Suprunowski v. Brown & White Cab Co.

• Decision Date: 17 January 1927
• Docket Number: 20185.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: SUPRUNOWSKI v. BROWN & WHITE CAB CO.

252 P. 155

142 Wash. 65

SUPRUNOWSKI v. BROWN & WHITE CAB CO.

No. 20185.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 17, 1927

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Griffiths, Judge.

Action by R. R. Suprunowski against the Brown & White Cab Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Ralph S. Pierce, of Seattle, for appellant.

Adam Beeler, of Seattle, for respondent.

BRIDGES J.

The jury would have been justified in believing the following to be the facts in this case: About 7 o'clock of an evening in February, 1925, when it was dark, the plaintiff was walking southerly on the westerly sidewalk of Third avenue in Seattle. When he came to Jefferson street which runs diagonally to Third avenue, and before stepping off of the sidewalk into that street, he looked to the left to see if any traffic was approaching. He saw the defendant's taxicab going northerly on the avenue. It was probably a little south of the intersection, and was going at such speed as that the plaintiff thought and had reason to believe that it intended to continue northerly on the avenue and not to turn into Jefferson street. After he had advanced from three to five steps into the street he was struck by the right-hand front fender of the taxicab and was thrown a distance of 12 or 15 feet. At the time of striking the plaintiff, or immediately before, the taxicab was going at a 'pretty fast clip.' The headlights of the automobile were burning and the horn was not blown.

The testimony of the driver of the auto contradicts much of that above mentioned, but since the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff we must look at the testimony from the view most favorable to him.

The appellant first insists that the testimony conclusively shows that the respondent was guilty of contributory negligence and that for that reason the trial court should have granted its motion for nonsuit or its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We are of the opinion, however, that the matter of respondent's negligence was a question for the jury. Before stepping into Jefferson street, he did what we have often said should be done under like circumstances; that is, looked to his left to see whether there were any approaching vehicles, and saw the appellant's taxicab, but it was still on Third avenue, and in such position and going at such speed as that he did not think it intended to turn into Jefferson street, and it is plain to us that he had reason to so conclude. According to his testimony, he had advanced some 10 or 15 feet in the street before he was hit. This would probably take him to or beyond the middle of the paved portion of Jefferson street. If this testimony is to be believed, he had a right to think that he was out of the path of automobiles which might be going westerly on Jefferson street, and it was his duty then to pay attention to traffic which might be approaching Third avenue on Jefferson street from the west, and this, he testified, is what he did. This testimony is amply sufficient, under all of our decisions, to present a question to be determined by the jury.

Appellant greatly relies on Silverstein v. Adams, 134 Wash 430, 235 P. 784, but the situation there was very different. In that instance the automobile was approaching at night, and struck the plaintiff just as he left the...