Summerlin v. State

• Decision Date: 28 October 2016
• Docket Number: A16A0674
• Citation: 793 S.E.2d 477,339 Ga.App. 148
• Parties: SUMMERLIN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

339 Ga.App. 148

793 S.E.2d 477

SUMMERLIN

v.The STATE.

A16A0674

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 28, 2016

Jennifer Sullivan Hanson, Bruce Steven Harvey, Candida Rychell Summerlin, for Appellant.

Michael Scott Carlson, Augusta, Daniel James Quinn, D. Victor Reynolds, Marietta, for Appellee.

Ray, Judge.

A Cobb County jury found Candida Summerlin guilty but mentally ill on two counts of criminal attempt to commit malice murder, two counts of criminal attempt to commit felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault on a peace officer, two counts of hit and run, two counts of criminal damage to property in the first degree, and one count each of aggravated battery, fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and interference with government property.¹ Summerlin appeals from her convictions and the denial of her motion for new trial, contending that: (1) the verdict was erroneous because she proved her insanity defense; (2) the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence; (3) the trial court erred in denying her motion for directed verdict on the criminal attempt to commit felony murder charges; (4) the trial court erred in charging the jury; and (5) the trial court erred in allowing certain hearsay testimony. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to support the verdict,² the evidence presented at trial showed that on May 31, 2013, Summerlin drove to the work-release facility at the Cobb County detention center. She parked in front of the building in an area normally reserved for Sheriff's Office vehicles, playing her radio loudly. Lieutenant Westenberger approached Summerlin and told her that she had parked in a restricted area and that she needed to move her vehicle to a different area of the parking lot. Summerlin responded to Lieutenant Westenberger in an angry tone, and she glared at the officer as she was putting on her seatbelt. As Lieutenant Westenberger was walking away from the vehicle, Summerlin revved up her engine and accelerated toward the officer, striking her with the front of the vehicle. Sergeant Kite observed Lieutenant Westenberger as she was rolling off the top of the moving vehicle, and he ran out of the building and tried to stop Summerlin. Summerlin then accelerated and veered her vehicle toward Sergeant Kite, striking him as well. When Summerlin's vehicle hit a nearby curb and a signpost, disabling her vehicle, Sergeant Kite approached the vehicle and placed Summerlin under arrest. The jury found Summerlin guilty but mentally ill of all counts charged in the indictment.

1. We first address Summerlin's enumeration of error relating to the admission of certain statements made by Summerlin during telephone conversations while in custody at the Cobb County Jail. Summerlin contends that the statements were irrelevant, unreliable, and prejudicial hearsay, and that the admission of the statements violated her right to confrontation. We disagree.

The first of these telephone calls occurred on May 26, 2013, just five days prior to the criminal conduct at issue in this case, when Summerlin was under arrest for another incident. Although this telephone call had been recorded by the jail and later listened to by the officer assigned to investigate the instant case, the officer was unable to copy the audio to a CD due to a change in the jail's phone system. After the trial court provided the jury with the appropriate limiting instructions, the officer was permitted to testify as to Summerlin's statements, using his investigative notes. The officer testified that Summerlin had stated on the phone: "I know the bitch ass that just locked me up is about to get it, tell you that."

The two other telephone calls occurred on June 15 and June 17, 2013, after Summerlin was arrested for the charges in this case. The investigating officer was able to download a copy of the audio of the latter telephone calls onto a CD, which was played for the jury. In the June 2013 telephone calls, Summerlin complained of previous harassment by Cobb County law enforcement officers and that one of the deputies she hit with her car "tried to shoot at me so I ran the bitch over."

In Georgia, hearsay is generally not allowed as evidence and is defined as "a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." OCGA § 24–8–801 (c). However, statements made by the opposing party are deemed admissions which are not excluded by the rule. OCGA § 24–8–801 (d) (2) (A). Additionally,

[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

OCGA § 24–4–404 (b).

