Sullings v. Ginn
| Decision Date | 31 October 1881 |
| Citation | 131 Mass. 479 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | John W. Sullings & others v. David R. Ginn |
Bristol. Contract upon an account annexed for goods sold and delivered. Trial in the Superior Court, before Rockwell, J., who allowed a bill of exceptions, in substance as follows:
The defendant, on his own petition, was duly adjudged insolvent by the Court of Insolvency for the county of Barnstable, on June 28, 1880; and he moved that this action be continued to await said insolvency proceedings, and the granting or refusal of his discharge therein.
The writ showed that an attachment of certain real estate of the defendant had been made on December 22, 1879; and the plaintiffs contended that they could have, and moved for, a special judgment against the property attached, because the attachment was made more than four months prior to the first publication of notice of the issuing of the warrant. The judge thereupon ordered such special judgment to be entered for the plaintiff, and further ordered a default to be entered.
The defendant contended that the St. of 1880, c. 246, § 7, did not apply to this case, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a special judgment or a default; and alleged exceptions to the orders of the judge.
Exceptions overruled.
J. Brown, for the defendant.
C. T. Bonney, for the plaintiffs, was not called upon.
OPINION
Both points in this case are governed by previous decisions. The assignment in insolvency, having been executed since the St. of 1880, c. 246, § 7, took effect, is controlled by its provisions, and does not dissolve an attachment made more than four months before the commencement of the proceedings. O' Neil v. Harrington, 129 Mass. 591. The insolvent law of the Commonwealth, differing in this respect from the recent bankrupt act of the United States, leaves the question whether a continuance shall be granted, so as to enable the debtor to obtain and plead a certificate of discharge, to the discretion of the court in which the action is pending. Barker v. Haskell, 9 Cush. 218.
Exceptions overruled.
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Noble v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co.
...of a continuance is for the presiding judge alone. Pickering v. Reynolds, 111 Mass. 83;Kittredge v. Russell, 114 Mass. 67;Sullings v. Ginn, 131 Mass. 479;Soper v. Manning, 158 Mass. 381, 33 N. E. 516. There is nothing in the case at bar to indicate abuse of discretion or arbitrariness in re......
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Noble v. Mead-morrison Manufacturing Co.
... ... a continuance is for the presiding judge alone. Pickering ... v. Reynolds, 111 Mass. 83 ... Kittredge v ... Russell, 114 Mass. 67 ... Sullings v. Ginn, 131 ... Mass. 479 ... Soper v. Manning, 158 Mass. 381 ... There ... is nothing in the case at bar to indicate abuse of discretion ... or ... ...
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American Woodworking MaChinery Co. v. Forbush
... ... In this respect the case differs from ... Dalton-Ingersoll Co. v. Fiske, 175 Mass. 15, 55 N.E ... 468, relied on by the plaintiff. See Sullings v ... Ginn, 131 Mass. 479. It also differs from that case in ... another important particular. Something had intervened ... between the default ... ...