Sun v. Langston
| Decision Date | 01 March 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 67712,67712 |
| Citation | 316 S.E.2d 172,170 Ga.App. 60 |
| Parties | SUN v. LANGSTON. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Joseph C. Sun, pro se.
Jeffrey M. Smith, Kathleen Fisher, James C. Morton, Atlanta, for appellee.
Appellant Joseph C. Sun appeals an order dismissing his pro se suit against appellee David Langston for failure to state a claim.
Sun's complaint, as amended, alleged that Langston had provided legal representation for the defendant in a prior action which Sun had brought against an alleged "hit and run" driver in Gwinnett County. Count 1 asserted that Langston "by manipulation and fraud ... made attempt to coverup the 'where-abouts' of [the defendant] in the Gwinnett suit." For this alleged injury, Sun sought damages of $2,000 to compensate him for unnecessary work he otherwise could have avoided. In Count 2, Sun complained that by engaging in "harassment and unethical method of litigation," Langston was stubbornly litigious and had caused him "great difficulty and constant anxiety" during the Gwinnett litigation. For this alleged injury, Sun sought $50,000 in general damages. Count 3 was based upon Langston's alleged malicious attempts to embarrass Sun, disturb his employer, and threaten his wife and children in effecting service of process, taking depositions, and carrying out other discovery procedures, which "manipulative approach" was alleged to constitute an abuse of civil process giving rise to damages of $1,000. In Count 4, Sun sought $50,000 in punitive damages for wounded feelings, as well as court costs and expenses of litigation.
Langston filed a timely answer and motion to dismiss. Sun then filed a "Motion for Order to Compel Defendant to Comply with Georgia Civil Practice Act," to which Langston filed a response, accompanied by a supplemental brief in support of his motion to dismiss. By order and judgment signed August 23 and entered August 25, 1983, the court denied Sun's motion, finding it was totally frivolous and filed in bad faith. In addition, the order granted Langston's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and awarded him attorney fees of $500. Held:
1. Sun contends that he withdrew his motion to compel Langston to comply with the Civil Practice Act on August 23, 1983, when a letter to this effect was delivered to the trial judge's office, and that the award of attorney fees to Langston based on this motion was therefore contrary to law. There is nothing in the record on appeal to show that the motion was in fact "withdrawn" by appropriate pleading filed with the court. In any event, since the award of attorney fees must be reversed for other reasons, stated infra, the issue is moot.
2. The trial court correctly granted Langston's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, as the allegations of the complaint did not support any civil cause of action recognized in this state. First of all, none of the alleged acts of "harassment" or "manipulation and fraud" complained of may be construed as giving rise to an invasion of privacy claim. Under Georgia case law, the concept of invasion of privacy encompasses four loosely related but distinct torts, as follows: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation for the defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name and likeness. Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga.App. 367, 370, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966). In the instant suit no actionable physical intrusion into the appellant's private affairs, public disclosure of embarassing private facts, false publicity, or appropriation of appellant's name was alleged. Cf. Williams v. Church's Fried Chicken, 158 Ga.App. 26, 31(5), 279 S.E.2d 465 (1981).
Second, appellant's allegations did not amount to "the kind of egregious conduct necessary to state a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress." Thomas v. Ronald A. Edwards Constr. Co., 163 Ga.App. 202, 205(2), 293 S.E.2d 383 (1982). Ga. Power Co. v. Johnson, 155 Ga.App. 862, 863(2), 274 S.E.2d 17 (1980).
Third, it is quite clear that there was no claim for either malicious use or abuse of process...
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