Super v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 November 2022
• Docket Number: Civil Action 22-1274 (BAH)
• Parties: VON MAURICE SUPER, Plaintiff, v. CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

VON MAURICE SUPER, Plaintiff,
v.
CONVERGENT OUTSOURCING, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 22-1274 (BAH)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

November 11, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL CHIEF JUDGE

Proceeding pro se, plaintiff Von Maurice Super sued Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., a debt collector, for actions they took to collect on an alleged debt that he owed to a third-party entity, alleging violations of his “natural right to privacy,” violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), see generally 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), see generally 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and other federal statutes. After answering plaintiff's Amended Complaint, defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 12(c). For the reasons outlined below, defendant's motion is granted, and the Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on March 23, 2022, alleging that defendant “committed aggravated identity theft” and “violated numerous consumer rights, [and] [his] privacy.” Statement of Claim at 2, ECF No. 1-2. In the section entitled “Request for Relief,” plaintiff listed the following: “[d]eletion of negative account[,] [c]ease collection of debt[,] compensation for FCRA violations[,] & court cost.” Id. On the page entitled “Notice,” plaintiff requested judgment in the amount of $9,000. Id. at 4. Defendant timely removed the case to federal court on May 9, 2022. See Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1.

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Plaintiff later filed his Amended Complaint, on August 29, 2022, in which he alleges that defendant “furnish[ed] inaccurate and misleading information of an alleged debt to credit reporting agencies . . . without permissible purpose and written consent from [him], and without providing [him] the opportunity to opt out of reporting [his] personal financial matters to additional unattended third parties.” Am. Compl. at 6, ECF No. 12. Specifically, defendant reported to Experian and Equifax-two leading credit reporting agencies-that plaintiff “owed an amount of $1,213.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff subsequently sent defendant “a cease-and-desist letter informing [it] the alleged debt is in dispute and demanding defendant to cease any and all forms of communication with [him] and all mediums.” Id. Despite his request, defendant “continued to communicate with Experian and Equifax about the alleged debt . . . until July 2022,” purportedly in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681n and an invasion of his privacy. Id. at 7-8. In his Amended Complaint's cover sheet, plaintiff notes that defendant has also violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692, 15 U.S.C. § 1028A, and 15 U.S.C. § 6803. Id. at 4.

After defendant's communications with Experian and Equifax, plaintiff “filed a complaint with the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau” requesting “proof of any documentation showing probable evidence that [he] ha[s] obligation to the” account with defendant. Id. at 6-7. According to plaintiff's factual allegations set out in the Amended Complaint, defendant responded to his complaint, explaining that on February 25, 2022, it “mailed [him] documents from Sprint, validating the balance that [Sprint] state[s] is owed.” Id. at 7.^[1]Defendant also explained that it would “mail [plaintiff] another copy of the documents obtained from Sprint,” validating the balance that they state is owed. Apparently, defendant mailed plaintiff the promised documents, but plaintiff alleges that “[t]he document that was received was three billing statements, which does not prove [his] indebtedness to [defendant] under” the account at issue. Id. Plaintiff further

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alleges, in support, that “defendant has not provided any double entry bookkeeping accounting ledger kept according to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)[,] [so] defendant can no longer assume that their alleged debt is valid.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges other violations of the FDCPA in his Amended Complaint. First, he claims that because “defendant has sent several document[s] claiming that [he] owe[s] a debt[,]” defendant is in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2). Id. Second, he says defendant engaged in “willful negligence” and caused “emotional distress and financial harm by furnishing the alleged debt on [his] credit file,” purportedly in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692j. Id. In his prayer for relief, plaintiff seeks damages and various types of injunctive relief. Id.

As already noted, defendant answered the Amended Complaint, see Answer to Am. Compl., ECF No. 21, and thereafter filed the pending motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c), along with an accompanying memorandum of law in support. See Def.'s Mot. for J. on Plead. (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 22; Def.'s Mem. In Supp. of Mot. for J. on Plead. (“Def.'s Mem.”), ECF No. 22-1. The parties completed their briefing on November 9, 2022, see Def.'s Me. In Further Supp. Def.'s Mot. For J. on Pleadings (“Def's Reply”), ECF No. 24, so the motion is now ripe for resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 12(c) allows for judgment on the pleadings after responsive pleadings have been filed but prior to trial. The standard for a motion for judgment under Rule 12(c) is essentially the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Schuchart v. La TabernaDelAlabardero, Inc., 365 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C.Cir. 2004); Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006); Baumann v. District of Columbia, 744 F.Supp.2d 216, 221 (D.D.C. 2010); Sanders v. District of Columbia, 601 F.Supp.2d 97, 99 (D.D.C.2009) (“The standard of review for motions for judgment on the

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pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules is essentially the same as that for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”). That is, the court must accept as true the non-movant's “well-pleaded allegations to the extent that ‘they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'” See, e.g., McNamara v. Picken, 866 F.Supp.2d 10, 14 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)); Bowman v. District of Columbia, 562 F.Supp.2d 30, 32 (D.D.C. 2008). Legal conclusions, however, need not be accepted as true. McNamara, 866 F.Supp.2d at 14. “Because a Rule 12(c) motion would summarily extinguish litigation at the threshold and foreclose the opportunity for discovery and factual presentation, the Court must treat [the defendant's] motion with the greatest of care and deny it if there are allegations in the complaint which, if proved, would provide a basis for recovery.” Baumann, 744 F.Supp.2d at 221 (quotations omitted) (citing Haynesworth, 820 F.2d at 1254).

Although pro se complaints are liberally construed and “held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,'” with entitlement “to all favorable inferences that may be drawn from his or her allegations, a pro se complaint, like any other, must present a claim upon which relief can be granted by the court.” Nicastro v. Clinton, 882 F.Supp. 1128, 1129 (D.D.C. 1995) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (citation omitted), aff'd, 84 F.3d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).

III. DISCUSSION

Liberally construed, the Amended Complaint is...