal defendant denies one or more elements of the crime, he or she is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988). Some courts have reasoned that it is not necessarily inconsistent to introduce evidence showing the defendant did not commit the unlawful acts or did not commit them with the requisite unlawful intent, in addition to evidence that he or she lacked criminal predisposition and that there was inordinate government inducement. See Strong v. State, 591 N.E.2d 1048, 1051-52 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992); Buendia, 912 P.2d at 289. Thus, in line with Mathews, many state courts have concluded that, if a defendant disputes the particulars of the crime or having the requisite intent, he or she is not precluded from presenting an entrapment instruction to the jury. Buendia, 912 P.2d at 288; see also State v. Rokos, 771 So.2d 47, 48-49 (Fla.Dist. Ct.App.2000); Strong, 591 N.E.2d at 1051-52; Commonwealth v. Tracey, 416 Mass. 528, 624 N.E.2d 84, 88 (1993); Hopson v. State, 625 So.2d 395, 399-400 (Miss.1993).

Nevertheless, the Mathews decision did not rest on constitutional grounds and is not binding on the states. State v. Soule, 168 Ariz. 134, 811 P.2d 1071, 1072 (1991); Buendia, 912 P.2d at 288. Courts have commented that it is both factually and legally inconsistent for a defendant to deny committing the offense and then to assert as a defense that he or she committed the offense, but only because of incitement or inducement by authorities. See St. Jean v. State, 255 Ga.App. 129, 564 S.E.2d 534, 536 (2002); People v. Arndt, 351 Ill.App.3d 505, 286 Ill.Dec. 754, 814 N.E.2d 980, 990 (2004). Further, to allow inconsistent defenses can foster perjury and confuse the jury. Soule, 811 P.2d at 1073. Accordingly, some courts have rejected Mathews and continue to require that a defendant admit committing the offense with which he or she is charged before being permitted...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • Oliver v. State
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • 9 Noviembre 2011
    ...design and implants in the mind of the innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense." Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 162, 139 P.3d 762, 764 (Ct. App. 2006). See also State v. Canelo, 129 Idaho 386, 391, 924 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 519......
  • Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd.
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • 17 Agosto 2006
    ...different labels to distinguish a third party sale from a redemption on maturity because, as noted above, for the security's recipient [139 P.3d 762] the transactions have different consequences. From the perspective of the taxpayer/investor, however, they are identical; hence, from the per......
  • Maschek v. State
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • 11 Octubre 2012
    ...fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 760, 760 P.2d at 1176; Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 162, 139 P.3d 762, 764 (Ct. App. 2006). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance,......
  • Baker v. State
    • United States
    • Idaho Court of Appeals
    • 17 Abril 2015
    ...there is a strong presumption that he or she did so for tactical reasons other than through sheer neglect.' Suits v. State, 143 Idaho 160, 164, 139 P.3d 762, 766 (Ct. App. 2006)." Baker does not carry his burden of overcoming that presumption here. Accordingly, the district court did not er......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT