Sunderland v. Lmassc
Decision Date | 09 June 2005 |
Docket Number | No. B173641.,B173641. |
Citation | 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 665,130 Cal.App.4th 1 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Kristi SUNDERLAND et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS SUPPORT COMPANY et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Law Offices of Volodar S. Kuzyk and Al Schallau, Palos Verdes Peninsula, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Haight, Brown & Bonesteel, George Christensen and Rita Gunasekaran, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Respondent.
In this appeal we discuss the differing purposes of the workers' compensation law and the respondeat superior doctrine of vicarious employer liability. We hold that the "commercial traveler rule" of workers' compensation law may not be incorporated into the respondeat superior doctrine.
In workers' compensation law, a worker is covered, without regard to fault, if the activity which injures the employee arises "out of and in the course of the employment." The commercial traveler rule provides that during the period an employee travels on the employer's business, the employee is within the "course of employment," which includes the activities of obtaining food and shelter.
By contrast, the respondeat superior doctrine makes an employer vicariously liable for an employee's torts committed within the "scope of employment." If the employee commits the tort while engaged in purely private purposes, however, such private conduct is outside the scope of employment and cannot form the basis for an employer's respondeat superior liability.
In this case, the injuries to plaintiffs were allegedly caused by an employee of defendant corporation, as the employee pursued the purely private activity of buying food at a fast-food restaurant. Plaintiffs argue that because that employee was in California pursuant to his employer's temporary work assignment, this court should borrow the commercial traveler rule from workers' compensation law and apply it to the respondeat superior doctrine to hold the corporation vicariously liable for its employee's alleged tort. As we will explain, the differing purposes of workers' compensation law and the respondeat superior doctrine do not permit incorporation of the commercial traveler rule into respondeat superior vicarious liability.
In a June 6, 2000, complaint against defendant Ali Mazloom, plaintiff Kristi L. Sunderland alleged a cause of action for negligence and Robert Sunderland alleged a cause of action for loss of consortium. The complaint arose from an automobile collision in Lancaster, California, on June 16, 1999. Plaintiffs later amended their complaint to add Mazloom's employer, Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems Support Company (LMASSC), as a defendant.
The trial court granted LMASSC's motion for summary judgment and entered judgment for LMASSC on December 11, 2003. Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.
(Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476-477, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 28 P.3d 116.)
Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. on June 16, 1999, while Mazloom and Kristi Sunderland waited in the drive-through lane at an In-N-Out Burger Restaurant in Lancaster, California, Mazloom's vehicle collided with the rear of Sunderland's vehicle.
On the date of the collision, LMASSC, a Lockheed Martin Corporation subsidiary, employed Mazloom as a field service representative. Headquartered in Marietta, Georgia, LMASSC provides after-market technical field support to government and military customers which own and operate aircraft manufactured by Lockheed Martin Corporation. LMASSC employs field service representatives, such as Mazloom, throughout the world where customers' personnel and aircraft are located. Between assignments, field service representatives work in Marietta, Georgia.
Mazloom was assigned to provide technical field support to LMASSC's military customer at Edwards Air Force Base. On May 12, 1999, Mazloom left Marietta, Georgia and drove his vehicle to Lancaster, California, arriving on May 15, 1999. Expecting to work at Edwards Air Force Base for several months, Mazloom rented a furnished apartment in Lancaster and moved in on June 3, 1999. Mazloom's job required him to perform all work at the base where aircraft were located and where he could work with other LMASSC and customer personnel. Mazloom and other LMASSC personnel had office space on the base, and Mazloom was not required to work away from Edwards Air Force Base.
On June 15, 1999, LMASSC cut short Mazloom's field assignment to Edwards Air Force Base and notified him he would start a multi-year field assignment in Australia in mid- to late July 1999. On his last work day at Edwards Air Force Base on June 16, 1999, Mazloom worked until mid-morning, clearing out his office and coordinating with other LMASSC personnel. He then drove to his Lancaster apartment and spent the afternoon packing and terminating the rental of that apartment. In the evening, Mazloom drove to his father-in-law's residence in Lancaster to visit and say goodbye. After leaving his father-in-law's residence, Mazloom drove to the In-N-Out Burger Restaurant to buy some food for dinner. In the drive-through lane, Mazloom's vehicle collided with the rear of plaintiff Kristi Sunderland's vehicle, which was ahead of him in line. Mazloom and Sunderland exchanged information. Mazloom then picked up his food, drove to his apartment, and ate his food. Mazloom owns his vehicle. LMASSC has no ownership interest in his vehicle.
Mazloom left Lancaster on June 17, 1999, to drive to Marietta, Georgia. Mazloom's field assignment at Edwards Air Force Base concluded when he arrived in Marietta, Georgia on July 19, 1999.
While working at Edwards Air Force Base, Mazloom made his own lodging arrangements. LMASSC reimbursed Mazloom's lodging cost in Lancaster and paid Mazloom a per diem allowance for food and incidental expenses, because LMASSC assumes that field service representatives incur higher costs working and living away from their Georgia residences. LMASSC permits field representatives to use their own vehicles for travel to field assignments, in part to enable them to have personal transportation while on a field assignment. Mazloom drove his vehicle to California, drove it while he lived in Lancaster and worked at Edwards Air Force Base, and drove it back to Marietta, Georgia. LMASSC paid Mazloom a mileage allowance for the trip from Marietta to Lancaster, and for the return trip from Lancaster to Marietta, but did not pay Mazloom a mileage or transportation allowance for his use of his vehicle while he lived in Lancaster and commuted to work at Edwards Air Force Base.
The trial court found that the evidence showed that on the evening of June 16, 1999, Mazloom was involved only in personal activities and was not acting in the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. Therefore LMASSC was not vicariously liable for the accident under the respondeat superior doctrine.
Plaintiffs claim that the "commercial traveler rule" of worker's compensation should be applied to expand the definition of the "scope of the employment" required for application of the respondeat superior doctrine.
Plaintiffs argue that the "commercial traveler rule" of the workers' compensation system should be applied in this case to expand the definition of the "scope of the employment" under the respondeat superior doctrine. As we articulate, the statutory workers' compensation system and the common law tort doctrine of respondeat superior differ significantly. No authority supports application of the commercial traveler rule to create respondeat superior liability.1 We conclude that the commercial traveler rule of workers' compensation law does not apply to this appeal.
The respondeat superior doctrine makes an employer vicariously liable for torts of its employee committed within the "scope of the employment." (Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital (1995) 12 Cal.4th 291, 296, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 510, 907 P.2d 358.) Liability under the respondeat superior doctrine does not rely on the employer's fault, and thus "is a departure from the general tort principle that liability is based on fault." (Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 208, 285 Cal.Rptr. 99, 814 P.2d 1341.) Instead, the doctrine imputes liability to the employer for the employee's tortious act that injures a third party. The respondeat superior doctrine rests on three rationales: "(1) to prevent recurrence of the tortious conduct; (2) to give greater assurance of compensation for the victim; and (3) to ensure that the victim's losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise to the injury." (Id. at p. 209, 285 Cal.Rptr. 99, 814 P.2d 1341.) These rationales derive from a deliberate allocation of the risk, by which losses caused by employees' torts that "are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's...
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