Sulz v. Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ass'n

• Decision Date: 16 April 1895
• Citation: 40 N.E. 242,145 N.Y. 563
• Parties: SULZ v. MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASS'N.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

145 N.Y. 563

40 N.E. 242

SULZ

v.MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASS'N.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 16, 1895.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Second department.

Action by Dina Sulz, as administratrix, against the Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association on a certificate of membership. From a judgment of the general term (31 N. Y. Supp. 1133) affirming the judgment of the special term (28 N. Y. Supp. 263), defendant appeals. Reversed.

Raphael J. Moses, for appellant.

Charles J. Patterson, for respondent.

PECKHAM J.

This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of a certain policy of insurance for $3,000 issued by the defendant, an insurance company organized under chapter 175 of the Laws of 1883. The policy of insurance or certificate of membership, as it is sometimes called, was issued by the defendant association January 20, 1891, to Charles H. Sulz, payable to his ‘legal representatives' at the home office of the company in the city of New York within 90 days after satisfactory evidence of the death of the insured party. The application for membership and for a policy of insurance in the corporation defendant was made by the insured, Charles H. Sulz, in December, 1890. In such application, in answer to the requirement to state the name of the beneficiary in full, he answered, ‘My estate.’ Mr. Sulz, at the time of the issuing of the policy to him (January 20, 1891), was at San Francisco, in California, and upon its receipt he sent it to his wife at their residence in the city of Brooklyn, to which city he soon returned, and it remained in the possession of the wife for about six months, when, on the removal of the family (the husband and wife) from one house to another in the city of Brooklyn, the wife packed it in a trunk, which was taken by the deceased when he started on his journey to Tacoma in the state of Washington. When the deceased went to Tacoma, in 1891, he left his wife at his old home in the city of Brooklyn. In August, 1891, he wrote from the city of Tacoma to the home office of the defendant in the city of New York, notifying them that he had made Tacoma, Wash., his home for the future, having gone into the manufacture of soaps and chemicals there, and he asked them to forward assessments to him at Tacoma, or to notify him who their agent was there, to whom he might make further payments. In January, 1892, Mr. Sulz died at Tacoma, having at the time this policy or certificate in his possession. At the time of his death his wife was still residing in Brooklyn. Letters of administration were applied for by his widow to the surrogate of Kings county, and were granted, and she duly qualified and entered upon the discharge of her duties as administratrix. A few days after the granting of such letters she signed a written renunciation of her right to take out letters as administratrix in Tacoma, and forwarded it to the former attorneys of her husband at that place, and thereupon one R. P. Thomas was appointed administrator of the estate of her husband by the proper court in the state of Washington. Mr. Thomas at once commenced an action in that state to recover upon the policy of insurance, which he had taken possession of as part of the effects of the deceased, and such suit was commenced by the service of process upon an agent of the defendant residing in the state of Washington, and duly authorized under the laws of that state, and by the designation of the defendant corporation, to receive such service on its behalf. Within a few days subsequent to the commencement of that action the plaintiff herein commenced this action as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband in the supreme court of this state to recover the amount due under such policy of insurance. The defendant set up a defense to this action, based upon an alleged breach of warranty by the insured in making false answers to certain questions contained in the application for insurance signed by him. It also set up the above facts in relation to the insurance policy and the pendency of the action against it in the superior court of the state of Washington, and claimed that the plaintiff herein had no right to maintain this action because of these facts. The case was tried at circuit, and the facts relating to the alleged breach of warranty submitted to a jury, and upon the whole case the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff; and the question is whether the judgment entered upon that verdict shall stand.

We will assume that the letters of administration granted to the plaintiff by the surrogate of Kings county are conclusive in regard to the status of the plaintiff as being the administratrix duly appointed upon the estate of her deceased husband, and the only question remaining is whether as such administratrix, and upon the facts in this case, she can maintain this action. We are of the opinion that the courts of this state ought not to take jurisdiction of this action. The defendant issued what it terms, in the blank application provided by it, a ‘certificate of membership or policy of insurance,’ by which certificate or policy it insured the life of Mr. Sulz for $3,000 for the benefit of his ‘legal representatives,’ those words being used in the instrument instead of the words ‘my estate,’ as used by the insured himself in his application for the insurance. The constitution and by-laws of the company and the certificate or insurance policy itself must all be looked at for the purpose of discovering what was the contract entered into by the parties. In re Equitable Reserve Fund Life Ass'n of New York, 131 N. Y. 354-368, 30 N. E. 114. In some companies-possibly in this-a person might become a member thereof, and his family or any other named beneficiary be entitled to receive the benefit of such membership upon his death, as provided for in the constitution or by-laws, even where no certificates of membership or policy of insurance had been issued; but where such a paper has been issued by the company, and delivered to and accepted by the insured person, it must be read in connection with such constitution and by-laws for the purpose of determining what the contract was which existed between the parties at the time of the death of the insured. The policy in this case was in the possession of the deceased at the time of his death in the state of Washington, and I do not think that it differs materially from any other policy of insurance, so far as this question is concerned. Having been issued, it has become a material part of the contract between the parties to it.

The case of Holyoke v. Insurance Co., 22 Hun, 75, is cited by defendant, and is somewhat in point. In that case the plaintiff, as executrix of George E. Holyoke, brought an action in this state against the insurance company (a New York corporation) for the purpose of recovering the amount of a paidup policy issued upon the life of one Alfred S. Perkins, a resident of the state of Maine, and by him assigned to Holyoke. The plaintiff's testator died in Brooklyn, N. Y., May 7, 1875, where he had continuously resided for 16 years prior to his death, and he left a will by which he bequeathed and devised his whole property to his wife, the plaintiff, which will was duly admitted to probate in Kings county, and on June 8, 1875, letters of administration were issued to the plaintiff. After the death of Mr. Holyoke the assignment was found among his effects at his office in the city of New York, and was delivered to the plaintiff, and had been in her possession up to the commencement of the action. On October 8, 1878, Alfred S. Perkins, the insured person, died, and the plaintiff immediately gave proper proofs of his death, and otherwise duly performed all the conditions required of her by the policy, and demanded its payment. The defense interposed was that the assignment in question was a collateral assignment only to secure Perkins' indebtedness to Holyoke, and that the amount due the latter had been paid, and that letters of administration with the will annexed upon the estate of Holyoke had been issued to one Percival Bonney by the probate court of Cumberland county, Me., and that the policy of insurance was in the state of Maine at the time of Holyoke's death, and had been by Bonney assigned to, and was then held and owned by, another person residing in the state of Maine. The court held that at the time of the death of George Holyoke the legal title to the policy in controversy was vested in him; that he held written assignment of the policy; and that in contemplation of law it was in his possession. The policy was, however, as matter of fact, in the state of Maine when the testator died, and was taken possession of by the administrator of his goods, etc., with the will annexed, who had been appointed by the probate court in the latter state. The court said it was immaterial whether the assignment to Holyoke by Perkins was as collateral security for the debt due from the latter to Holyoke, or whether it was an absolute one. If collateral, the debt was due from Perkins himself, and, he being a resident of Maine, no one could...