Superior Improvement Co. v. Hignight, 73--8
| Citation | 254 Ark. 328,493 S.W.2d 424 |
| Decision Date | 30 April 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 73--8,73--8 |
| Parties | SUPERIOR IMPROVEMENT COMPANY, Appellant, v. Lillian Aldridge HIGNIGHT, Appellee. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Arkansas |
Ben F. Arnold, Little Rock, for appellant.
Boyce R. Love, Little Rock, for appellee.
This is a workmen's compensation case. Appellee-claimant asserted that she suffered a compensable fall in the course of her employment and was sustained by a unanimous commission and the circuit court. Appellant here contends that the finding that claimant suffered a fall on appellant's premises is not supported by substantial evidence; that if she did suffer such an occurrence it was not the cause of claimant's injuries; and that error was committed in not finding that the healing period ended on or about September 1, 1971.
Appellee, a sixty year old widow, was a telephone solicitor for appellant at the place of business on Broadway in Little Rock. Appellant was engaged in the business of selling and installing aluminum siding, doing quite a volume of business. Solicitors would obtain business by calling prospects listed in the telephone directory. If a call resulted in a favorable reception, the name of the prospect would be given to a solicitor who would contact the prospect and endeavor to firm up a sale.
If appellee-claimant sustained a fall on appellant's premises, then here are the facts in capsule form which sustain the contention. Appellee and Phyllis Wyatt were on duty at the company headquarters on the night of July 20, 1971, working in different rooms which appear to have been adjacent. We gather that there were four offices which joined. Between the warehouse and the offices there is a glass and appellee was sitting with her back to the glass with her headphone in place. Her attention was attracted by a noise or a shadow which caused appellant to look up. Through the glass she could see a man 'in a staggering position and pathetic looking'. She hurriedly locked the door just to her back, which door was between the warehouse and the office. She called to Phyllis to lock her door because a man might be coming in on them. Phyllis locked the back door and then went to lock the door to the manager's office. At the same time appellee went from her desk to the front office to lock the door that led in off the street. She was hurrying because she wanted to beat the man to the door. In the front office there was a box on the floor containing a substantial amount of literature and it was in appellee's path. The box was almost as high as appellee's knees. She tripped over the box and fell completely over it and on to a floor of concrete and tile. She hurriedly scampered to her feet and reached the door just as the man was reaching for the door knob. She managed to get it locked and the man turned and went down Broadway.
Phyllis walked into the front office and appellee reported the fall and complained of being hurt. They then went into appellee's office and appellee sat down. Phyllis cleaned appellee's hands, arms and knees, all of which were dirty from the fall. Phyllis did not see appellee fall because she was busy at the time of the incident locking the door which led to the warehouse. Phyllis verified that she got a glimpse of the intruder; that appellee reported the fall to her; that she cleaned appellee's hands with a rag because they were dirty; and that she bathed appellee's legs with alcohol. From the evidence abstracted we think it sufficient to reasonably deduce that appellee suffered a fall.
Appellant next contends that any fall appellee may have received was not the proximate cause of her injuries. Appellee is extremely overweight and had admittedly suffered for many years with intermittent attacks of thrombophlebitis in her left leg. At the time of the described occurrence her leg was swollen from that ailment and she kept it elevated while doing her telephoning. Therefore, says appellant, the condition of the knee was attributable to the phlebitis; appellant introduced medical testimony to that effect.
Appellee sought no medical aid that night, although she complained to Phyllis that she hurt her knee, that she believed she had a fractured rib, and that her breast was injured. The next morning the pain was so...
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