Sullivan v. General Helicopters, Int'L, Civil No. L-07-2825.

• Decision Date: 10 July 2008
• Docket Number: Civil No. L-07-2825.
• Citation: 564 F.Supp.2d 496
• Parties: Wayne P. SULLIVAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL HELICOPTERS, INT'L, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Page 496

564 F.Supp.2d 496

Wayne P. SULLIVAN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. GENERAL HELICOPTERS, INT'L, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. L-07-2825.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

July 10, 2008.

Donald E. Pallett, Parker and Pallett LLC, White Marsh, MD, for Plaintiffs.

Jonathan M. Stern, Schnader Harrison Segal and Lewis LLP, Washington, DC, M. Hamilton Whitman, Jr., Kelly M. Preteroti, Ober Kaler Grimes and Shriver, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

BENSON EVERETT LEGG, Chief Judge.

In November 2005, Plaintiffs Wayne P. Sullivan and Sullivan & Sons, Inc. ("Sullivan's") used a truck-mounted crane to move a disabled helicopter from the ramp of a vessel docked in the Port of Baltimore. Sullivan's has now sued General Helicopters, International ("GHI"); G.A.S. Capital, Inc. ("GAS"); and Ceres Marine Terminal ("Ceres") for a marine salvage award of $250,000. Each of the Defendants has moved to dismiss the complaint.

As explained more fully below, Sullivan's has demonstrated that the Court has jurisdiction over this suit, and it has properly stated a claim against both Ceres and GHI. Insofar as Sullivan's seeks to proceed against GAS and the helicopter, however, its complaint must be dismissed. Accordingly, the Court will, by separate order, GRANT in PART and DENY in PART the Defendants' motions to dismiss.

I. Background

On November 13, 2005, a group of stevedores working for Ceres attempted to unload a helicopter from the M/V Francohia while the vessel was docked safely in the Port of Baltimore. The stevedores bungled the job, breaking the nose wheel of the helicopter as they hauled it by tractor down the Franconia's loading ramp to the pier. Unable to move the helicopter from the ramp, the stevedores called for assistance.

Help soon arrived in the form of a tow truck from Sullivan's Garage. According to Sullivan's, the helicopter was unsecured on the Franconia's ramp and exposed to "high winds" at the time they arrived on the scene. Docket No. 1, ¶¶ 7, 11. Using a heavy-duty crane mounted on top of their tow truck, Sullivan's lifted the helicopter from the ramp and lowered it safely to the pier. The parties agree that Sullivan's was never paid for its work.

On November 18, 2007, Sullivan's filed this lawsuit against Ceres and GHI, the owner of the disabled helicopter. Sullivan's also sued G.A. S. Capital, Inc., GHI's corporate parent. In its complaint, Sullivan's seeks a marine salvage award of $250,000 for its assistance in moving the helicopter. Alternatively, Sullivan's asks that the helicopter be arrested and sold, and that the proceeds of the sale be applied in satisfaction of its salvage claim. Each of the Defendants has moved to dismiss the complaint.

II. Discussion

The Defendants' motions to dismiss are based on two different theories. According to GHI and GAS, Sullivan's complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alternatively, all three Defendants argue that Sullivan's has failed to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In this procedural posture, the Court must address the jurisdictional question, i.e., the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), before passing to the merits of the dispute. See, e.g., Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason University, 411 F.3d 474, 479-80 (4th Cir. 2005); citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) ("[S]ubject matter jurisdiction is a necessary prerequisite to any merits decision by a federal court.")

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction:

As the party asserting jurisdiction, Sullivan's bears the burden of demonstrating "that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist." Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648 (4th Cir.1999). In determining whether Sullivan's has met its burden, the Court may consider evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits, without converting the proceedings into a motion for summary judgment. See Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir.1995). As the Fourth Circuit has recognized, "the trial court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Id.; quoting Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Properties, 854 F.Supp. 400, 407 (D.S.C. 1994).

