Sullivan v. Estate of Maddox

• Decision Date: 30 July 2019
• Docket Number: NO. 2017-CA-00418-COA,CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2011-CT-00820-COA,2017-CA-00418-COA
• Citation: 283 So.3d 222
• Parties: Dempsey SULLIVAN, Billie Joyce Sullivan, and Terrell Stubbs, Individually, Appellants/Cross-Appellees v. Estate of Samuel MADDOX, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

283 So.3d 222

Dempsey SULLIVAN, Billie Joyce Sullivan, and Terrell Stubbs, Individually, Appellants/Cross-Appellees

v.Estate of Samuel MADDOX, Appellee/Cross-Appellant

NO. 2017-CA-00418-COA

CONSOLIDATED WITH NO. 2011-CT-00820-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

July 30, 2019

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: W. TERRELL STUBBS, JAMES LAWTON ROBERTSON, JACKSON

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: JAMES BURVON SYKES III, JACKSON, L. WESLEY BROADHEAD, MENDENHALL

EN BANC.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Dempsey Sullivan and Billie Joyce Sullivan (collectively, the Sullivans)¹ filed a complaint in 2010 seeking an injunction to prohibit their neighbors Steve Maddox and Samuel Maddox² (collectively, the Maddoxes) from entering their property in Simpson County. The Maddoxes filed a counterclaim asserting that they possessed an easement across the Sullivans' property. During the course of litigation, the chancellor entered an order dismissing the Sullivans' complaint for an injunction with prejudice and issuing sanctions against their attorney, Terrell Stubbs. The chancellor appointed a special master to determine the issue of the easement. The special master submitted a report, finding that the Maddoxes did not possess a valid easement over the Sullivans' property and recommending that the chancellor dismiss the Maddoxes' counterclaim with prejudice.

¶2. The chancellor ultimately entered a final judgment that, among other things, ratified and adopted the special master's report, dismissed the Maddoxes' counterclaim with prejudice after finding that no easement existed, affirmed and ratified all prior orders and judgments filed in the matter, and assessed the costs of the special master to the Maddoxes.

¶3. The Sullivans now appeal, asserting the following assignments of error: (1) they did not receive proper notice when the chancellor dismissed their complaint with prejudice; (2) the chancellor erred in dismissing their complaint on the merits; (3) the chancellor erred in awarding sanctions; (4) the Estate of Samuel Maddox was improperly substituted as a party for Samuel Maddox; and (5) the chancellor erred by ratifying and affirming all prior orders of the chancery court. The Maddoxes filed a cross-appeal, arguing that the chancellor erred in holding that the Maddoxes did not have an easement of record or an easement by implication across the Sullivans' property.

¶4. After our review, we affirm the following: the chancellor's dismissal of the Sullivans' complaint with prejudice; the chancellor's award of sanctions; the chancellor's judgment ratifying and affirming all prior orders of the chancery court; the chancellor's order substituting the Estate of Samuel Maddox as a party; and the chancellor's judgment finding that the Maddoxes did not have an easement of record or an easement by implication across the Sullivans' property. However, we reverse the chancellor's award of attorney's fees and expenses to the Maddoxes, which the chancellor issued as sanctions against Stubbs, and we remand this issue to the chancellor with instructions to: (1) dismiss the present action without prejudice as to Steve Maddox pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 25(a)(1) and (2) then reassess the distribution of the award of attorney's fees to the remaining party.

FACTS³

¶5. On March 30, 2010, the Sullivans filed a complaint in Simpson County Chancery Court requesting injunctive relief to prohibit the Maddoxes from entering the Sullivans' property.⁴ In their complaint, the Sullivans claimed that the Maddoxes wrongfully entered onto their property without the Sullivans' consent under the pretense of an alleged easement. The Sullivans attached the disputed easement to their complaint and asserted that the easement was not valid or enforceable. The Sullivans also requested that the chancellor set a hearing date with the time and place for a hearing to award a permanent restraining order or permanent injunction to prohibit the Maddoxes from entering their property.

¶6. On April 6, 2010, the Maddoxes filed their answer denying the essential allegations of the complaint. The Maddoxes also filed a counterclaim arguing that they possessed an easement and asking the chancellor to enjoin the Sullivans from interfering with their use of the easement. The Maddoxes also alleged several intentional torts and demanded damages from the Sullivans.

¶7. On April 16, 2010, the chancellor entered an agreed order that stated, among other things, that "[t]he parties have agreed that the [Maddoxes] will stay off [the Sullivans'] property for a period of [forty-five] days and should this matter not be resolved within [forty-five] days, this matter shall be brought back before this [c]ourt for further action."

¶8. On February 22, 2011, the chancellor held a conference and set Sullivan I for trial on May 3, 2011, and Sullivan II for trial on May 4, 2011.

