Sullivan v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 November 1908
• Citation: 200 Mass. 303,86 N.E. 511
• Parties: SULLIVAN v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co.[*]
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

200 Mass. 303

86 N.E. 511

SULLIVAN v. Old Colony St. Ry. Co.^[*]

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

November 24, 1908

COUNSEL

John T. Coughlin and David R. Radovsky for plaintiff.

James M. Swift and John A. Kerns, for defendant.

OPINION

SHELDON J.

No question was made at the trial but that the defendant was liable for any injury done to the plaintiff by reason of its car having left the track. But if no injury was caused by this to the plaintiff; if he suffered no damage whatever from the defendant's negligence, then he would not be entitled to recover. Although there has been negligence in the performance of a legal duty, yet it is only those who have suffered damage therefrom that may maintain an action therefor. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q. B. D. 503, 507; Farrell v. Waterbury Horse R. R., 60 Conn. 239, 246 21 A. 675, 22 A. 544; Salmon v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R., 38 N. J. Law. 5, 11, 20 Am. Rep. 356; 2 Cooley on Torts (3d Ed.) 791; Wharton on Negligence (2d Ed.) § 3. In cases of negligence, there is no such invasion of rights as to entitle a plaintiff to recover at least nominal damages, as in Hooten v. Barnard, 137 Mass. 36, and McAneany v. Jewett, 10 Allen, 151. Accordingly, the first and second of the plaintiff's requests for rulings could not have been given, and the rulings made were all that the plaintiff was entitled to.

The other rulings asked for could not have been given in the form in which they were expressed, because the third stated the rule of damages too broadly, so that the defendant would have been held for damages resulting from the plaintiff's own acts; the fourth was open to the same objection, and made the right of the plaintiff to be carried through to Newport depend merely upon his unexpressed intention, regardless of whether it had been communicated in any way to the defendant and whether the defendant had undertaken to carry him to Newport or not; and the fifth made the plaintiff's rights depend solely upon his having heard the announcement made by defendant's servant, without regard to the question whether it was seasonably and properly made. It was a question of fact for the jury whether under the circumstances the defendant had given sufficient notice of what was to be done in the existing emergency. The questions involved in these requests were fully covered by what was said to the jury. It could not have been ruled that there was an absolute and unqualified obligation upon the defendant either by agreement with the plaintiff or as a duty arising from the circumstances, to carry him to Newport. He had procured no ticket, he had paid no fare to that place. A separate fare was to be paid in each town upon the route as it was passed through; and he seems to have been carried as far as he had paid or offered to pay his fare. The attention of the jury was carefully directed to the question whether the defendant had properly notified the plaintiff and the other passengers that those who wished to go to Newport should walk to the ferry, and there take the last through car, which would wait for them; and under the instructions the jury must have settled this question in the defendant's favor, and found that the plaintiff's exposure and subsequent failure to reach Newport were due to his own acts and to...