Supreme Coat Co. v. Lyon Warehouse & Distributing Co.

• Decision Date: 07 April 1955
• Citation: 126 N.E.2d 107,332 Mass. 505
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: SUPREME COAT COMPANY, Harvey Corporation and Louis Widoff, v. LYON WAREHOUSE AND DISTRIBUTING COMPANY. BURKE BROTHERS DISTILLERIES, Inc., v. LYON WAREHOUSE AND DISTRIBUTING COMPANY.

Page 107

126 N.E.2d 107

332 Mass. 505

SUPREME COAT COMPANY, Harvey Corporation and Louis Widoff, v. LYON WAREHOUSE AND DISTRIBUTING COMPANY.

BURKE BROTHERS DISTILLERIES, Inc., v. LYON WAREHOUSE AND DISTRIBUTING COMPANY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Argued Jan. 5, 1955.

Decided April 7, 1955.

Charles W. Proctor, Worcester (Frank Howard, Holden and James N. Gabriel, Boston, with him), for plaintiffs.

John P. Dunn, Shrewsbury, for defendant.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, WILKINS, SPALDING and COUNIHAN, JJ.

COUNIHAN, Justice.

These are actions of tort in which the plaintiffs seek to recover damages by reason of a fire on premises which the defendant allegedly rented from the Harvey Corporation, one of the plaintiffs. The other plaintiffs alleged that they were tenants of the defendant. All of the plaintiffs alleged that the fire, which occurred on March 13, 1948, was caused to be set and spread by the negligence of the defendant. The actions are here upon exceptions of the defendant to the denial of its motions for directed verdicts and to the allowance of motions of two of the plaintiff to amend their declarations. There was no error.

One Katz, who was the president and treasurer of the defendant corporation, was called as a witness by the plaintiffs. After his direct examination had ended the judge stated to the jury 'that damages had been agreed on and would be stated later, and that the whole issue for them to decide is the question of the cause of the fire and the responsibility of the defendant as to the cause.' Later the judge told the jury that the Harvey Corporation was the owner of the building. The judge instructed the jury that if they found for the plaintiffs they should assess damages in certain specified amounts which had been agreed upon by the parties. The jury returned a verdict for each plaintiff in the agreed amount.

There was ample evidence that the fire was caused by the negligence of the defendant in the installation and maintenance of an oil space heater in its office in the building. Other than the statement of the judge as to the Harvey Corporation, there was no evidence as to the relationship which existed between the plaintiffs and the defendant or the status of the parties. The defendant argues that because of the absence of such evidence the plaintiffs may not recover. There is no merit in such contention.

When the judge made the statement to the jury relative to the issue to be decided by them, all of the parties acquiesced. No exceptions were taken by the defendant and no requests for instructions were later made by it. The defendant manifestly agreed that the only issue was its responsibility for the fire. In effect it admitted that, if the jury should find that the damages sustained were caused by the fire and that the fire was caused by the negligence of the defendant, then the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. The verdicts of the jury fixed the responsibility of the defendant and it is too late now to raise questions as to the relationship of the parties or their status. Its right to do so was...