Sumner v. Village of Milford

• Decision Date: 21 February 1905
• Citation: 73 N.E. 742,214 Ill. 388
• Parties: SUMNER v. VILLAGE OF MILFORD et al. SUMNER et al. v. SAME. MARSHALL v. SAME.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

214 Ill. 388

73 N.E. 742

SUMNER

v.VILLAGE OF MILFORD et al.

SUMNER et al.

v.SAME.

MARSHALL

v.SAME. ^*

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 21, 1905.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Iroquois County; R. W. Hilscher, Judge.

Suits by William V. Marshall against the Village of Milford and others, and by Jennie Sumner and others against the same defendants, and by Aaron T. Sumner against the same defendants. From a decree sustaining demurrers to the bills and dismissing them, complainants appeal. Affirmed.

Magruder, J., dissenting.

Robert Doyle, for appellants.

J. H. Dyer, McClellan Kay, and Morris & Hooper, for appellees.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

In these three cases the appellants, who are owners of lots or tracts of land upon which a special tax was levied and confirmed by the judgment of the county court of Iroquois county to pay the cost of grading, curbing, and paving certain streets in the village of Milford, filed their bills in equity in the circuit court of said county against appellees, the village of Milford, the members of the board of local improvements, and the village treasurer, praying for an injunction prohibiting said defendants from issuing any warrant or bond or causing any tax to be levied against their said property, in pursuance of said judgment of the county court, to pay for any work on said improvement. The bills were severally demurred to on the grounds of want of equity on their face, the absence of a necessary party in the person of the contractor for the improvement, and because there was an adequate remedy at law. The demurrers were sustained; and the bills were dismissed at the cost of the complainants, who appealed from the decrees.

The bills are of the same nature, and the facts averred in each are the same, except as to the particular pieces of property owned by the complainants, and the appeals have therefore been heard together. The special tax sought to be enjoined is the same one involved in the case of Vennum v. Village of Milford, 202 Ill. 423, 66 N. E. 1040, and the facts alleged with respect to the previous use of the petition of property owners for the improvement, as a basis for recommending previous ordinances, are the same as were stated in that case. The bills also allege that a petition of the village of Milford was filed in the county court, in pursuance of the ordinance for the improvement, asking the court to proceed to levy and confirm the assessment; that the president of the board of local improvements appointed a commissioner to make said assessment, whose appointment was confirmed by the county court, and he was ordered to make the same; that the commissioner made and returned the assessment sworn to by him, which was filed in the county court; that objections to the assessment were filed by sundry persons, all of which were overruled, except those of one objector, which were sustained, and the objector's assessment was reduced; that in all other respects the court confirmed the assessment; that Gilbert Vennum appealed from the judgment of confirmation to this court, which reversed the judgment because no legal petition for the improvement was presented to the board of local improvements; that the lands of the complainants were taxed to make the improvement; that section 9 of the ordinance divided the tax into 10 installments, all except the first to bear interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum; and that when the ordinance was passed the law did not authorize the passage of an ordinance or the issue of bonds for such a number of installments bearing such a rate of interest. The grounds for equitable relief alleged and relied upon are that, by reason of amendments to the local improvement act, the president of the board of local improvements had no power at the time to appoint the commissioner, and there was no power in the village board to divide the assessment into 10 installments bearing interest at 5 per cent.; that the reversal of the judgment as to the tract owned by Gilbert Vennum operated to set aside the entire assessment; and that the petition of the property owners for the improvement had lost its vitality from previous use.

The power of the president of the board of local improvements to appoint a commissioner to spread the special tax was upheld in the case of Village of Melrose Park v. Dunnebecke, 210 Ill. 422, 71 N. E. 431, and the decision in that case is also adverse to the claim made as to the division of the tax or assessment into installments. The argument that the reversal of the judgment as to the tract owned by Gilbert Vennum operated to set aside the tax as to the property of the complainants is met by several decisions of this court. Kelly v. City of Chicago, 148 Ill. 90, 35 N. E. 752;Phelps v. City of Mattoon, 177 Ill. 169, 52 N. E. 288;City of Chicago v. Nodeck, 202 Ill. 257, 67 N. E. 39. The reversal as to Vennum's property had no effect as to any other piece of property, and, indeed, section 56 of the local improvement act so expressly provides. Laws 1897, p. 121. These questions are therefore out of the case, and we need not consider whether under any circumstances they could afford ground for equitable relief.

