Summers v. Martin

• Decision Date: 11 December 2013
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. CV-12-S-1816-NE
• Parties: SONNEY SUMMERS, Plaintiff, v. C. MARTIN, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

SONNEY SUMMERS, Plaintiff, v. C. MARTIN, Defendant.

Civil Action No. CV-12-S-1816-NE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

DONE: December 11, 2013

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Sonney Summers, asserts claims against a former Madison County Deputy Sheriff, Chris Martin, for an alleged illegal arrest and the use of excessive force when effecting the arrest.¹ All of plaintiff's claims are asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and arise out of his arrest at the scene of a traffic stop involving his son.² The action is before the court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment,³ and on plaintiff's motion to strike part of defendant's evidentiary submissions.⁴ Upon consideration of the pleadings, evidentiary submissions, and briefs, the court concludes that all motions are due to be denied.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (alteration supplied). Thus, "the plain language of [that rule] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (alteration supplied).

In making this determination, the court must review all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.

[However,] [t]he mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case. The relevant rules of substantive law dictate the materiality of a disputed fact. A genuine issue of material fact does not exist unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a reasonable [factfinder] to return a verdict in its favor.

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal citations omitted, alterations and emphasis supplied).

When presented cross motions for summary judgment, "[t]he court must rule on each party's motion on an individual and separate basis, determining, for eachside, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance with the Rule 56 standard." 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2720, at 335-36 (1998) (footnote omitted, alteration supplied). As another court within this Circuit has observed:

"Cross motions for summary judgment do not change the standard." Latin Am. Music Co. v. Archdiocese of San Juan of the Roman Catholic & Apostolic Church, 499 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2007). "Cross motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately; the denial of one does not require the grant of another." Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Buell Cabinet Co. v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431, 433 (10th Cir. 1979)). "Even where parties file cross motions pursuant to Rule 56, summary judgment is inappropriate if disputes remain as to material facts." Id.; accord Monumental Paving & Excavating, Inc. v. Pa. Mfrs.' Ass'n Ins. Co., 176 F.3d 794, 797 (4th Cir. 1999) ("When considering motions from both parties for summary judgment, the court applies the same standard of review and so may not resolve genuine issues of material fact. Instead, [the court must] consider and rule upon each party's motion separately and determine whether summary judgment is appropriate as to each under the Rule 56 standard.") (citations omitted).

Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 541 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1297-98 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (alteration in original). See also American Bankers Insurance Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005) ("This court reviews the district court's disposition of cross-motions for summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards used by the district court, viewing the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and resolving all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-moving party.").

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiff asks this court to strike portions of three affidavits submitted by defendant in support of his motion for summary judgment.⁵ The affidavits contain identical language, to the effect that plaintiff "shouted angrily" at defendant as he approached the scene of the traffic stop.⁶ Plaintiff asserts that these statements should be stricken because they directly contradict testimony given in the witnesses' prior depositions.⁷ In response, defendant contends that the affidavits do not "flatly contradict," nor are they "inherently inconsistent" with, the witnesses' deposition testimony and, as such, they are not due to be stricken.⁸

The Eleventh Circuit has held that "a party cannot give 'clear answers to unambiguous questions' in a deposition and thereafter raise an issue of material fact in a contradictory affidavit that fails to explain the contradiction." Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1987) (quoting Van T. Junkins and Associates, Inc. v. U.S. Industries, Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir. 1984)). TheEleventh Circuit has cautioned, however, that this so-called "sham affidavit" rule should be applied "'sparingly because of the harsh effect it may have on a party's case.'" Allen v. Board of Public Education for Bibb County, 495 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rollins, 833 F.2d at 1530). Indeed, courts are advised to

be careful to distinguish "between discrepancies which create transparent shams and discrepancies which create an issue of credibility or go to the weight of the evidence." Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953 (11th Cir. 1986).

[E]very discrepancy contained in an affidavit does not justify a district court's refusal to give credence to such evidence. In light of the jury's role in resolving questions of credibility, a district court should not reject the content of an affidavit even if it is at odds with statements made in an early deposition.

Id. at 954 (quoting Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 894 (5th Cir. 1980)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

Faulk v. Volunteers of America, 444 F. App'x 316, 318 (11th Cir. 2011).

As grounds for the motion to strike, plaintiff claims that statements to the effect that he "shouted angrily" are in direct contradiction with specific portions of the witnesses' prior deposition testimony. Plaintiff is correct in his assertion that defendant was questioned extensively during his deposition about what plaintiff allegedly did and said that was perceived by the defendant as threatening behavior, and that ultimately led defendant to arrest plaintiff, but "shouting angrily" was nevermentioned.⁹ Even so, plaintiff's reliance on specific passages from the depositions of Deputy Hughes and Deputy Rives for the contention that plaintiff "never yelled" at defendant is misplaced.¹⁰ For example, plaintiff relies on Deputy Hughes' testimony that plaintiff "never yelled anything to interfere with the traffic stop."¹¹ Hughes' response, however, only indicates that plaintiff never yelled words that interfered with the traffic stop, and not necessarily that plaintiff never "yelled angrily" at defendant. Plaintiff also quotes the following exchange from Deputy Rives' deposition:

Q. Well, do you recall anything that Mr. Summers said?

A. That's my son, . . . or I'm here to get the truck. I can't recall exactly how it was stated, the first comment that came out of his mouth.

Q. Something like that?

A. Something in regards to that's my son, I'm here to get the truck.

Q. Okay. And what did Deputy Martin say?

A. Deputy Martin said for him to go back to his truck.

Q. Okay, how did he say that?

A. Just in a normal type voice at that time. . . .¹²

As defendant notes, however, the passage from Rives' deposition refers to the manner in which defendant spoke to plaintiff — that is, "in a normal voice" — and not the manner in which plaintiff spoke to defendant.¹³ Thus, the passage is not relevant when considering whether the three affidavit statements should be stricken.

In response to the motion to strike, defendant points to several passages from the witnesses' prior deposition testimony in which plaintiff was described as "erratic,"¹⁴ "hostile,"¹⁵ "aggressive,"¹⁶ "irate,"¹⁷ "agitated,"¹⁸ "aggravated,"¹⁹ and "angry."²⁰ Further, defendant points out that Deputy Hughes testified that plaintiff questioned defendant Chris Martin "in a very hostile, aggressive voice."²¹

This court concludes that there is no "inherent inconsistency" between the affidavits and the deposition testimony. Accordingly, any conflicts or discrepancies present an issue of credibility that should be considered by the trier of fact. Thus, the motion to strike will be denied.

III. SUMMARY OF FACTS

Defendant, Chris Martin, and two fellow Deputy Sheriffs, James Rives and Jeremy Hughes, worked second shift for the Madison County Sheriff's Department on May 14, 2010.²² They were assigned to patrol a northern portion of the County.²³ During a regular patrol, Deputy Rives initiated a traffic stop for a seat belt violation at approximately 4:00 p.m. near the intersection of Charity Lane with Butter & Egg Road in Hazel Green, Alabama.²⁴ The driver of the vehicle was plaintiff's son, Sonney Summers, Jr. ("Junior").²⁵ The passenger in Junior's vehicle had an outstanding felony arrest warrant.²⁶ Consequently, Deputy Rives called the Sheriff's Dispatch Operator and requested backup assistance.²⁷ Defendant and Deputy Hughes responded to the call.²⁸

Deputy Hughes arrived first, and assisted Deputy Rives in removing Junior and his passenger from their vehicle.²⁹

Defendant...