Summerlin's statement in the May 26, 2013, telephone call relates to a prior wrong or act which would generally be irrelevant character evidence. However, since Summerlin asserted an insanity defense, her state of mind at the time of the conduct was highly relevant. This particular telephone call occurred five days before the criminal conduct at issue in this case, and her statement indicates her disdain for law enforcement intervention and a desire to seek revenge. Therefore, this statement is relevant to show her motive and intent in committing the crimes in this case. Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury not to use this evidence as proof of the prior wrong and to only consider it to the extent it shows Summerlin's intent or motive in committing the alleged crimes in the case before them. Finally, Summerlin had the opportunity to cross-examine the investigating officer in an attempt to show that his memory of the phone conversation was not credible. Therefore, this evidence was properly admitted by the trial court.

As for the June 2013 telephone calls, Summerlin contends that the statements made by the person to whom she was speaking constituted inadmissible hearsay. She argues that without the hearsay the telephone conversation would be incomplete, which would allow Summerlin's statements to be taken out of context. However, Summerlin's statements speak for themselves. The statement "she tried to shoot at me so I ran the bitch over" shows a willingness to use a motor vehicle as a weapon or a means of attack against another person, even without the other person's response. Thus, this evidence is relevant to Summerlin's motive and intent at the time of the incident and her propensity to use a motor vehicle to strike another person. It also was an admission. Therefore, her objection was properly overruled and the trial court did not error in admitting this evidence.

2. Summerlin argues that the guilty but mentally ill verdict is erroneous because she established her insanity defense by a preponderance of the evidence and that the State failed to disprove that defense beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree.

Under Georgia law, a person is insane, and shall not be guilty of a crime, if at the time of the act ... constituting the crime, the person did not have [the] mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to the criminal act or acted because of a delusional compulsion which overmastered [her] will to resist committing the crime. A defendant claiming insanity has the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Because Georgia law presumes every person is of sound mind and discretion, criminal trials begin with the rebuttable presumption that the defendant is sane[,] and this presumption is evidence. Where the defense presents evidence in support of a defense of insanity, a jury is authorized to reject such evidence. On appeal, [the standard of review is] whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdicts, a rational trier of fact could have found that [Summerlin] failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [she] was insane at the time of the crimes, and whether the State met its burden of proving [she] was guilty, but mentally ill, beyond a reasonable doubt.

(Citations omitted.) Norred v. State , 297 Ga. 234, 235–236, 773 S.E.2d 234 (2015). Although jurors are entitled to reject expert testimony on the question of sanity, the jury "may not rely solely on the rebuttable presumption of sanity[ ] when the proof of insanity is overwhelming." (Citation and footnote omitted.) Barge v. State , 256 Ga.App. 560, 562 (2), 568 S.E.2d 841 (2002).

At trial, Summerlin presented evidence and expert testimony concerning her prior mental health and her state of mind on the day of the incident. Her evidence showed that she had a history of mental health issues. Summerlin's expert, Dr. Matthew Norman, testified that he diagnosed Summerlin as having a bi-polar disorder with manic and psychotic features. Dr. Norman further testified that, in his opinion, Summerlin was experiencing a manic episode with hallucinations and delusions at the time of the incident. The State responded with expert testimony which showed that bi-polar disorders are extremely common diagnoses and that most people with bi-polar disorders could still distinguish right from wrong. Additionally, the State's psychiatric experts testified that they evaluated Summerlin and diagnosed her as having "malingered hallucinations," meaning that she either fabricated her hallucinations and delusions or exaggerated them to achieve a secondary purpose. Having heard all of the evidence and testimony, including the statements made by Summerlin indicating her disdain for law enforcement intervention and her penchant for seeking revenge, the jury rejected Summerlin's defense of insanity and instead found her guilty but mentally ill.

Summerlin argues that her conduct was so inexplicable that her actions alone...