Superior Mfg. Co. v. School Dist. No. 63, Kiowa County
| Decision Date | 16 November 1910 |
| Citation | 114 P. 328,28 Okla. 293,1910 OK 366 |
| Parties | SUPERIOR MFG. CO. v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 63, KIOWA COUNTY. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Under the provisions of section 4 of an act of Congress approved July 30, 1886 (24 Stat. 171, c. 818), a school district of a territory cannot become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to any amount which in the aggregate, including existing indebtedness, exceeds 4 per centum of the value of the taxable property within such school district, to be ascertained by the last assessment for territorial and county taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness; and any contract entered into by its officers in violation of this section is void.
Where the aggregate indebtedness of a school district, located in a territory, is in excess of 4 per centum of the value of the taxable property within such school district as shown by the last assessment for territorial and county taxes, the acceptance, retention, and use of furniture or supplies by the officers of such school district in its behalf will create no liability against the district for the value of the same.
Error from Kiowa County Court; J. W. Mansell, Judge.
Action by the Superior Manufacturing Company against School District No. 63, Kiowa County. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
Morse & Standeven and James H. Wolverton, for plaintiff in error.
Thomas W. Conner, for defendant in error.
This case presents error from the county court of Kiowa county being originally brought in that county by plaintiff in error as plaintiff to recover judgment against the defendant in error as defendant for $175.40 with 6 per cent. interest from the 2d of September, 1903. The petition is in two counts; the first being upon a warrant issued and delivered by defendant to the plaintiff to cover the purchase price of certain school supplies and furniture sold and delivered to the defendant, and the second count is for the value of the said property which was delivered and received by the defendant and which it still retains and uses.
It is conceded on the part of counsel for plaintiff in error that under the rule of this court, in the case of Ray v School District No. 9, Caddo County, 21 Okl. 88, 95 P 480, it is not entitled to recover upon the warrant issued; but it is insisted that it is entitled to recover a judgment against the district for the value of the property which it delivered and which the district received, retained, and still uses. At the time this property was sold and delivered to the school district, Oklahoma was a territory, and the defense to the action is made that plaintiff cannot recover on either count by reason of the provisions of section 4 of the act of Congress approved July 30, 1886 (24 Stat. 171, c. 818), commonly known as the "Harrison act," and which provides: "That no political or municipal corporation, county, or other subdivision in any of the territories of the United States shall ever become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to any amount in the aggregate, including existing indebtedness, exceeding four per centum of the value of the taxable property within such corporation, county, or subdivision, to be ascertained by the last assessment of the territorial and county taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness, and all bonds or obligations in excess of such amount given by such corporation shall be void. ***"
It is conceded that, at the time of the purchase and delivery of the furniture, the price or value of which is herein sued for, the defendant school district was indebted in an amount in excess of the 4 per cent. above mentioned. Notwithstanding this, however, it is the contention of counsel for plaintiff that the officers of the school district could not purchase and the district receive, retain, and use the furniture without being liable. And a number of authorities are cited in support of the proposition that the obligation to do justice rests upon all persons, natural and artificial, and that if the school district obtained the money or property of others without authority of law, independent of any contract, it would be compelled to make restitution or compensation. Marsh v. Fulton County, 10 Wall. 676, 684, 19 L.Ed. 1040, 1042; Louisiana v. Wood, 102 U.S. 294, 299, 26 L.Ed. 153, 155.
The facts and the law involved in these cases, however, are such as do not render them an authority to sustain in all particulars the contention which plaintiff here advances. Nor is plaintiff's contention sustained by the case of Hitchcock v. Galveston, 96 U.S. 341, 24 L.Ed. 659, for in that case the Supreme Court of the United States, referring to the terms of the charter of the city alleged to have been violated, holds that the provision involved could not have been intended to prohibit incurring an indebtedness exceeding the sum named; that it was in no sense a limitation of the debt of the city. The rule laid down in the case of Pittsburgh, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co., 131 U.S. 371, 9 S.Ct. 770, 33 L.Ed. 157, relating to the ultra vires contracts entered into by officers of private corporations where the concern has accepted and is enjoying the benefits, is as follows: "According to many recent opinions of this court, a contract made by a corporation, which is unlawful and void because beyond the scope of its corporate powers, does not, by being carried into execution, become lawful and valid, but the proper remedy of the party aggrieved is by disaffirming the contract and suing to recover, as on a quantum meruit, the value of what the defendant has actually received the benefit of." But this rule has, so far as our investigation has gone, never been extended to the point of creating an obligation against a municipal corporation to pay the value of goods, supplies, or other property, although it has received and retained them where the same exceeded the legal limit of its debt-incurring power.
The language of the statute invoked is that a municipality shall not "become indebted in any manner or for any purpose." This same language is used in the Constitution of Illinois (section 12, art. 9), and received a construction at the hands of the Supreme Court of that state in the case of City of Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626. Referring to this particular language, the court in the opinion says: ...
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