Sunset Harbour Condominium Association v. Robbins, No. SC03-520 (FL 7/7/2005)

• Decision Date: 07 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. SC03-520.,SC03-520.
• Parties: SUNSET HARBOUR CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, et al., Appellants, v. JOEL ROBBINS, etc., Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

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SUNSET HARBOUR CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, et al., Appellants, v. JOEL ROBBINS, etc., Appellee.

No. SC03-520.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 7, 2005.

An Appeal from the District Court of Appeal — Statutory or Constitutional Invalidity, Third District — Case No. 3D02-2316, (Dade County).

Arnaldo Velez, Coral Gables and Mitchell A. Feldman, Miami, and Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Eric J. Taylor, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Louis Hubener, and Mark T. Aliff Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Appellants.

Robert A. Ginsburg, Miami-Dade County Attorney, Thomas W. Logue, Jay W. Williams, and James K. Kracht, Assistant County Attorneys, Miami, Florida, for Appellees.

David L. Powell and Dan R. Stengle of Hopping, Green and Sams, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, and Robert M. Rhodes, Executive Vice President, Jacksonville, Florida, on behalf of the St. Joe Company as Amicus Curiae.

Victoria L. Weber of Hopping, Green and Sams, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, and Kenneth M. Rubin, Senior Attorney, Juno Beach, Florida, on behalf of Florida Power and Light Company as Amicus Curiae.

Joseph C. Mellichamp of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of Florida Home Builders Association as Amicus Curiae.

Benjamin K. Phipps of The Phipps Firm, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of Florida Association of Homes for the Aging and National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts as Amici Curiae.

Larry E. Levy and Loren E. Levy of the Levy Firm, Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of Property Appraisers' Association of Florida, Inc. as Amicus Curiae.

Paul F. King, Assistant County Attorney of Palm Beach County, West Palm Beach, Florida, on behalf of Palm Beach County as Amicus Curiae.

Heather J. Encinosa of Nabors, Giblin and Nickerson, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, on behalf of Florida Association of Counties, Florida Association of County Attorneys and Florida League of Cities, as Amici Curiae.

Gaylord A. Wood, Jr., of Wood and Stuart, P.A., New Smyrna Beach, Florida, on behalf of William Markham, as Broward County Property Appraiser; Francis Akins, as Levy County Property Appraiser; Kristina Kulpa, as Henry County Property Appraiser; Alvin Mazourek, as Hernando County Property Appraiser; Laurel Kelly, as Martin County Property Appraiser; Morgan Gilreath, as Volusia County Property Appraiser; and H.W. "Bill" Suber, as Seminole County Property Appraiser, as Amici Curiae.

REVISED OPINION

PER CURIAM.

We have on appeal a decision of the Third District Court of Appeal declaring section 192.042, Florida Statutes (1997), unconstitutional.¹ Section 192.042 requires property appraisers to assess all real property according to its just value as of January 1 of each year. However, if improvements to a parcel of property are not substantially completed on January 1, no valuation is to be placed on those improvements for that year. We hold that: (1) Sunset Harbour Condominium Association waived any objection to the property appraiser's affirmative defense that section 192.042 is unconstitutional; and (2) section 192.042 reasonably implements the provisions of article VII, section 4 of the Florida Constitution (which directs the Legislature to prescribe regulations that will secure a just valuation of property) and, therefore, is constitutional. We reverse the district court's decision and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

Sunset Harbour Condominium, located in Miami, was in the final stages of construction as of January 1, 1997. The Miami-Dade County Property Appraiser, Joel Robbins, determined that the structure was substantially complete as of January 1, 1997, and assessed the property a value of $22,935,100. The Sunset Harbour Condominium Association filed suit and argued that under section 192.042(1), Florida Statutes (1997), the improvements to the property should have been assessed no value because the condominium was not "substantially complete" on January 1, 1997.² Robbins raised as an affirmative defense that the statute violated article VII, section 4 of the Florida Constitution, and moved for summary judgment on this ground. The trial court held that the statute was unconstitutional and granted summary judgment in Robbins' favor. The Third District affirmed the trial court, Sunset Harbour N. Condo. Ass'n v. Robbins, 837 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003), for the reasons stated in its earlier decision in Fuchs v. Robbins, 738 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).³ Fuchs was reversed by this Court after the Court held that the property appraiser did not have standing to challenge the statute in question. See Fuchs v. Robbins, 818 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2002). Standing was not raised by the parties in this case in either the trial court or the Third District Court of Appeal. However, it was raised by Sunset Harbour in its initial brief to this Court and was addressed by several amici curiae.

