Sumpter v. State
| Decision Date | 10 December 1906 |
| Citation | 98 S.W. 719 |
| Parties | SUMPTER v. STATE. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Garland County; Alex. M. Duffie, Judge.
O. H. Sumpter was indicted, and pending trial was suspended from office, and appeals. Affirmed.
The grand jury of Garland county returned an indictment against O. H. Sumpter, county judge of Garland county for nonfeasance in office for failing to hold the common pleas court on the 13th day of September, 1906; that being a day of an adjourned term of that court which the county judge was required to hold. Afterwards, on motion of the prosecuting attorney, the circuit court entered an order suspending Sumpter from the office of county judge until the indictment was tried, but specified that the suspension should not extend beyond the next term of the court, unless the cause was continued on the application of Sumpter. Sumpter appealed.
C. V. Teague, R. G. Davies, and James P. Clarke, for appellant.
RIDDICK, J. (after stating the facts).
The only question presented by this appeal is whether the statute by virtue of which the appellant was suspended from the office of county judge pending the trial of an indictment against him for nonfeasance in office is a valid law or not. The language of the act is as follows: Kirby's Dig. § 7992. The act further provides that, upon conviction for any such offenses, a part of the sentence of the court shall be removal from office. It also provides for a temporary appointment of an officer to discharge the duties of the office during the suspension and for an appointment to fill the vacancy if, upon conviction, the officer so suspended is removed from office. It will be noticed that the statute does not authorize a removal from office upon the filing of the indictment, but only a suspension until the indictment can be tried, and to guard against unwarranted delay it provides that the suspension shall not extend beyond the next term of the court, unless the case be continued on the application of the defendant. There is a distinction between a suspension and a removal from office. In the case of suspension the defendant still remains an officer, and there is no vacancy, but as a matter of public policy he is prevented from exercising the duties of the office while an indictment is pending against him. The statute makes no reference to the salary of the officer pending his suspension. It may follow that, by virtue of the suspension, he loses the salary during the period of suspension. But that matter is not before us. The question here is: Has the Legislature the power as a matter of public policy to provide that a county officer indicted for misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office shall be suspended and not allowed to discharge the duties of the office during the pendency of the indictment?
In a recent work it is said that "it is well settled in the United States that an office is not the property of the office holder, but is a public trust or agency; that it is not held by contract or grant; that the officer has no vested right therein; and that subject to constitutional restrictions the office may be vacated or abolished, the duties thereof changed, and the term and compensation increased or diminished." 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 328. This statement of the law is supported by numerous decisions, and is undoubtedly correct. It follows that, unless restricted by the Constitution, the Legislature has the right to declare that no county judge shall serve as such while an indictment is pending against him for malfeasance or nonfeasance in office.
To sustain the contention that this law is invalid, we are pointed to only two provisions of the Constitution. It is said that the Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Article 2, § 8. And again that it...
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