Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor v. Selby

• Decision Date: 12 October 1910
• Citation: 69 S.E. 51,153 N.C. 203
• Parties: SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS OF HONOR v. SELBY et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

69 S.E. 51

153 N.C. 203

SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS OF HONOR v. SELBY et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 12, 1910

Appeal from Superior Court, Wilson County; Guion, Judge.

Action by the Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor against Benjamin R Selby and others. From a judgment against plaintiff in part it appeals. Affirmed as modified.

Defendants in an interpleader bill, by not demurring to the complaint on the ground that it showed that one of defendants was entitled to the debt, and by answering and setting up their conflicting claims, waived such defect in the bill.

The Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor is a fraternal beneficiary association under the laws of the state of Missouri, issuing benefit certificates to its members. The member has the right to designate a beneficiary, but the right of revocation is reserved, and the by-laws provide that, if all the beneficiaries designated by the member die before the decease of such member, if no other benefit certificate has been procured by him, the benefit shall be paid to the widow and children of the member, and, if no widow, then to his children.

One John Selby became a member of the order and received a benefit certificate for the sum of $2,000, and died on December 4, 1908. At the time of his death he was a member in good standing in appellant's said order, and appellant became bound to pay the amount of the benefit certificate to whomsoever should be lawfully entitled thereto. The benefit certificate was payable to the wife of the member, Esther Selby, who died in his lifetime, and at the time of his death Selby had not obtained a new benefit certificate.

He left no widow, but three children, namely, the defendants Benjamin R. Selby, Susan B. Rierson, and Minnie B. Walls. After the death of Selby, the said children made demand on appellant for the payment of the amount of the certificate to them. They resided in Wilson county. About the same time the defendant, Smyth Bros., McCleary-McClellan Company, a corporation, with headquarters at Richmond, Va., made demand on appellant for the payment of the amount of the benefit certificate to it, claiming that in his lifetime said John Selby delivered and pledged to said corporation the said benefit certificate to secure advances made by it to him; that the said benefit certificate was always and then was in its possession; and that said company had paid all assessments and premiums on said benefit certificate for a period of four years, and that the amount of the indebtedness of Selby to the company at the time of his death largely exceeded the amount of the said certificate, and said company threatened to sue plaintiff for the said amount unless the same was paid to it. On the 1st day of March, 1909, the appellant filed in the superior court of Wilson county its action against the respective claimants of this fund, making as additional parties the husbands of the defendants Mrs. Rierson and Mrs. Walls. The Virginia corporation entered its appearance in such suit of interpleader in Wilson county, so that all questions might be determined in the one suit.

The plaintiff in its complaint filed prayed that it might be allowed to pay into court the sum of $2,000 and stand discharged from any and all liability, and that the defendants be required to litigate their claims to the same, and that it be allowed its costs and reasonable attorney's fees. The children of John Selby answered, admitting the allegations of the complaint except that the plaintiff was a mere stakeholder; stated their right to the fund and demanded judgment against the plaintiff for the amount and interest and costs; and denied its right to be allowed an attorney's fee. The corporation defendant filed answer and stated its claim to the fund. There was no order made before the final judgment, requiring the plaintiff to pay the fund into court and the defendants to interplead. Upon the admissions in the pleadings, his honor adjudged that the children of John Selby were entitled to the fund, and gave judgment against the plaintiff for the amount, with interest from March 4, 1909, denied the motion of plaintiff for allowance of attorney's fees, and taxed the costs against the defendant corporation. The plaintiff excepted to the judgment because it awarded interest against it, and because its motion for attorney's fees, fixed at $25, was disallowed, and appealed to this court.

Pou & Finch and F. H. Bacon, for appellant.

Connor & Connor, for appellees.

MANNING J.

In 4 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (3d Ed.) § 1322, the learned author thus states the essential elements required to invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court by a bill of interpleader or a complaint as a substitute for the bill "(1) The same thing, debt or duty, must be claimed by both or all the parties against whom the relief is demanded. (2) All their adverse titles or claims must be dependent, or be derived from a common source. (3) The person asking the relief--the plaintiff-- must not have nor claim any interest in the subject-matter. (4) He must have incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants; that is, he must stand perfectly indifferent between them, in the position merely of a stakeholder." And, in speaking further in section 1328 of the averments of the bill, the same author says: "The bill need not show an apparent title in either of the defendants. On the contrary, if the bill should show that plaintiff...