Supreme Council American Legion of Honor v. Batte

• Decision Date: 10 February 1904
• Citation: 79 S.W. 629
• Parties: SUPREME COUNCIL AMERICAN LEGION OF HONOR v. BATTE.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

79 S.W. 629

SUPREME COUNCIL AMERICAN LEGION OF HONOR v. BATTE.^*

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

February 10, 1904.

Appeal from District Court, Milam County: J. C. Scott, Judge.

Action by Amanda Batte against the Supreme Council American Legion of Honor. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

In this case the evidence establishes the following facts: In August, 1880, appellee became a member of the American Legion of Honor, a fraternal beneficial order, and thereupon the following benefit certificate was issued: "$5,000.00. American Legion of Honor. Benefit Certificate. This certificate is issued to Companion Mattie A. Batte, a member of Hercules Council No. 255, A. L. H., located at Cameron, Texas, upon evidence received from said council that said companion is a sixth degree contributor to the benefit fund of this order, and upon condition that the statements made by said companion in application for membership in said council, and the statements certified by said companion to the medical examiner, both of which are filed in the supreme secretary's office, be made a part of this contract; and upon condition that the said companion complies, in the future, with the laws, rules and regulations now governing the said council and fund, or that may hereafter be enacted by the supreme council to govern said council and fund. These conditions being complied with, the supreme council of the A. L. H. hereby promises and binds itself to pay out of its benefit fund to W. T. Hefley a sum not exceeding five thousand dollars, in accordance with and under the provisions of the laws governing said fund, upon satisfactory evidence of the death of said companion and upon the surrender of this certificate that said companion is in good standing in this order, at the time of death, and provided also that this certificate shall not have been surrendered by said companion and another certificate issued in accordance with the laws of this order." Appellee paid all of her assessments, up to and including the 2d day of September, 1901. In August, 1900, the Supreme Council of the American Legion of Honor enacted the following by-law: "Two thousand dollars shall be the highest amount paid by the order on the death of a member under any benefit certificate heretofore or hereafter issued. This sum shall be paid on the death of every member holding a benefit certificate of two thousand dollars or over; and one thousand dollars on the death of every member holding a benefit certificate for that amount; and five hundred dollars on the death of every member holding a benefit certificate for that amount; provided that if at the death of said member one full assessment upon each of the members of the order will not amount to the full sum of two thousand dollars, then the amount to be paid to the beneficiaries of said deceased member shall not exceed the amount collected by said assessment, if said member's benefit certificate is for two thousand dollars; one-half of the amount if the benefit certificate is for one thousand dollars; and one quarter of the amount if the benefit certificate is for five hundred dollars. And provided that the face value of the benefit certificate shall be paid, so long as the emergency fund of the order has not been exhausted. And provided that the said member shall, at the time of death, be a member of the order in good standing, and shall have complied with all the laws, rules and regulations of the order as they now are, or as they may be hereafter from time to time altered or amended." August 21, 1901, said supreme council amended the foregoing by-law by dropping the word "face" from the next to the last sentence thereof. After the enactment of said by-law, appellee protested against said action, but continued to pay her regular assessments until September 2, 1901 and the evidence warrants the conclusion that she continued to pay the assessments for this time under a reasonable expectation that the supreme council might be induced to change its action with reference to said by-law. On this date, however, she abandoned this expectation, and, because of said...