Sullivan v. City of N.Y.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | 14-CV-1334 (JMF) |
| Parties | SEAN SULLIVAN, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Sean Sullivan brings suit against several defendants pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983 and New York State law. This Opinion and Order addresses Plaintiff's claims against two of those defendants: the New York City Criminal Justice Agency ("CJA") and one of its employees, Jane Doe # 1 ("Jane Doe" and, together with the CJA, the "CJA Defendants"), for alleged violations of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and for negligence and failure to train and supervise under New York State law. On March 19, 2015, the Court dismissed those claims pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after Plaintiff gave every indication that he had abandoned them. (Docket No. 84). On April 1, 2015, however, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's Order of Dismissal. (Docket No. 91). By Order entered June 12, 2015, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reasons to be stated "in an opinion to be filed in due course." (Docket No. 107). This is that opinion.
The background relevant to Plaintiff's motion can be stated briefly. Because the issues before the Court stem from the CJA Defendants' motion to dismiss, the facts are taken from Plaintiff's operative complaint and assumed to be true. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Hasty, 651 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir. 2011). Plaintiff is an "unemployed attorney" who resides in the Southern District of New York. . On November 28, 2012, Plaintiff was arrested outside the apartment of his then-wife, from whom he was estranged, by a group of police officers who are also defendants in this case. (SAC ¶ 26). He was then taken to the local police station where he was "compelled" to sit for an interview with Jane Doe, a CJA employee. (SAC ¶¶ 29-30). The CJA is a non-profit organization that conducts bail interviews and makes recommendations regarding bail under a contract with New York City, see New York Criminal Justice Agency Inc., 2013 Annual Report 4, available at http://issuu.com/csdesignworks/docs/annualreport13?e=2550004/10499680#search ("CJA 2013 Annual Report").1 The following day, while he was apparently still in custody and after a court-appointed attorney had been assigned to him, Plaintiff was "compelled" to sit for a second interview with Jane Doe; his newly appointed attorney did not participate in the interview. (SAC ¶ 30). Following the interview, Plaintiff appeared at a bail hearing at which he "was not recommended for release on his own recognizances by the . . . CJA" (although it is not clearfrom the face of the SAC what, if anything, the CJA recommended). (SAC ¶ 30). The judge presiding over the bail hearing apparently felt "compelled" not to release Plaintiff on his own recognizances in the absence of such recommendation by the CJA. The judge ultimately required Plaintiff to post $750 bail before being released. (SAC ¶ 30). Plaintiff lacked the financial resources to make this payment and therefore did not post bail. (SAC ¶ 30).
On February 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed suit against the CJA Defendants and the City of New York (the "City"), the Warden of the New York City Police Department, the Warden of Rikers Island Correction Facility, as well as several individual members of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD"), the New York City Department of Corrections, and the Kings County District Attorney's Office, alleging, among other things, violations of his rights under the U.S. Constitution, the New York State Constitution, and New York law. (Docket No. 2). On April 11, 2014, the Court sua sponte dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the CJA Defendants on the ground that they were non-suable agencies of the City . (Docket No. 6). Plaintiff then filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision, which the Court granted, "if only out of an abundance of caution and without prejudice to the CJA Defendants filing a motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 17, at 3). The CJA Defendants filed such a motion on January 12, 2015 (after an earlier motion was denied as moot based on Plaintiff's amendment of his complaint), and the Court issued an order setting February 12, 2015, as the deadline for Plaintiff's opposition. (Docket No. 62). On February 20, 2015, eight days after Plaintiff's opposition had been due, the CJA Defendants filed a letter requesting that their motion be deemed unopposed. (Docket No. 64). Three days later, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause in writing by March 9, 2015, why his motion should not be deemed unopposed. (Docket No. 65). The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that "[f]ailure to show such good cause or otherwise indicate an intention toproceed with his claims against the New York City Criminal Justice Agency and Jane Doe will result in Defendants' motion being deemed unopposed and may result in dismissal of the claims against those Defendants for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." (Docket No. 65 (emphasis added)). Plaintiff did not respond to the CJA Defendants' letter or to the Court's order to show cause. Significantly, however, he continued to actively litigate the case with respect to the other Defendants. For example, on March 16, 2015, he filed a motion for expanded discovery and an affirmation in support of that motion. (Docket Nos. 80-81).
Three days later, on March 19, 2015, the Court dismissed the claims against the CJA Defendants by Order of Dismissal. (Docket No. 84). The operative paragraph of the Court's Order stated as follows:
Upon review of Defendants' motion papers, the motion is GRANTED and all claims against Jane Doe #1 and CJA are dismissed, both for failure to prosecute and substantially for the reasons stated in Defendants' memorandum of law. (Docket No. 60). Among other things, Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claims fail because the right to counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment does not attach until "the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment," Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), and Plaintiff's interview with Jane Doe #1 took place prior to that point. (See Second Am. Compl. (Docket No. 55) ¶¶ 29-31). Next, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims fail because, among other things, he has not pleaded facts alleging the personal involvement of Jane Doe #1 in setting Plaintiff's bail or facts suggesting that CJA has a policy or practice of recommending, let alone imposing, excessive bail. See, e.g., Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013); Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, (1978)). Finally, Plaintiff's state law claims for negligent training and supervision fail because, among other things, Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts suggesting that CJA "knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct which caused the injury." S.C. v. NYC Dept. of Educ., 949 N.Y.S. 2d 71, 71 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
(Id. (emphasis added)). The Court also declined to grant leave to amend the complaint sua sponte, noting that amendment would be futile and that while Plaintiff had previously been granted leave to amend he given no indication that he was in possession of facts that would cure the problems identified in the motion to dismiss. (Id.). This motion followed.2
Motions for reconsideration are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3, which are meant to "ensure the finality of decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost motion with additional matters." Medisim Ltd. v. BestMed LLC, No. 10-CV-2463 (SAS), 2012 WL 1450420, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court "has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion [for reconsideration]." Baker v. Dorfman, 239 F.3d 415, 427 (2d Cir. 2000). Such a motion "is appropriate where 'the moving party can point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked — matters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court.'" Medisim, 2012 WL 1450420, at *1 (quoting In re BDC 56 LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2003)). "'The major grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening change in controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.'" Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 820 F. Supp. 2d 558, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992)).
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must accept all facts set forth in the complaint as true and draw all reasonableinferences in the plaintiff's favor. See, e.g., Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam). Significantly, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that a court should not accept as true non-factual matter or "conclusory statements" set forth in a complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009). Instead, a court must follow a two-step approach in assessing the sufficiency of a complaint in the face of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See id. at 680-81. First, the court must distinguish between facts, on the one hand, and "mere conclusory statements" or legal conclusions on the other hand; the latter are...
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