Sullivan v. State ex rel. Atty. Gen. of Alabama
Decision Date | 31 May 1985 |
Citation | 472 So.2d 970 |
Parties | James D. SULLIVAN v. STATE of Alabama, ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALABAMA, Charles A. Graddick. 83-771. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Barry Hess of Hess, Atchison & Horne, Mobile, for appellant.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and H. William Wasden, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether, in light of the new Judicial Article, the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, had jurisdiction to remove appellant, James D. Sullivan, from office pursuant to the Attorney General's petition for writ of quo warranto. Appellant contends the new Judicial Article vests in the Judicial Inquiry Commission and the Court of the Judiciary the exclusive jurisdiction to remove sitting judges from office and that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss and in issuing the writ of quo warranto removing appellant from office.
Appellant was sworn in as a judge in the District Court of Mobile County, Alabama, in December of 1980. He was qualified to hold office at that time.
In the fall of 1983, Sullivan was indicted by a federal grand jury and charged in two counts with a violation of the RICO statute and a conspiracy to violate it. In March of 1984, a jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. In May of that same year, appellant was sentenced to concurrent twenty-year prison terms on counts one and two of the federal indictment under which he had been convicted. After sentencing, Sullivan's judicial office was automatically vacated, pursuant to Code 1975, § 36-9-2. That section provides as follows:
Subsequent to Sullivan's conviction, and prior to the imposition of a sentence, the Attorney General filed a petition for writ of quo warranto in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, seeking to have Sullivan removed from office. Before the hearing on the petition commenced, appellant, through counsel, specially appeared for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the circuit court to remove him from office, and in support of his position, appellant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Amendment 328 to the Constitution of Alabama, more commonly referred to as the Judicial Article, provided the only method by which a sitting judge could be removed from office.
The trial court denied Sullivan's motion and granted the Attorney General's petition. Sullivan appealed to this court.
First, we note that it is clear James Sullivan was, after conviction by a jury of a crime punishable by imprisonment in the federal penitentiary, disqualified to hold office under the authority of the State of Alabama. Article IV, Section 60, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 states:
"No person convicted of embezzlement of the public money, bribery, perjury, or other infamous crime, shall be eligible to the legislature, or capable of holding any office of trust or profit in this state." (Emphasis added.)
Section 36-2-1, Code 1975, states:
Furthermore, the writ of quo warranto was, under these circumstances, a proper procedure to test Sullivan's qualifications to hold office. Historically, the writ of quo warranto has been proper to challenge qualifications and eligibility to hold public office. See State ex rel. Graddick v. Rampey, 407 So.2d 823 (Ala.1981); Akers v. State ex rel. Witcher, 283 Ala. 248, 215 So.2d 578 (1968); State ex rel. Norrell v. Key, 276 Ala. 524, 165 So.2d 76 (1964); and State ex rel. McIntyre v. McEachern, 231 Ala. 609, 166 So. 36 (1936).
The distinction between the use of the writ and an affirmative removal of a public official for cause was noted by this court in State ex rel. Chambers v. Bates, 233 Ala. 251, 254, 171 So. 370 (Ala.1936):
(Citation omitted and emphasis added.)
In Opinion of the Justices, 359 So.2d 1155, 1157-1158 (Ala.1978), the distinctions between ineligibility to hold public office and impeachment were clarified as follows:
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