Surtman v. State
| Decision Date | 30 June 1944 |
| Docket Number | No. 50.,50. |
| Citation | 15 N.W.2d 471,309 Mich. 270 |
| Parties | SURTMAN et al. (HOLLEY et al., Interveners) v. SECRETARY OF STATE. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit by John Earl Surtman and others against Herman H. Dignan, Secretary of State of the State of Michigan, to enjoin defendant from enforcing the provisions of an amended section of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, wherein Isaac B. Holley and others intervened as plaintiffs. From a decree of dismissal, the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County, in Chancery; Adolph F. Marschner, Judge.
Before the Entire Bench.
Edward N. Barnard, of Detroit, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Roxborough & Taliaferro, of Detroit, for intervening plaintiffs and appellants.
Herbert J. Rushton, Atty. Gen., Foss O. Eldred, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, and Daniel J. O'Hara and Maurice M. Moule, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.
The validity and constitutionality of Act No. 248, Pub. Acts 1943 (Stat.Ann. §§ 9.1543,9.1543[1]), is challenged in this appeal. The title of the act is as follows:
‘An Act to amend section 3 of Act No. 203 of the Public Acts of 1933, entitled ‘An act to provide for the revocation and suspension of operators' and chauffeurs' licenses and registration certificates; to require proof of ability to respond in damages for injuries caused by the operation of motor vehicles; to prescribe the form of and conditions in insurance policies covering such risks; to subject such policies to the approval of the commissioner of insurance; to provide for the payment of judgments in installments in certain cases so as to meet the requirements of this act; to provide for furnishing by the secretary of state of information relative to the operating records of any person; to authorize the secretary of state to make rules for the administration of this act and to prescribe penalties for the violation of the provisions thereof,’ as last amended by Act No. 216 of the Public Acts of 1939; and to add to said act a new section to stand as section 3a thereof.'
Act No. 203, Pub. Acts 1933 (Stat.Ann. §§ 9.1541-9.1557), is known as ‘The [Michigan] Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act of nineteen hundred thirty-three (1933).’ The only change which the 1943 act made in the 1933 act, as amended, so far as § 3 is concerned, is to require satisfaction within 30 days of any judgment involving damages ‘in excess of $50.00’ instead of ‘in excess of three hundred dollars,’ as provided in the original act. No question is raised on this appeal as to the change in section 3.
Section 3a, which was added to the original act, is questioned on the following grounds, (a) that the Legislature failed to observe constitutional provisions in the legislative process of its adoption of the added section, and (b) that the added section contravenes various provisions of both State and Federal Constitutions. Appellants argue that the 1943 enactment is void because the Legislature (1) failed to publish at length or to reenact the act revised, and (2) because the amendment embraces more than one object, which is not expressed in its title. Appellants also contend that the act is void because (1) it violates the equal protection of the laws clauses of both Constitutions, (2) the due process of law clauses, (3) it is contrary to the provisions of the guarantees against self-incrimination, and (4) it infringes upon the right of municipalities to reasonable control of their streets.
Section 3a, in substance, requires every operator or owner of a motor vehicle involved in an accident in which any person is killed or injured, to report in writing to the secretary of state, giving the names and addresses of the owners and operators of all motor vehicles involved, of all persons injured or killed, the date, time and place of the accident, and the name of any insurance carrier whose policy of insurance was in force and applicable to the liability of the owner of operator. Failure to furnish such report within 10 days constitutes a misdemeanor and sufficient ground for the suspension or revocation of the operator's license and registration, certificate, unless showing of financial responsibility is made. The suspension is to continue until such proof is furnished, unless the injury or death claims are satisfied. The section provides a method for releasing the security and for self-insurance permits to be issued to the owner or operator of 25 or more motor vehicles. It also provides that the report may be examined by any person named therein, or his attorney, and for otherwise withholding the same from public inspection. It states that the provisions of the section shall not be applicable to any motor vehicle, or driver thereof, owned by the State or any agency, municipality or political subdivision thereof.
Plaintiffs Surtman, Pfeiffer, and others, owners and operators of motor vehicles, filed a bill in equity to enjoin defendant Dignan, secretary of state, from enforcing the provisions of section 3a of the act. The trial judge entered a decree denying such relief and dismissed the bill of complaint and an intervening bill, which was filed in the cause. From this decree plaintiffs and intervenors have appealed.
The 1943 session of the Legislature adopted Joint Rule 15, generally known as the ‘short title’ rule. It provides, in substance, that, when considering an amendment to an act which had been given a short title, such as the one here involved, the title of a proposed amendment during its passage through both Houses is only required to contain the ‘short title’ of the act, proposed to be amended with the chapter, part numbers, and compiler's section numbers, if any, and the year of compilation. Following the passage of an amendment in the House other than the House of origin, the title is there amended by striking out the ‘short title’ and inserting in lieu thereof the last full title of the amended act, together with such other corrections and amendments as may be necessary, so that the amended title may be agreed to by the House in which the bill originated.
Such procedure was followed in the enactment of the amendment to the act in question. Appellants say this is a violation of § 21 of article V of the Constitution of 1908, which reads in part as follows:
This constitutional provision expressly refers to the title of an act as enacted, rather than to the title of a bill during its various steps towards enactment. The act in question did not attempt to amend the original act by reference only to the title of that act, but made the change in the original act by reenacting § 3 in its entirety, as amended, and adding a new § 3a in full.
The Legislature was not required to re-enact and publish the amended act in full. People v. Shuler, 136 Mich. 161, 98 N.W. 986.
We need not repeat the discussion of this proposition as stated in People v. Stimer, 248 Mich. 272, 226 N.W. 899, 901, 67 A.L.R. 552, where the court said:
‘In so far as the act under consideration revises, alters, or amends Act 181, Pub. Acts 1919, it does so in express language, published at length; and in so far as the change or alteration is by implication merely, it does not offend the constitutional provision.’
Under the doctrine of ‘reasonable construction’ enunciated by Mr. Justice Cooley in People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 496, 497, the legislative procedure here involved cannot be said to violate this constitutional provision.
But, say the appellants, the amendment embraces more than one object, which is not expressed in its title. It should be noted that the Legislature did not amend the title to the original act, and that...
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