Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co.

• Decision Date: 23 June 1908
• Docket Number: 140
• Parties: Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Company, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

70 A. 775

222 Pa. 72

Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Company, Appellant

No. 140

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 23, 1908

Argued February 17, 1908 [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Appeal, No. 140, Oct. T., 1907, by defendants, from decree of C.P. No. 2, Allegheny Co., Oct. Term, 1902, No. 620, awarding an attachment for contempt of court in case of E. R. Sullivan and Jennie P. A. Sullivan, his wife, v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Company et al. Reversed.

Petition for attachment for contempt.

The trial court, YOUNG, J., found the defendants guilty of contempt in the following opinion:

This cause comes before us now upon the petition of the plaintiffs reciting that on April 19, 1904, at the above number and term of this court, a decree was entered by this court, among other things, perpetually enjoining and restraining the defendant "from such operation of its furnaces, situated in Fourteenth Ward of the City of Pittsburg, and described in the bill, as to cause to be emitted therefrom, clouds of ore dust, working and causing the injury to the property of the plaintiffs, as in the bill described and found by the Court;" and that, notwithstanding said decree, the defendants "have persistently and at intervals, daily and frequently, many times during the day and night, since the day when said decree was entered, so operated its furnaces as to cause to be emitted therefrom clouds of ore dust, working and causing the injury to plaintiffs' property, as in said bill described, and found by this Honorable Court, and in open and deliberate violation of the terms of said decree and injunction, and against the oft-repeated protests of your said petitioners," and that the petitioners are "advised, believe and charge that the defendant, its officers, agents and employees are each and all in contempt of this Honorable Court," and prays that Benjamin F. Jones, Jr., Willis L. King, William L. Jones, Henry S. Kiehl, W. W. Willock, William C. Moreland, James B. Laughlin and George M. Laughlin, who are the directors of the Jones & Laughlin Steel Company, of whom Benjamin F. Jones, Jr., is president, Willis L. King, vice-president, James B. Laughlin, treasurer, William C. Moreland, secretary, William L. Jones, general manager, and E L. Messler, superintendent of the Eliza Furnaces of said Jones & Laughlin Steel Company, be adjudged to be in contempt of this court, and that attachment be issued against them for failure to comply with the aforesaid terms of said decree.

To this petition, presented to the court upon January 10, 1907, the defendants, on January 19, filed an answer, admitting that the defendants are the officers, agents and servants of the defendant company, and that they were duly notified of the entry of the decree at the time of its entry; but denying "that the defendant, the Jones & Laughlin Steel Company, has persistently and at intervals, daily and frequently, many times during the day and night, since the day when said decree was entered, so operated its furnaces as to cause the injury to plaintiffs' property, as in said bill described, and found by this court, and in open and deliberate violation of the terms of said decree and injunction, and against the oft-repeated protests of the said petitioners." The answer also admits that "there have been at different times since April 19, 1904, escapes of ore dust from the Eliza furnaces, but not at all in character, extent or effect such escapes of ore dust as were enjoined by the decree of this honorable court, and most of these escapes occurred during the time that new and very extensive appliances -- adopted to do away with the escape of ore dust -- were being attached to said furnaces and were due to this cause, said new appliances being so extensive as not only greatly to disarrange and disturb the operation of the furnaces while the work of putting them up and attaching them was going on, but to render necessary the disconnecting and opening of certain pipes and parts of the furnaces, which contributed to the escape of ore dust." The answer also denies "that they have violated said injunction in letter or spirit, but beginning even before the entry of said injunction, and continuing to this time, they have been unceasing in their efforts to prevent the escape of ore dust from the furnaces in question," and avers that "they have been watchful and careful in the operation of their furnaces; they have analyzed and selected all the ingredients used therein, ore, coke and limestone; they have made important changes in their furnaces; they have adopted and used new and costly appliances, and, without stopping to consider cost, they have in many other ways, done that which to them or to their engineers gave promise of good results in furtherance of their efforts to remove entirely every cause of annoyance, or even inconvenience from escaping ore dust. And they are willing and ready in time to come, in the operation of said furnaces there, to do any and everything further in this behalf, which will prevent entirely, or still further reduce the escape of ore dust;" and that "speaking from their own observations, from what the changes in the furnaces and the new appliances themselves show; from the expressed opinions and beliefs of their engineers, superintendents and persons in charge of said furnaces; from what they have learned, and heard from many persons living in the Oakland district, and even nearer to the site of said furnaces, they are enabled to say, and do say, that great progress and advancement have been made towards preventing the escape of ore dust from the said furnaces, or at least reducing it to such an extent that no inconvenience or annoyance will be suffered therefrom;" and denying "that the defendants, its officers, agents, servants and employees are each, and all, or any of them, in contempt of this honorable court, and they pray, therefore, that the rule for an attachment entered in this case, may be discharged."

Upon this petition and answer being filed, this court, upon February 7, began taking the testimony to determine the question as to whether said defendants, its officers and agents, should be adjudged guilty of contempt of this court, and an attachment be issued against them for failure to comply with the terms of the decree; and the court continued to take testimony submitted, taking in all 1,962 pages of testimony, and finally having heard counsel both in oral argument and by written brief, we come now to determine the question whether the defendants in this case, its officers, agents and employees, are in contempt of this court and have violated its decree. The sole inquiry, then, before the court, is whether the Jones & Laughlin Steel Company, the defendant, or the persons named as its officers, employees and agents, have since April 19, 1904, refused or failed to comply with the decree of this court in enjoining and restraining them "from such operation of its furnaces, situated in the Fourteenth ward of the city of Pittsburg, and described in the bill, as to cause to be emitted therefrom, clouds of ore dust, working and causing the injury to the property of the plaintiffs, as in the bill described and found by this court." There lies at the very foundation of this inquiry the question as to the meaning of this injunction, because, until we shall have determined exactly its meaning, we shall not be able to determine whether or not the defendants have disobeyed it. Ordinarily the meaning of a decree and the purpose to be accomplished by it are easily determined from the words of the order or decree, but where there may be any doubt concerning either the meaning of the decree or the purpose of the court in making it, we are entitled to have such light from proper sources as to make it clear beyond question, and especially is this true when the proceeding is one for the punishment of persons for its violation, the proceeding becoming a quasi criminal proceeding, and we are required to examine and strictly construe the order disobeyed as though it were a criminal statute. It is especially important in the case at bar to determine these things accurately and definitely because of the magnitude of the operations on the one hand and the great alleged injury on the other hand, arising out of conditions in a great manufacturing city, subject to many injuries and annoyances by reason of its being a manufacturing city that would not occur elsewhere, aside from the duty of the court to compel obedience to its decree. In seeking the meaning of the decree and the objects of the court in making it, the decree naturally falls into two propositions, or inquiries: first, what is meant by such operation of its furnaces as to cause to be emitted therefrom clouds of ore dust; and, second, what injury to plaintiffs' property is described in the bill and found by the court; and to the answer to these two propositions, or inquiries, we must first apply ourselves. To determine this, we must look to the findings of fact by the learned judge of the court below on the original trial of the case and to the opinion of the Supreme Court.

Such operation of the furnaces must include therein rebuilding, improving or enlarging, as found in the ninth finding of fact, in these words:

"That between March, 1898, and May, 1901, the three furnaces at that time constituting the Eliza furnaces were rebuilt improved and enlarged upon the site then and now occupied by them, and a fourth furnace added upon that site. The first of the rebuilt furnaces was 'blown in' September 1, 1899; the second, May 13, 1900; the third, January 21, 1901, and the fourth on May 8, 1901. These furnaces as rebuilt, improved and enlarged, are...