Sullins v. State Bar

Decision Date01 December 1975
Citation125 Cal.Rptr. 471,542 P.2d 631,15 Cal.3d 609
Parties, 542 P.2d 631 Paul Goodsell SULLINS, Petitioner, v. The STATE BAR of California, Respondent. L.A. 30419.
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court

Paul Goodsell Sullins, in pro per.

Herbert M. Rosenthal and Arthur L. Margolis, San Francisco, for respondent.

BY THE COURT

This is a proceeding to review a recommendation of the Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of California that petitioner be publicly reproved. Petitioner presently is 69 years old, was admitted to practice in California in April 1953, and has no prior record of discipline in California or in Illinois, where he practised law from 1930 to 1953.

In disciplinary board's recommendation is based on findings by a local administrative committee of the State Bar that petitioner deliberately misled the Los Angeles County Superior Court by concealing the existence of a letter pertinent to a request by petitioner before the court. In the language of the disciplinary board's findings: 'In failing to disclose to the Court the existence or content of the Fick letter, Respondent intended to and willfully (sic) did in fact mislead the Court in connection with the Court's determination of Respondent's petition for approval of a fifty percent contingency fee with reference to Civil Action No. NEC 2141. In concealing these matters from the Court, Respondent withheld from the Court material facts bearing upon issues which were before the Court for decision.'

The local administrative committee concluded that '(petitioner) violated his oath and duties as an attorney and counselor at law within the meaning of Section 6103 . . . of the Business and Professions Code 1 . . .; (he) wilfully violated Section 6128 . . . of the Business and Professions Code 2 . . .'; and '(he) committed acts involving moral turpitude and dishonesty within the meaning of Section 6106 . . . of the Business and Professions Code 3 . . ..' The local administrative committee then recommended that petitioner be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 90 days. The disciplinary board resolved merely to publicly reprove the petitioner, however, by a vote of eight to five. 4

This case springs from a series of actions involving the residence of Mrs. Elizabeth Weber. On March 20, 1957, Mrs. Weber allegedly conveyed her Pasadena home (hereinafter 'Brent Avenue Property') to herself and her sole surviving child, Mrs. Gladys Betty Heitz, by a joint tenancy grant deed. The Brent Avenue Property, valued at about $20,000, was Mrs. Weber's only substantial asset.

On May 20, 1963, Mrs. Weber, by then 74 years old and in a hospital recuperating from a stroke, signed a request that Reverend Thomas A. Williams be appointed temporary conservator for her. Mrs. Heitz, who herself desired to act as her mother's conservator, contested the proposed appointment of Williams. On September 6, 1963, the matter of the conservatorship of Elizabeth Weber received a hearing in Los Angeles Superior Court; petitioner Sullins represented Williams. Following the hearing, the superior court appointed Mr. Williams permanent conservator. The court also questioned the effectiveness of the 1957 joint tenancy grant deed, on the grounds that it never had been delivered. 5

On these grounds Mrs. Weber, through her conservator Williams, on November 5, 1963 filed the civil action No. NEC 2141 (hereinafter referred to as the 'civil action') against Mrs. Heitz, seeking to set aside and cancel the purported March 1957 conveyance of the Brent Avenue property. Petitioner represented the conservator in this civil action, which on December 20, 1963, resulted in a default judgment against Mrs. Heitz. On April 28, 1964, however, through the efforts of Mr. David Daar, her new counsel, Mrs. Heitz succeeded in having this default judgment set aside, and in securing permission to file an answer to the civil action complaint.

Mrs. Weber died on January 8, 1964, leaving a will dated September 19, 1963, drafted by petitioner. The will named Mrs. Weber's nephew Bradford Fick as sole beneficiary of her estate, specifically disinherited Mrs. Weber's daughter, and contained a no contest clause 6 which forms the basis for one of petitioner's contentions. The will was admitted to probate; the court named Williams (whose conservatorship had terminated with Mrs. Weber's death) executor; petitioner continued to represent Williams. The court also substituted Williams as plaintiff in the civil action, in place of the deceased Mrs. Weber. Except for the possibility of obtaining the Brent Avenue property through success of the civil action, the assets of the estate were no more than about $350, less than the unpaid debts (funeral expenses, etc.).