¶9. On April 12, 2011, the Sullivans filed motions for recusal of the chancellor, Judge David Shoemake, in both Sullivan I and Sullivan II. In both motions, the Sullivans claimed "it has recently been brought to the undersigned's attention[ ] that Wesley Broadhead, attorney for the [Maddoxes], is currently representing Mike Stuckey, the husband of this [c]ourt's [a]dministrator, on a proceeding on appeal" in the Simpson County Circuit Court. The Sullivans asserted that based on this claim, the chancellor should recuse himself from Sullivan I and Sullivan II "in order to avoid even an appearance of impartiality or impropriety." The Maddoxes filed motions to consolidate the hearings on the motions to recuse filed in Sullivan I and II .

¶10. On May 3, 2011, the chancellor entered an order consolidating the hearings in regard to the Sullivans' motions to recuse. That same day, the chancellor entered its order denying Sullivan's motions to recuse in Sullivan I and Sullivan II . The next morning, prior to the commencement of the Sullivan II trial, the Sullivans renewed the motions to recuse, which the chancellor denied.

¶11. At the Sullivan II trial held on May 4, 2011, the chancellor heard testimony from Samuel Maddox; Steve Maddox; Dempsey Sullivan; Bobby Hall, who owned the property between Sullivan and Maddox; Stanley Eubanks, whose family once owned certain portions of the Sullivans' property; and Samuel Maddox Jr. The matter was then continued to a later date.

¶12. On March 13, 2013,⁵ the Sullivans filed a second motion for the recusal of the chancellor in the present matter and in all other cases involving the Sullivans or their attorney, Stubbs. The Sullivans alleged that Judge Shoemake and his court administrator had a clear bias against the Sullivans that created a conflict in this case and in all cases involving the Sullivans. The Sullivans attached the following documents to the motion for recusal: Campaign Finance Reports for the 2010 Election Campaign filed by Judge Shoemake, who was a candidate; a copy of a bar complaint filed by Judge Shoemake's court's administrator against the former judge, Larry Buffington; a copy of the response to the bar complaint filed by Larry Buffington; and seven affidavits.

¶13. On April 4, 2013, the Maddoxes filed a joint response to the Sullivans' March 13, 2013 motion for recusal. In the response, the Maddoxes argued that the Sullivans should be sanctioned or disciplined pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for knowingly continuing to make false statements of material fact to the court.

¶14. Nearly a week later, on April 10, 2013, the chancellor entered an order denying the motion for recusal, dismissing the Sullivans' complaint, imposing sanctions, and continuing the cause for a hearing on monetary sanctions. In his order, the chancellor stated that the Sullivans' March 13, 2013 motion to recuse was filed "801 days after this [c]ourt took the bench on January 1, 2011, and 673 days after May 3, 2011," the date the chancellor entered his first order denying the Sullivans' motion to recuse. The chancellor stated that Uniform Chancery Court Rule 1.11 does not allow parties to file unlimited motions to recuse, and the rule requires recusal motions to be filed within a reasonable period of time.

¶15. The chancellor discussed the Sullivans' motion to recuse, as well as the affidavits and bar complaint attached to the motion. The chancellor found that the attached documents failed to "evidence any bias or partiality of this [c]ourt" and produced "no evidence of this [c]ourt having any involvement in or knowledge of" improper campaign donations or other improper conduct.

¶16. Regarding the Sullivans' trespass claims, the chancellor found the Sullivans failed to prosecute the claims. The chancellor explained as follows:

The 2010 [c]omplaint filed by the [Sullivans] asked the [c]ourt to cancel an easement given on August 24, 1981, across property that is now owned by the [Sullivans], the easement now benefitting the [Maddoxes]. The [c]omplaint also seeks damages for trespass, negligence, and damages to the value of the real property, and numerous other claims for damages. The prior [c]hancellor, without a trial, entered an [o]rder on April 7, 2010, ordering the [Maddoxes] not to cross the [Sullivans'] property and stated further "should this matter not be resolved within 45 days, this matter shall be brought back before this [c]ourt for further action." Since the [Sullivans] have such an order, they have chosen not to bring their action back before the [c]ourt.

The [c]omplaint was filed March 30, 2010. The [Sullivans] have not sought to prosecute their [c]omplaint since the one day of trial on May 4, 2011. In fact, they have resisted all efforts by the [Maddoxes] to have the case concluded. Counsel for the [Sullivans] is well aware of Uniform Chancery Court Rule 1.11 which requires the filing of affidavits and requires a ruling by the [t]rial [c]ourt within thirty (30) days. To the [c]ourt, this is evidence of delay, dilatory conduct and a clear abuse of the judicial process, and in clear

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