Super Wash v. City of White Settlement
| Decision Date | 26 February 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-03-089-CV.,2-03-089-CV. |
| Parties | SUPER WASH, INC., Appellant, v. CITY OF WHITE SETTLEMENT, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Hal R. Ray, Jr., Pope, Hardwicke, Christie, Harrell, Schell & Kelly, L.L.P., Fort Worth, for appellant.
Michael R. Burkett, Fort Worth, for appellee.
PANEL B: LIVINGSTON, DAUPHINOT, and HOLMAN, JJ.
Appellant, Super Wash, Inc. (Super Wash), filed this suit against Appellee, the City of White Settlement (the City), challenging the validity and enforceability of a zoning ordinance placing conditions on the use of property owned by Super Wash. Both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment. The City's motion was granted and Super Wash's motion was denied. Both parties then submitted a joint motion for final judgment, which the trial court granted. In seven issues, Super Wash now argues that the trial court erred by granting the City's partial motion for summary judgment. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On August 29, 2000, Super Wash contracted to purchase a tract of land in the City for the purpose of constructing and operating a car wash facility. The contract for sale was conditioned on Super Wash securing all necessary building permits, approvals, and permission from the City to construct the car wash. Super Wash contacted the City's representatives and after receiving approval and permission from the City, proceeded with the purchase and development of the property.
On or about February 8, 2001, the City issued a building permit to Super Wash to construct a car wash in accordance with the plans and specifications contained on the site plan previously submitted to the City for approval. The site plan clearly showed an exit onto Longfield Drive. When the permit was issued, the building official was not aware of the conditions of use imposed on the property by the 1986 ordinance that amended the original multifamily medium density zoning classification to thoroughfare commercial zoning classification. The City's zoning map did not note the conditions.
The residential neighbors informed the building official of the existence of the ordinance less than a week after the building permit was issued. On or about February 12, 2001, the City's building official contacted Super Wash and for the first time informed Super Wash that the City required Super Wash to construct a wooden fence with brick columns on the northern edge of the property along Longfield Drive. He also advised Super Wash that the City required the width of the curb cut along Longfield Drive to be increased from eighteen feet to twenty-four feet. The existence of a curb cut and driveway, therefore, remained an approved part of the site plans.
After the residents brought the 1986 ordinance to the City's attention, the City researched the ordinance more thoroughly in the next few weeks. By a letter dated March 1, 2001, the City informed Super Wash that it was required to modify its previously submitted and approved site plan again. The plan would need to be modified to include the wooden fence with brick columns, but the curb cut and driveway would no longer be allowed. This modification was required, the City alleged, under Ordinance No. 837-86 (the Ordinance), which states in part:
This change of zoning is expressly conditioned upon the owner and/or occupant, now or later, of this property constructing and thereafter maintaining a six-foot wooden privacy fence with brick columns on Longfield to the building line on Cherry Lane in accordance with the requirements in the Building Code. Failing these conditions, there shall occur an automatic revision to `MFM' Multi Family Medium Density zoning classification.
At the time Super Wash received the March letter, construction on the car wash was about forty-five percent complete. Based on the letter, Super Wash, under protest and without expressly waiving, releasing, or otherwise relinquishing its right to complete construction, amended the site plan removing the curb cut and driveway and submitted a revised site plan. The City approved this amended site plan.
Super Wash then sued the City challenging the validity and enforceability of the Ordinance. Both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment. Super Wash filed its motion for partial summary judgment on the grounds that the condition requiring a fence on Longfield Drive violates the Zoning Enabling Act because the fence condition is not uniform with conditions on other property classified as thoroughfare commercial; the condition requiring the fence is impermissible contract zoning; and the reversionary clause is invalid under the Zoning Enabling Act, impermissibly delegating the City's legislative power. The City filed its motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Ordinance was validly passed pursuant to established procedures; the Ordinance is entitled to the presumption of validity and enforcement, and there is no evidence to rebut the presumption; Super Wash has no standing to challenge the Ordinance; the Ordinance was validated by the legislature; the City cannot be estopped from enforcing the Ordinance; and the reversionary clause in the ordinance is not at issue in the case. The City's motion was granted in its entirety without explanation and Super Wash's motion was denied in its entirety without explanation.
Believing that the matter of attorney's fees was the only issue that remained following the trial court's partial summary judgment, the parties submitted a joint motion for final judgment, which the trial court granted. Super Wash now brings this appeal. Super Wash argues, in seven issues, that the trial court erred by granting the City's motion for partial summary judgment.
In a summary judgment case, the issue on appeal is whether the movant met his summary judgment burden by establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.1 The burden of proof is on the movant, and all doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of material fact are resolved against the movant.2 Therefore, we must view the evidence and its reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.3
In deciding whether there is a material fact issue precluding summary judgment, all conflicts in the evidence are disregarded and the evidence favorable to the nonmovant is accepted as true.4 Evidence that favors the movant's position will not be considered unless it is uncontroverted.5
The summary judgment will be affirmed only if the record establishes that the movant has conclusively proved all essential elements of the movant's cause of action or defense as a matter of law.6
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if the summary judgment evidence establishes, as a matter of law, that at least one element of a plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established.7 The defendant as movant must present summary judgment evidence that negates an element of the plaintiff's claim.8 Once the defendant produces sufficient evidence to establish the right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to come forward with competent controverting evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the element challenged by the defendant.9
When both parties move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the reviewing court should review both parties' summary judgment evidence and determine all questions presented.10 The reviewing court should render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered.11
In its fifth issue, Super Wash argues that the trial court erred by finding that, as a matter of law, it did not have standing to challenge the validity or enforceability of the Ordinance. We agree.
Standing pertains to a plaintiff's justiciable interest in a suit.12 To have standing in Texas, the general rule is that a plaintiff must establish that he has an individual interest in a conflict that is distinct from the interest of the general public.13 Specifically, a plaintiff has standing if: (1) he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the complained of wrongful act; (2) there is a direct relationship between the alleged injury and the claim to be adjudicated; (3) the plaintiff has a personal stake in the controversy; (4) the challenged action has caused the plaintiff some injury in fact, either economic, recreational, environmental, or otherwise; and (5) the plaintiff is an appropriate party to assert the public interest in the matter as well as the plaintiff's own interest.14
In this case, Super Wash has standing to challenge the validity and the City's enforcement of the Ordinance.15 It is settled law that people have a fundamental right to use their property as they wish, provided that the use does not harm others.16 The only way this fundamental right can be limited is through the lawful exercise of police power.17 The Ordinance, and the City's enforcement thereof, specifically limits Super Wash's fundamental right to use its property. Accordingly, Super Wash has sustained direct injury and it has an individual interest distinct from the public's interest in the validity and enforceability of the Ordinance.
Super Wash also has standing to seek declaration of the validity of the ordinance under the Declaratory Judgment Act18 because its rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by the municipal ordinance.19 Consequently, the trial court erred to the extent that it held, as a matter of law, that Super Wash did not have standing to challenge the validity and enforceability of the Ordinance. We sustain Super Wash's fifth issue to that extent.
In Super Wash's first through fourth and sixth issues, it argues that the Ordinance is not valid as...
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