The averment of the bills that the petition of the property owners had been used twice before in proceedings for the confirmation of a tax for this same improvement, which had been dismissed by the county court, remains to be considered. It is contended in support of the claim for equitable relief against the judgment that this fact deprived the county court of jurisdiction to render any judgment confirming the special tax, that both the ordinance and judgment of the court are nullities, and that property owners, therefore, have a right to an injunction to prevent the execution of the judgment and the collection of the tax. It is not a case where there is an attempt by taxpayers to enjoin a misappropriation of public money held in trust by public officials, but if the right exists it is a private one, affecting only the property of the complainants. The power of a court of equity to interfere and enjoin the enforcement or collection of a judgment is unquestioned, but the power is exercised according to fixed and determined rules, one of which is that it is no ground for relief in equity that a judgment is manifestly wrong in law or fact, or both, if the complainant, having an opportunity to make his defense at law, has omitted to do so. A court of equity will never interfere to stay the execution of a judgment unless the party invoking its aid can show some special equitable feature or ground of relief, and the failure of the complainant to make his defense in a court of law having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of his person is no ground for such interference. If he has been brought into court and has an opportunity to interpose his defense, equity will give him no relief from the consequences of his neglect. State Bank v. Stanton, 2 Gilman, 352;Holmes v. Stateler, 57 Ill. 209; 3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. § 1361. Even if a judgment is absolutely void for want of jurisdiction in the court over the subject-matter or the person, and may be defended against whenever and wherever there is an attempt to enforce it, equity will only enjoin its execution where there is some equitable ground for intervention. In this case, if the judgment of confirmation should be held void for want of jurisdiction in the county court to render it, that would be a good defense to an application for judgment of sale, which could be interposed by complainants without resort to a court of equity, and the question would be finally settled upon application for judgment for the first installment.

The bills allege that the village of Milford filed its petition in the county court for the levy and confirmation of the special tax, and do not aver that the court did not acquire jurisdiction of the persons of complainants by proper notice, as provided for in the statute. Complainants do not attack the judgment on account of any want of notice or want of jurisdiction of their persons, or allege that notice was not given; but their claim is that the court acquired no jurisdiction because the petition presented to the board of local improvements had lost its vitality by the prior use made of it. The only question, then, is whether the county court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter. If it did, and the complainants failed to make the defense that the petition had been previously used, and make proof of such fact, they cannot now invoke the aid of a court of equity on account of their neglect.

Jurisdiction is authority to hear and determine a cause-authority to decide. It is the power conferred by law to hear and determine controversies concerning certain subjects, and, as applied to the particular controversy, it is the power to hear and determine that controversy. 11 Cyc. 660; People v. Talmadge, 194 Ill. 67, 61 N. E. 1049. If a court has jurisdiction, its judgment may be directly attacked for errors or irregularities; but however manifestly erroneous the decision may be, it is binding until reversed or set aside in a direct proceeding for that purpose. The exercise of the jurisdiction may be erroneous; but if the court has authority to decide the case at all, every party brought within the jurisdiction must make his defense, and the judgment can only be set aside by appeal or on error, when such a remedy is available. Courts of equity do not sit to review the judgments of courts of law, rendered within their jurisdiction, on account of errors. Jurisdiction of the subject-matter must be found in and derived from the law, and in this case the law gives jurisdiction to county courts to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy. Section 37 of the local improvement act confers jurisdiction on the county court of any proceeding under that act. Laws 1897, p. 114. Jurisdiction of a particular case must be acquired in the manner prescribed by the...