The Florida Department of Revenue was named by Sunset Harbour as a party defendant in the original action, as required by statute. The department joined Sunset Harbour as an appellant after the circuit court held section 192.042 to be unconstitutional.

We begin our analysis by determining whether Sunset Harbour preserved its objection to Robbins' standing to raise the affirmative defense. We also address the constitutionality of section 192.042.

I. FAILURE TO RAISE AN OBJECTION TO THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

Sunset Harbour and amici curiae argue that Robbins lacked standing to raise the constitutionality of section 192.042 as an affirmative defense. As support for his argument that the affirmative defense was properly asserted, Robbins relies on obiter dictum from Fuchs. This dictum states that a property appraiser may raise a defensive challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.

We hold that Sunset Harbour waived any objection to the validity of the asserted affirmative defense because no objection was raised in either the trial court or the district court. As a general rule, it is not appropriate for a party to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. Dade County Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 1999) (a claim not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal); Dober v. Worrell, 401 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 1981) (appellate court will not consider issues not presented to the trial judge on appeal from final judgment on the merits). "In order to be preserved for further review by a higher court, an issue must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that presentation if it is to be considered preserved." Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985). Because an objection to the availability of this affirmative defense to the property appraiser was not made at the trial court or the district court, we hold that any objection to the defense was waived.

II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 192.042, FLORIDA STATUTES

Having held that Sunset Harbour waived any objection to the affirmative defense asserted by Robbins, we now address the constitutionality of section 192.042. Robbins argues that section 192.042(1) is unconstitutional because article VII, section 4 of the Florida Constitution requires all property and structures to be assessed at fair market value, regardless of whether the structures are substantially completed. He argues that section 192.042(1) creates an unconstitutional fifth exception to the just valuation requirement in article VII, section 4. We disagree. In Culbertson v. Seacoast Towers East, Inc., 212 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 1968), we rejected the claim that the predecessor substantially complete statute constituted an exception to the "just valuation"⁴ requirement. We recognized that the statute did not create an exception to the constitutional requirement that property be assessed at its fair market value but, instead, determined the time at which property improvements should be assessed (i.e., when they are substantially complete). Id. The same reasoning applies in this case.

We begin our analysis by restating the appropriate standard of review. We then address the state of the substantial completion statute after Culbertson. Finally, we discuss the legislative method for achieving a just valuation.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court's review of the district court's decision is de novo. See Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm'n v. Caribbean Conservation Corp., Inc., 789 So. 2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that whether a state statute is constitutional is a pure question of law subject to de novo review), approved, 838 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2003).

Statutes come before this Court "clothed with a presumption of constitutionality." Dep't of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So. 2d 879, 881 (Fla. 1983). Therefore, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that, if at all possible, a statute should be construed to be constitutional. See Van Bibber v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d 880, 883 (Fla. 1983). In fact, this Court is bound "to resolve all doubts as to the validity of [the] statute in favor of its constitutionality, provided the statute may be given a fair construction that is consistent with the federal and state constitutions as well as with the legislative intent." State v. Stalder, 630 So. 2d 1072, 1076 (Fla. 1994) (quoting State v. Elder, 382 So. 2d 687, 690 (Fla. 1980)). In interpreting constitutional provisions, "[t]he fundamental object to be sought in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain the intent of the framers and the provision must be construed or interpreted in such manner as to fulfill the intent of the people, never to defeat it." Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960).

B. THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION STATUTE AFTER CULBERTSON

In 1968 this Court upheld the constitutionality of section 193.11,⁵ the...