Sullivan v. Tufts

• Decision Date: 10 September 1909
• Citation: 89 N.E. 239,203 Mass. 155
• Parties: SULLIVAN v. TUFTS.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

203 Mass. 155

89 N.E. 239

SULLIVAN v. TUFTS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

September 10, 1909

COUNSEL

Frederic H. Chase, for plaintiff.

Noble Davis & Stone, for defendant.

OPINION

BRALEY J.

It is plain, upon the plaintiff's testimony, that the jury could find he had been employed by the defendant, acting through her husband as agent, to effect a sale, and after having begun negotiations with the purchaser they were suspended, with the understanding by him, and by the parties that they had not been abandoned, and were to be shortly resumed, but before the time arrived for taking them up, the parties, through the agency of another broker, who had been employed by the purchaser, agreed upon the terms which he had arranged, and unknown to him completed the sale. If this were all the evidence he would have earned his commission, as the plaintiff having been the efficient means of bringing the parties together the defendant could not appropriate the benefit of his services without payment of the stipulated price. Munroe v. Taylor, 191 Mass. 483, 484, 78 N.E. 106; Fitzpatrick v. Gilson, 176 Mass. 477, 478, 57 N.E. 1000. But from the plaintiff's own evidence, as well as from the evidence of the purchaser, the jury could further have found that he had been employed to buy as well as to sell, and that during the trade he acted in a double capacity. While it is true he made known his employment by the purchaser to the defendant's agent, by whom doubtless this position was not deemed disadvantageous, it nowhere appears even inferentially that he ever informed the purchaser of his agency for the defendant. If this knowledge of the defendant relieves the plaintiff from having placed himself in a position hostile to her interests, and he would not be deprived of his commission within the decision of Quinn v. Burton, 195 Mass. 277, 279, 81 N.E. 257, the principle there applied was held to control in Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass. 133, 18 Am. Rep. 459, where it was decided that if a broker in effecting an exchange or sale of property acts for both parties he can recover a commission from neither, unless his double relation was known, and assented to by each of them. The reason which has often been pointed out is that such a relation tends to place the broker under a temptation to sacrifice the interests of one or both of his employers for the purpose of obtaining or enhancing his own emolument. The courts as a matter of public policy will not sanction contracts, which manifestly place agents, when in the performance of their duties, not only in a position antagonistic to the interests of their principals, but where they are subjected to a strong incentive to defraud them. Farnsworth v. Hemmer, 1 Allen, 494, 79 Am. Dec. 756; Holcomb v. Weaver, 136 Mass. 265.

The defendant's fourth and fifth requests, which were refused, directed the attention of the court to this principle, and were appropriate on the evidence to which we have referred. It is contended by the defendant that the instructions covered the requests. But an...