Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–12752,14–12752
• Citation: 31 A.D. Cases 1259,789 F.3d 1239
• Parties: Portia SURTAIN, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. HAMLIN TERRACE FOUNDATION, d.b.a. Hamlin Place of Boynton Beach, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

789 F.3d 1239

31 A.D. Cases 1259

Portia SURTAIN, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.HAMLIN TERRACE FOUNDATION, d.b.a. Hamlin Place of Boynton Beach, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 14–12752

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 16, 2015.

Marjorie Graham, Marjorie Gadarian Graham, P.A., Palm Beach Gardens, FL, Arnold S. Gaines, Harper Gaines PLLC, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. D.C. Docket No. 9:12–cv–81401–DMM.

Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Portia

Surtain appeals the District Court's order denying her motion for a default judgment and sua sponte dismissing with prejudice her second amended complaint. Surtain's complaint contains essentially three claims. First, she alleges that her former employer, Hamlin Terrace Foundation, discriminated against her on the basis of race (she is African–American) by handling her request for medical leave differently than it did the requests of white employees, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“Section 1981 ”), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ; and the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”), Fla. Stat. § 760.10. Second, she alleges that Hamlin discriminated against her on the basis of disability by terminating her employment when it discovered she had a medical disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Finally, she alleges that Hamlin interfered with, or retaliated against her for exercising, her right to take medical leave by providing inadequate paperwork and then firing her, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. We conclude that the District Court evaluated Surtain's race- and disability-discrimination claims under the wrong standard, but that even under the right standard, her complaint plainly fails to make out a claim of disability discrimination. We also conclude that the court improperly dismissed the interference portion of her FMLA claim without giving her notice and an opportunity to respond, though it properly dismissed the retaliation portion of this claim. Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

I.

Surtain filed her initial complaint on December 21, 2012.¹ After Hamlin failed to respond in a timely manner, Surtain obtained an entry of default against Hamlin from the Clerk of Court. She then moved the District Court to enter a default judgment against Hamlin. Hamlin failed to respond to this motion or to the District Court's order to show cause why Surtain's motion should not be granted. The court dismissed Surtain's race- and disability-discrimination claims with leave to amend, finding that she had failed to allege facts sufficient to withstand a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and thus to support the entry of judgment. The District Court found that the complaint did state a valid FMLA claim, however, and concluded that Surtain was entitled to judgment on this claim.²

Surtain filed an amended complaint, to which Hamlin again failed to respond. Surtain sought and received another entry of default from the Clerk, and moved a second time for default judgment. The District Court then called a status conference, at which the court inquired as to both the manner of service of process and the nature of Surtain's claims in general. On the latter point, the court expressed doubts as to the viability of (1) Surtain's disability-discrimination claim, given that she had neither informed Hamlin of the nature of her disability or afforded it an opportunity to provide a reasonable accommodation, and (2) her race-discrimination claims, noting that she was required to point to substantially similar comparators who had received different treatment.

At the conclusion of the conference, the District Court concluded that neither the initial complaint nor the amended complaint were properly served, denied Surtain's second motion for entry of default judgment, and ordered her to re-serve Hamlin. Surtain promptly filed a second amended complaint, which she properly served on Hamlin's registered agent, and in which she provided a modicum of additional information about her disability. After Hamlin again failed to respond, and Surtain again obtained an entry of default from the Clerk, Surtain filed a third motion for entry of default judgment as to liability.

After reviewing the allegations of the complaint, the District Court denied the motion. Regarding the race-discrimination claims, the District Court held that, even taking the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, Surtain failed to make out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).³ The court held that the second amended complaint failed to allege enough factual matter to support the conclusion that the white employees who Surtain claimed received different treatment were similarly situated.

Regarding Surtain's disability-discrimination claim, the District Court similarly found that her complaint failed to make out a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. The court first concluded that she was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA because she failed to adequately plead that she could have performed her job had she been afforded a reasonable accommodation. Alternatively, the court found that she had not delineated her job responsibilities or alleged the length of time between her initial request for medical leave and her diagnosis. Without this information, the court concluded, it was impossible to ascertain whether an accommodation would have been reasonable or not.

Regarding Surtain's FMLA claim, the District Court held that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to support recovery. Specifically, Surtain failed to adequately plead that she was an eligible employee under the FMLA, because the complaint did not allege that she had worked for Hamlin for at least 1,250 hours during the previous twelve months. Nor did it contain any facts supporting her conclusory allegation that Hamlin was a covered employer under the FMLA.

Finding the allegations of the complaint insufficient to justify entry of judgment on Surtain's claims for relief, the District Court denied her motion for default judgment and dismissed her case with prejudice. The court declined to permit Surtain to amend her complaint, noting that it had already granted her leave to do so twice.

Surtain raises two issues on appeal. First, she argues that the District Court erred in denying her motion for default judgment, arguing that the factual allegations in her complaint were sufficient to support the claims she asserted. Second, she argues that the court's sua sponte dismissal of her complaint was procedural error because she was not given notice of the court's intent to dismiss or an opportunity to amend her complaint. We will address each argument in turn.

II.

We review the denial of a motion for default judgment for abuse of discretion. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir.2002). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Aycock v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 769 F.3d 1063, 1068 (11th Cir.2014) (quotation marks omitted).

When a defendant has failed to plead or defend, a district court may enter judgment by default. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2).⁴ Because of our “strong policy of determining cases on their merits,” however, default judgments are generally disfavored. In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.2003). “[W]hile a defaulted defendant is deemed to admit the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, he is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir.2005) (alteration omitted) (quotation marks omitted). Entry of default judgment is only warranted when there is “a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered.” Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.1975).⁵

Although Nishimatsu did not elaborate as to what constitutes “a sufficient basis” for the judgment, we have subsequently interpreted the standard as being akin to that necessary to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n. 41 (11th Cir.1997) (“[A] default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.”). Conceptually, then, a motion for default judgment is like a reverse motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Wooten v. McDonald Transit Assocs., Inc., 775 F.3d 689, 695 (5th Cir.2015) (stating in the context of a motion for default judgment, “whether a factual allegation is well-pleaded arguably follows the familiar analysis used to evaluate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ”).

When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court looks to see whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). This plausibility standard is met “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 ).

We turn our attention to the claims that the District Court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) : the race-discrimination claims⁶ ; the...