Sumner v. The Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta Rail-Road Co.
| Decision Date | 31 January 1878 |
| Citation | 78 N.C. 289 |
| Parties | B. H. SUMNER v. THE CHARLOTTE, COLUMBIA & AUGUSTA RAIL-ROAD COMPANY. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
CIVIL ACTION, for Damages removed from Mecklenburg and tried at Fall Term, 1877, of CABARRUS Superior Court, before Kerr, J.
This action was brought to recover damages for the loss of eighty-five bales of cotton which the plaintiff alleged he had delivered to the defendant company at Ridgeway, South Carolina, to be transported to Charlotte, North Carolina, and that the defendant negligently failed to notify the consignee of its arrival in Charlotte, and negligently lost the same or converted it to defendant's own use. It appeared that said cotton was bought for plaintiff by A. K. Craige, the depot-agent of the defendant at Ridgeway; the plaintiff having placed in Crage's hands, in 1863, a considerable sum of money, with instructions to buy the cotton, also directing him when, and to whom, to ship it. It further appeared that the defendant's Road, at the time of the alleged delivery of said cotton to the agent at Ridgeway, was in the possession of the authorities of the Confederate Government, and used for the transportation of munitions of war and supplies for the Confederate Army, and that by the irresistible force of said Government in the management and control of the same, it was impossible for the officers of the Road to transport the property of individual citizens. There was much evidence adduced upon the trial in the Court below, but that portion which is necessary to an understanding of the case is set out by Mr. Justice READE in delivering the opinion of this Court. Under the instructions of His Honor, the jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. Judgment. Appeal by defendant.
Messrs. W. J. Montgomery and W. H. Bailey, for plaintiff .
Messrs. Wilson & Son, and R. Barringer, for defendant .
The theory of the plaintiff is that in November, 1864, he delivered to the defendant at its depot, Ridge way, in South Carolina, 85 bales of cotton to be delivered to him in Charlotte, North Carolina, and that the same was never delivered, and that it is a total loss. In order to support that theory, the plaintiff himself testified that one Craige was the defendant's depot agent at Ridgeway; that the plaintiff in October, 1863, employed Craige as his agent and furnished him with money to buy cotton for him, and that Craige agreed “to ship any cotton so purchased, whenever directed;” that in March, 1864, he was at Ridgeway and saw 10 bales on the platform, marked to him, and again in June 1864, he saw 48 bales marked to him, and that he then instructed Craige that as soon as 85 bales should be secured, he should ship. He proves by another witness that in July, or August, there were 48 bales; and by the same witness, that in December, 1864, Craige told him that he had 85 bales, and had not shipped for want of cars. And another witness testifies that he saw the cotton still at Ridgeway, on the 10th of February, 1865.
Now taking this testimony to be true, does it support the plaintiff's theory? Upon the supposition that Craige was the defendant's depot agent, what was his business? Manifestly to do what the defendant was bound to do. What then was the defendant bound to do? Its ordinary duty was to receive freight and transport it within a reasonable time, as a common carrier; and as incident to this, it had the duty of bailee or warehouseman when it was necessary to store goods. This duty the defendant had to perform through agents,--in this instance, through Craige. It is to be assumed from the mere fact that Craige was the depot agent, that he had the power to perform this duty, and to make contracts in regard thereto, and to bind the defendant in regard to all matters germane to its business. Beyond that, it is not to be assumed that he had any power, and the burden of...
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