Summers v. Summers

• Decision Date: 21 June 1968
• Docket Number: No. 40910,40910
• Citation: 239 N.E.2d 795,40 Ill.2d 338
• Parties: Alice Luster SUMMERS, Appellant, v. Charles SUMMERS, Appellee
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 795

239 N.E.2d 795

40 Ill.2d 338

Alice Luster SUMMERS, Appellant, v. Charles SUMMERS, Appellee.

No. 40910.

Supreme Court of Illinois,

June 21, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1968.

Thomson, Thomson & Mirza, Bloomington (Jerome Mirza, Bloomington, of counsel), for appellant.

Costigan & Wollrab, Bloomington (William F. Costigan, Bloomington, of counsel), for appellee.

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice.

Plaintiff, Alice Luster Summers, brought an action in the circuit court of McLean County, for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Count I of the complaint alleged that she was the owner-occupant of an automobile being driven by defendant when an accident occurred at which time she was a 'passenger' and not a 'guest' within the meaning of the Illinois guest statute. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 95 1/2, par. 9--201.) It further alleged that defendant was negligent in the operation of the automobile in specified ways, that plaintiff exercised ordinary care and caution for her own safety and that as a direct and proximate result of defendant's negligence, plaintiff suffered personal injuries and the loss of her automobile. Count II of the complaint charging defendant with wilful and wanton conduct was dismissed prior to trial.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss count I on the grounds that the owner-occupant of a vehicle has no cause of action against the driver thereof for negligence and that the plaintiff had failed to allege that she had abandoned or contracted away her right to control the vehicle. These grounds were also set forth in defendant's answer as affirmative defenses. Following denial of his motion to dismiss, defendant moved for a summary judgment setting forth the facts as they related to the owner and driver and urging that the only duty imposed upon him was to refrain from wilful and wanton misconduct and that his conduct, if negligent, was imputed to plaintiff to bar recovery. This motion was also denied.

At the conclusion of the trial, upon plaintiff's motion, defendant's affirmative defenses were stricken, a judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff on a jury verdict of $12,000 and defendant's post-trial motions were denied.

On appeal, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, reversed this judgment, holding that as a matter of law plaintiff was a 'guest' within the Illinois guest statute, and that therefore her action based on simple negligence was barred. (85 Ill.App.2d 182, 228 N.E.2d 539.) We granted leave to appeal.

The facts relevant to disposition of the issues before this court are undisputed. On November 14, 1962, plaintiff drove her nephew, in her 1956 Chevrolet, to a drug store to purchase a book. They then proceeded to the hotel where defendant was residing, went to his room, and plaintiff asked him if he wished to accompany her in taking the nephew for a ride. At this time, plaintiff and defendant had been acquainted for some three months and were contemplating engagement. They have since married. There was no discussion between them whether to use plaintiff's car or defendant's, which was located nearby, nor was there any discussion as to who would drive. When the three arrived at plaintiff's car, she entered the right front seat with her nephew and defendant entered on the left or driver's side. The parties, with defendant behind the wheel, drove out of the town at a speed of 25 to 30 miles an hour, and, as they traveled, plaintiff read a book to her nephew. The evidence indicated that defendant became distracted by the laughing and talking of plaintiff and her nephew and that the car left the roadway and struck a culvert, causing injury to the plaintiff.

The Illinois guest statute provides in pertinent part: 'No person riding in or upon a motor vehicle or motorcycle as a guest without payment for such ride, or while engaged in a joint enterprise with the owner or driver of such * * * nor his personal representative in the event of the death of such guest, shall have a cause of action for damages against the driver or operator of such * * * or its owner or his employee or agent for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the wilful and wanton misconduct of the driver or operator of such * * * or its owner or his employee or agent and unless such wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 95 1/2, par. 9--201.) Whether under these circumstances plaintiff, as an owner-occupant, was a 'guest' within the meaning of this statute is a question of first impression in Illinois. However, this question has been decided numerous times by courts in jurisdictions having statutes similar to our own. The vast majority of these cases have held that an owner-occupant riding in his own car is not a guest. (Gledhill v. Connecticut, 121 Conn. 102, 183 A. 379; Degenstein v. Ehrman (N.D.), 145 N.W.2d 493; Baldwin v. Hill (6th cir.), 315 F.2d 738; Peterson v. Winn, 84 Idaho 523, 373 P.2d 925; Henline v. Wilson, 111 Ohio App. 515, 174 N.E.2d 122; Parker v. Leavitt, 201 Va. 919, 114 S.E.2d 732; Wilson v. Workman (D.C.Del.), 192 F.Supp. 852; Leonard v. Helms (4th cir.), 269 F.2d 48; Collie v. Aust, 173 Cal.App.2d Supp. 793, 342 P.2d 998; Lorch v. Eglin, 369 Pa. 314, 85 A.2d 841; see Annotation, 65 A.L.R.2d 312.) 'The rationale underlying these decisions is that the hostguest relationship is dependent in large measure upon the furnishing of hospitality by the host to the guest. Since the owner-passenger is the one extending the hospitality--furnishing the mode of transportation--to the driver, the owner-passenger is the host and the driver is the guest.' (Baldwin v. Hill, 6 cir., 315 F.2d at 740--741, also cited in Degenstein v. Ehrman, N.D., 145 N.W.2d at 499.) In other words, each of these cases recognizes that guest statutes were enacted primarily to protect those who gratuitously transport others in their automobile and that it is the owner, not the driver, who is extending the gratuitous transportation and hospitality.

Cases decided under our guest statute have expressed a similar understanding of its underlying legislative purpose. In Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 579, 52 N.E.2d 229, 237, it was stated: 'That there should be a difference between the liability of a person who, out of the generosity of his heart, renders gratuitously some service to his fellow traveler over those rendering such service for hire and barter, can hardly be questioned. Those who are charitably inclined should not be restrained by fear of the consequences of their own charitable act and the recipients should not be permitted to gain by the generosity of their host. Undoubtedly the Legislature, in adopting this act,...