Sun Oil Co. v. Burns

• Decision Date: 18 November 1933
• Docket Number: No. 4373.,4373.
• Citation: 65 S.W.2d 808
• Parties: SUN OIL CO. v. BURNS et ux.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

65 S.W.2d 808

SUN OIL CO. v. BURNS et ux.

No. 4373.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.

November 18, 1933.

Rehearing Denied November 23, 1933.

Appeal from District Court, Smith County; Walter G. Russell, Judge.

Action by L. E. Burns and wife against the Sun Oil Company. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

The action is by L. E. Burns and wife against the Sun Oil Company, a corporation, in trespass to try title to 3.736 acres of land of the Juan Vargas League in Smith County. The Sun Oil Company answered by general denial and plea of not guilty. In a trial before the court without a jury, judgment was rendered in favor of the appellees for the title and possession of the land sued for. The appellant has appealed from the judgment.

The facts, which are agreed to and here set out in full, show, namely:

That Mattie M. Burns, joined by her husband, L. E. Burns, in consideration of $500, duly executed and delivered on September 19, 1930, to the Sun Oil Company, a corporation, a lease of "the land hereinafter described" for the purpose of drilling for and the production of oil, gas, and other minerals, namely: "The said land being situated in Smith County, Texas, and described as follows: A part of the Juan Vargas League, Abstract No. 22, Beginning at the S. W. corner of the J. A. St. Clair tract on E. B. line of the H. A. Pace 445-38/100 tract; thence S. 9 W. 692 varas to a corner; thence S. 81 E. 842 varas to a corner; thence N. 9 E. 695 varas to a corner, the S. E. corner of said St. Clair tract; thence N. 81 W. 842 varas to the place of beginning, containing 100 acres of land."

Following the above description, which is written on typewriter, appears in printed form, namely: "It being the intention, however, of lessor to include within the terms of this lease not only the above described land, but also any and all other land owned or claimed by lessor in said Survey or Surveys in which the above described land is situated or in adjoining surveys and adjoining the above described land."

The lease was drawn up on a regularly printed form and with the lessors' name and residence and the consideration paid and the description, by metes and bounds, of the 100 acres, were written by typewriter in the blanks specially left for such purposes. The last-quoted paragraph above following the description of the 100 acres was in printed form. The lease after its execution was recorded on October 22, 1930, in record of deeds of Smith county.

That a true and correct survey was made in January, 1932, of the "100-acre tract," set out in the lease, and it was found that the area described by metes and bounds "actually contains 106.25 acres."

That on September 19, 1930, when the lease was made to the Sun Oil Company, the plaintiffs, Mattie M. Burns and husband, L. E. Burns, "owned and claimed" the "tract of 3.736 acres" described and sued for in plaintiffs' petition. The tract of 3.736 acres "was and is in the Juan Vargas League in Smith County, Texas, and adjoined and adjoins the 100-acre tract in the said League described by metes and bounds in the said lease, the North line of the said tract of 3.736 acres being coincident with the South line of the 100 acres for its full length, both lines of the same length and having common corners." A plat of the premises has been attached and made a part of the statement of facts.

T. N. Jones, of Tyler, and T. L. Foster and J. W. Timmins, both of Dallas, for appellant.

Lasseter, Simpson & Spruiell, of Tyler, for appellees.

LEVY, Justice (after stating the case as above).

The parties have entered into the following stipulation: "That the only question to be considered in this case is whether or not the lease by its terms, under the proper construction thereof, in connection with the other facts which are reflected in this agreement, includes and covers the 3.736 acres described and sued for in plaintiffs' petition. That if the Court construes the lease as covering the land sued for, judgment should be entered in favor of the defendants establishing the lease to the land sued for; but if the Court construes the lease as not covering the land sued for then judgment should be in favor of the plaintiffs."

No claim is made that because of fraud or mistake the lease as executed does not express the intention of the parties thereto. And no claim is made that the field notes described by the boundaries and courses and distances stated in the lease when laid on the ground truly establish in fact that the 3.736 acres of land sued for are embraced therein. It is otherwise agreed as a fact that the specific metes and bounds of the field notes stated in the lease, when laid on the ground, truly establish that "106.25 acres" and no greater quantity of land are embraced therein. Such excess quantity of "6.25 acres" above the quantity of "100 acres" mentioned in the granting clause of the lease is conceded to have passed to appellant under the specific...