Surf Works, L.L.C. v. City of Jacksonville Beach

• Decision Date: 08 November 2017
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1D16–3312
• Citation: 230 So.3d 925
• Parties: SURF WORKS, L.L.C., and Nadime Karan Kowkabany, Petitioners, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE BEACH, Respondent.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

230 So.3d 925

SURF WORKS, L.L.C., and Nadime Karan Kowkabany, Petitioners,

v.CITY OF JACKSONVILLE BEACH, Respondent.

CASE NO. 1D16–3312

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

Opinion filed November 8, 2017

Rehearing Denied December 18, 2017

Paul M. Harden and Zachary Miller, Jacksonville; Steve Diebenow of Driver, McAfee, Peek & Hawthorne, Jacksonville, for Petitioners.

Susan Smith Erdelyi of Marks Gray, P.A., Jacksonville, for Respondent.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J.

Petitioners Surf Works, L.L.C. and Nadime Karan Kowkabany petition this court for a writ of certiorari to quash the circuit court's decision upholding Respondent Jacksonville Beach's denial of Petitioners' application for rezoning. Because the circuit court applied the incorrect law, which departed from the essential requirements of the law, we grant the petition.

Background

In 2014, Petitioners filed a rezoning application seeking to rezone the classification of property in Jacksonville Beach from Central Business District to Redevelopment District ("RD"). The property was the site of Mango's Beach Bar and Grille, which Petitioners intended to redevelop into a mixed-use facility of office and retail space, with the majority of the proposed development devoted to a two-story bar named "Surfer—the Bar." Petitioners envisioned their proposed bar as becoming a destination for surfers and surf enthusiasts.

Petitioners' application for rezoning specifically stated their intention to locate the proposed bar within 500 feet of two other alcoholic beverage establishments, contrary to Respondent's Land Development Code ("Code"). (Mango's Bar had been grandfathered into the location.) Petitioners acknowledged that their proposed bar was inconsistent with the provisions of section 34–407 of the Code, which imposed additional requirements for outdoor bars and restaurants, but noted their proposed deviations were permissible under the flexible RD zoning process. Under the Code, the expressed purpose of this RD zoning district is to

achieve a diversity of uses in a desirable environment through the application of flexible land development standards and to foster creative design and planning practices in the Jacksonville Beach Downtown Redevelopment Area in order to encourage economic vitality and redevelopment pursuant to the objectives of the Jacksonville Beach Community Redevelopment Plan.

Jacksonville Beach, Fla., Code § 34–347(a) (2015) (emphasis added).

This section of the Code outlines the procedure that must be followed to receive an RD zoning district classification. Specifically, it requires land to "receive approval of a preliminary development plan pursuant to the procedures and standards" of section 34–347(c). Jacksonville Beach, Fla., Code § 34–347(c)(1). To obtain this approval, an applicant must submit a proposed preliminary development plan to Respondent's Planning and Development Director. Once the application is determined to be sufficient, it is further reviewed by Respondent's Redevelopment Agency and Planning Commission, which recommends either approval, approval with conditions, or denial. The application and recommendations are then forwarded to the city council for a public hearing for final action on the preliminary development plan "pursuant to the standards in section 34–347(c)(3)(i.)." Jacksonville Beach, Fla., Code § 34–347(c)(3)(h.) (2.) (emphasis added).

If the city council votes to approve the preliminary development plan, "[i]ssuance of a development order for [the] preliminary development plan for an RD zoning district classification shall constitute an amendment to the official zoning map to RD zoning district." Jacksonville Beach, Fla., Code § 34–347(c)(3)(k.) (emphasis added).

Petitioners' application was reviewed once by Respondent's Planning Commission and twice by Respondent's Community Redevelopment Agency under section 34–347(c) of the Code, and both bodies recommended approval of the application.¹ There was no indication that any additional provisions of the Code were factored into the review. Also significant here, Respondent's Senior Planner noted that while Petitioners' proposed development departed from the conventional zoning criteria of sections 34–393 and 34–407(b), those "characteristics [we]re allowed to be addressed and modified from the normal standards as part of the RD zoning process, which was created to allow flexibility from traditional standards in an effort to encourage redevelopment activity in the Downtown Redevelopment Area." Memoranda from Bill Mann, Senior Planner, Dep't of Planning & Dev., to George D. Forbes, City Manager (July 7, 2014; Sept. 9, 2014).