Since the early nineteenth century, it has been widely assumed that claims arising out of salvage operations fall squarely within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. See, e.g., Executive Jet v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 270, 93 S.Ct. 493, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972); Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 640 F.2d 560, 566 (5th Cir.1981). Yet though it is true that most salvage claims are so obviously maritime in character as to require no jurisdictional analysis at all, occasionally a putative claim bears a more tenuous relationship to traditional maritime activity. See, e.g., Provost v. Huber, 594 F.2d 717 (8th Cir.1979) (Plaintiff sought salvage award for rescuing parts of a house which had fallen through a frozen lake). In these borderline cases, courts have struggled mightily to fashion a coherent standard for determining their authority to hear the dispute. See id., Historic Aircraft Recovery, v. Wrecked and Aband. F4U-1., 294 F.Supp.2d 132 (D.Me.2003). It is to this challenge that we presently turn.

The Defendants submit, and the Court is inclined to agree, that a logical starting point for the jurisdictional analysis is the two-part test for admiralty jurisdiction in tort cases. In Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the Supreme Court explained that "a party seeking to invoke admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim must satisfy both conditions of location and of connection with maritime activity." 513 U.S. 527, 534, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995). To satisfy the location prong of the test, the claimant must establish that the tort giving rise to his injury occurred on navigable water, or that an injury suffered on land was caused by a vessel on navigable water. Id. The connection prong of the test raises two questions: first, whether the general features of the incident giving rise to the claimant's injury have a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce; and second, whether "the activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity." Id.; quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363-65, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990).

According to GHI and GAS, the jurisdictional inquiry in this case should be governed by a modified version of the Grubart test. Rather than focus on the incident giving rise to the claimant's injury, the Defendants' test would look to the activities of the putative salvor, in this case Sullivan's assistance in moving the disabled helicopter. The Defendants would also reduce the "connection" prong of the test to the single question of whether the salvor's activities bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Protesting that they see "no reason to redefine maritime activities," Sullivan's objects to the Defendants' test but offers no competing test of its own.¹

Although at least one district court has declined to apply the Grubart test in determining its jurisdiction over a salvage claim, see Historic Aircraft Recovery, supra, the Court believes that the Defendants' approach is practical. Under the circumstances of this case, the activities of the putative salvor are both easy to identify and readily amenable to Grubart's two-pronged analysis. Accordingly, the Court will apply the Defendants' test below.

We begin with the "locality" prong of the test At the time Sullivan's arrived at the terminal, the parties agree that the helicopter was sitting, with a broken wheel, on the Franconia's loading ramp. As the courts have consistently recognized, "[f]ederal admiralty jurisdiction extends to the means of ingress and egress ... of a vessel in navigable waters." White v. United States, 53 F.3d 43, 47 (4th Cir. 1995); citing Russell v. City Ice & Fuel Co., 539 F.2d 1318, 1320 (4th Cir.1976); see also The Admiral Peoples, 295 U.S. 649, 651, 55 S.Ct. 885, 79 L.Ed. 1633 (1935) ("The basic fact in the instant case is that the gangplank was a part of the vessel.") Such "means of egress" clearly include the ramp of a vessel docked at the harbor for unloading. As a result, the Court has no trouble concluding that the helicopter was located "on navigable waters" when Sullivan's moved it to the pier.²

Turning to the "connection" prong of the test, the Defendants urge us to apply a multi-factor analysis to determine whether Sullivan's actions bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Docket No., at 11; citing Oman v. Johns-Manville Corp., 764 F.2d 224, 230 (4th Cir.1985). In its decision in Grubart, however, the Supreme Court rejected such analyses as needlessly complex and "hard to apply." 513 U.S. at 547, 115 S.Ct. 1043. In keeping with the spirit of Grubart, the Court will thus confine its inquiry to the general question of whether Sullivan's activities are essentially maritime in character.

According to GHI and GAS, Sullivan's activities may properly be described as "using land-based equipment to lift or move an object from a ramp to [the] ground." Docket No., at 12. At this level of generality, however, the Defendants' description fails to capture the essential nature of Sullivan's task: the unloading of cargo from a vessel. Thus recharacterized, Sullivan's activities fall comfortably within the ambit of traditional maritime activity. As the Supreme Court recognized in P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, "[p]ersons moving cargo from the ship to land transportation are engaged in maritime employment." 444 U.S. 69, 82, 100 S.Ct. 328, 62 L.Ed.2d 225 (1979). For this reason, Sullivan's has satisfied the "connection" prong of the test.

As the foregoing...