Mrs. Heitz, represented by Daar, contested the will in a petition filed on April 30, 1964, alleging (inter alia) that at the time Mrs. Weber executed the will she had been imcompetent and unduly influenced by Williams. Petitioner Sullins represented the estate in this will contest action. In addition, on or about June 4, 1964, pursuant to his duties as attorney for the executor, petitioner wrote to Mrs. Weber's nephew Bradford Fick, then age 56 and living in Chicago, Illinois, informing him of Mrs. Weber's will and the status of the estate. 7

Mr. Fick replied promptly in a notarized letter dated June 9, 1964, stating that he wished Mrs. Heitz to have all property under Mrs. Weber's will, and that he did not wish Mrs. Heitz to contest the will; the letter also asked petitioner to send Fick for signature any papers needed to carry out Fick's wishes. 8 Petitioner's treatment of this letter from Fick is the main basis of the disciplinary board's findings against petitioner, portions of which findings were quoted above.

In particular, petitioner admits: that he did not reply to this letter of Fick's or otherwise acknowledge its receipt; that he made no effort to inform Mrs. Heitz of its contents; and that he never disclosed the letter's receipt or contents to the superior court, which in June 1964 had before it the civil action to set aside the 1957 conveyance, the probate of the Weber estate, and Mrs. Heitz's contest of her mother's will. On September 18, 1967, moreover, still without disclosing Fick's letter, petitioner sought and secured from the court approval of a 50 percent contingency fee agreement for petitioner's legal services pending in the civil action, explaining that a prior court approved 33 1/3 percent contingency fee agreement was inadequate because the civil action had been and would continue to be fiercely contested. 9

Shortly before the civil acton was scheduled for trial, Fick came to Los Angeles at Daar's request 10 and testified at two depositions, in August and September 1968. His testimony revealed his 1964 exchange of correspondence with petitioner, affirmed that before Daar contacted him in 1968 Fick had never communicated with Mrs. Heitz or Mr. Daar concerning matters connected with Mrs. Weber's will, and reaffirmed Fick's intention to assign his interest in the estate to Mrs. Heitz; indeed Fick executed such an assignment on August 12, 1968.

Alluding to Fick's testimony, Mrs. Heitz petitioned the superior court for removal of the administrator of the estate 11 and his attorney (petitioner Sullins). After a full hearing, the court on April 23, 1969, ordered the requested removal, and directed the public administrator to administer the estate. The court found that the administrator and petitioner Sullins had '. . . committed a fraud upon the Court, and the Estate . . .' when they presented the new agreement for attorney fees to the court without disclosing the existence of the letter or Fick's intention to make Mrs. Heitz the assignee of his interest in the estate. The court also found, 'That neither petitioner Gladys Betty Heitz or her attorney learned that Bradford Fick had renounced all interest he had in the Estate in favor of Gladys Betty Heitz until during the month of July of 1968.' The Court of Appeal affirmed the removal order in an unpublished opinion filed April 23, 1970. Petitioner Sullins did not request a rehearing, nor did he petition for a hearing from us. 12

The disciplinary board's recommendation rests on the above recital of facts. Petitioner's numerous lengthy contentions in opposition to the recommendation may be consolidated and summarized as follows: (1) The local administrative committee and the disciplinary board permitted procedural irregularities which denied petitioner due process; in particular, the local administrative committee made findings, adopted by the disciplinary board, which involved matters not included in the State Bar's notice to show cause, as amended. (2) Mrs. Heitz's attorney David Daar had himself concealed from the court the existence of Fick's letter, which Daar had acquired shortly after it was written on June 9, 1964. (3) The no contest clause in the will implied that Fick forfeited his interest in the estate when he wrote petitioner offering to sign his interest over to Mrs. Heitz; alternatively, accepting his inheritance under the will estopped Fick from assigning his interest to Mrs. Heitz and thereby defeating Mrs. Weber's express disinheritance of her daughter. (4) Petitioner's duty to the creditors of Mrs. Weber's estate required him to press the civil action to cancel the deed, irrespective of Fick's intention to assign his interest in the estate to Mrs. Heitz; indeed, to avoid prejudicing this duty to the creditors, petitioner had to keep Fick's letter off the court records. These contentions will be examined Seriatim.

Our standards of review of State Bar disciplinary recommendations are well established. In determining the appropriate discipline for an attorney's misconduct, this court independently appraises the evidence and makes its own evaluation, recognizing that the disciplinary board's findings and recommendations,...

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