Petitioners first presented their rezoning application to the city council on July 21, 2014. The mayor announced that Petitioners' application would be considered pursuant to the standards of section 34–211 of the Code, which governed zoning atlas and code amendments. One of the standards contained in section 34–211(c) required the city council to consider whether the proposed rezoning conflicted with any other portion of the Code. Jacksonville Beach, Fla., Code § 34–211(c)(2) (2016). During the hearing, concerns were raised by citizens, the mayor, and city council members about Petitioners' application and its inconsistencies with the Code. Petitioners were given a chance to work on the comments received from the city council, and another hearing was scheduled.

At the second hearing, the mayor again announced that Petitioners' application would be considered pursuant to the standards contained in section 34–211. Petitioners asserted that significant efforts had been made to improve the application. Following substantial public comment, the city council ultimately voted to deny Petitioners' rezoning application, citing concerns that the location was unsuitable. The city council stated that Petitioners' application was denied for four reasons, including: 1) its conflict with section 34–393, which requires a 500–foot separation between alcoholic beverage establishments; and 2) its conflict with section 34–407(b), which limits the amount of outdoor seating allowable for outdoor restaurants and bars. Both of these grounds were acknowledged in Petitioners' application, which, as noted above, sought approval under section 34–347(c)(3)(i.).

Petitioners then filed a petition in the circuit court seeking certiorari review of the city council's decision. Petitioners alleged that the city council's decision was not supported by competent, substantial evidence and that the city council applied the wrong provisions of the Code in denying the application, and as such, departed from the essential requirements of law. Petitioners argued that their application was subject to the requirements of section 34–347 of the Code, which governs the RD zoning district.

Section 34–347(c)(3)(h.)(2.) provides: "After the public hearing, the city council shall approve, approve with conditions, or deny the application pursuant to the standards in section 34–347(c)(3)(i)." Jacksonville Beach, Fla., Code § 34–347(c)(3)(h.)(2.) (emphasis added). Petitioners argue here, as below, that this provision restricted the city council's consideration solely to the criteria of section 34–347(c)(3)(i.), and because sections 34–393 and 34–407 were not expressly included in that criteria, the city council applied the incorrect law in relying on Petitioners' noncompliance with those sections as a basis for denying their application.

In denying the petition below, the circuit court ruled that Petitioners' RD zoning district application was governed by sections 34–201 through 34–211. As stated above, one of the factors listed in section 34–211(c) requires the city council to consider whether a proposed zoning amendment conflicts with any portion of the Code. Accordingly, the court ruled that the city council's denial of Petitioners' application based on Petitioners' noncompliance with sections 34–393 and 34–407 was supported by competent, substantial evidence, despite the fact that compliance with sections 34–393 and 34–407 was not among the criteria enumerated by section 34–347(c)(3)(i.). The court found that none of the other reasons the city council gave for denying the application were supported by competent, substantial evidence.

Analysis

District courts should grant second-tier certiorari "only when there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice." Custer Med. Ctr. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 62 So.3d 1086, 1092 (Fla. 2010) (quoting Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 96 (Fla. 1983) ). Under this standard, the mere existence of legal error is insufficient to invoke the district court's certiorari jurisdiction. Combs, 436 So.2d at 95. Likewise, "a misapplication or an erroneous interpretation of the correct law does not rise to the level of a violation of a clearly established principle of law." State, Dep't of Highway Safety v. Edenfield, 58 So.3d 904, 906 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Certiorari relief cannot be granted when the established law provides no controlling precedent, "because ‘[w]ithout such controlling precedent, [a district court] cannot conclude that [a circuit court] violated a clearly establish[ed] principle of law.’ " Id. (quoting Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So.2d 679, 682 (Fla. 2000) ).

District courts must be cautious and prudent when exercising their jurisdiction to grant relief by writ of certiorari. Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 So.2d 679, 682–83 (Fla. 2000). Only where the circuit court failed to afford procedural due process or failed to apply the correct law may such relief be granted by the district court: "The inquiry is limited to whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and whether the circuit court applied the correct law.... [T]hese two components are merely expressions of ways in which the circuit court decision may have departed from the essential requirements of the law." Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs...