Sumner v. Jones
| Decision Date | 11 November 1880 |
| Parties | Jesse Sumner and another v. William E. Jones |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal by plaintiffs from a judgment of the district court for Rice county, Buckham, J., presiding, and from an order refusing a new trial. The action was brought to enforce a lien for lumber to the amount of $ 96.34, furnished by plaintiffs to defendant for use, and used by him, in building a dwelling-house. The defence was that by reason of an agreement for a five per cent. discount on a large quantity of lumber bought by defendant of plaintiffs, and which discount the plaintiffs agreed to allow on final settlement but which they then refused to allow, the defendant has overpaid the plaintiffs in the sum of $ 158.23, being $ 62.23 over and above the $ 96.34 claimed in the complaint. The issue as to the agreement for and the rate of discount was submitted to a jury, who found in favor of the defendant. The other issues were tried by the court, which found that the discount had not been allowed, and that defendant had overpaid plaintiffs for the lumber furnished by them including that mentioned in the complaint, in the sum of $ 58.03, and ordered judgment that there is nothing due or owing from defendant to plaintiffs, and that defendant recover his costs. A new trial was refused, and judgment entered pursuant to the order.
This disposes of the appeals, and the judgment and order refusing a new trial affirmed.
J. H Case and H. S. Gipson, for appellants.
A. D Keyes, for respondent.
The principal contention of the plaintiffs upon these appeals is in effect, that the findings of the jury are not supported by the evidence. The claim is not that there was no testimony going to support them, but that it was false, as appears from other testimony. If anything can be regarded as settled in the law, it is that the credibility of testimony is peculiarly for a jury. As a general rule, their decision upon this is final. There may be cases in which the verdict of a jury will be set aside, because the evidence upon which it rests has no reasonable tendency to support it; but this would not be in a case like this at bar, in which there is simply a conflict of evidence, upon which a pure question of credibility is presented to the jury. Upon these appeals, we see no reason whatever for departing from the general rule mentioned above. This disposes of the positions taken by ...
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