Susan M. Fisher v. James L. Mayfield, Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation, Industrial Commission of Ohio Champion Local Board of Education, 88-LW-2588
| Decision Date | 05 August 1988 |
| Docket Number | 3987,88-LW-2588 |
| Parties | Susan M. FISHER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James L. MAYFIELD, Administrator, Bureau of Workers' Compensation, Industrial Commission of Ohio Champion Local Board of Education, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Civil Appeal from Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, Case No 86 CV 1388.
Richard L. Magill, Steven D. Maas, Elliott, Heller & Maas Youngstown, for plaintiff-appellant.
Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General, Timothy J. Krantz Assistant Attorney General, Cleveland, for defendants-appellees Adm. Bureau of Workers' Comp. and The Industrial Commission of Ohio.
Daniel Letson, Warren, for defendants-appellees Champion Local Board of Education.
Before FORD, P.J., and COOK and CHRISTLEY, JJ.
The following facts are an edited version of the parties' stipulation of facts submitted to the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas.
Susan Fisher (appellant) began working for appellee, Champion Local Board of Education, at Central Elementary School, as a learning disability teacher in September 1976. In November 1985, appellant was asked to take care of the Flower Fund by a school building representative.
The Fund was in effect when appellant began working at Champion and was set up for the purpose of providing flowers or other condolences when a school employee or a close family member of one of the school employees got married, had a baby, or died, etc. Solicitations to belong to the Fund were made to various employees of Champion Schools, some of which included principals, other teachers, nurses, secretaries, and librarians.
The procedure of collection for the Fund is done on a voluntary and personal basis regarding donations and no memoranda or notices were posted informing employees of collection. However, thank-you notes and other notices were posted in the office at Central when the receivers of the flowers or other forms of condolences wished to show their appreciation to the Fund. In addition, when a school employee was in the hospital or off ill for an extended period, the information or hospital room number was posted in the office at Central. The informal collection procedure is not addressed or included in the Master Contract between the School Board and the Champion Education Association.
Mrs. Buzzanco, another teacher for Champion Schools, was in charge of the Fund for the 1985-1986 school year. Buzzanco's father had died, and since appellant had handled the Fund previously, the building representative requested that appellant handle the flowers or condolences for Buzzanco. On the date of the accident, November 14, 1985, appellant went to Kaiser Elementary School, another school in the Champion system, first to pick up money from other teachers for the Fund and also to have the teachers at Kaiser sign a sympathy card for Buzzanco. Appellant never worked at Kaiser either as a regular or a substitute teacher. Appellant was supposed to be at work at Central between 8:40 and 8:50 a.m., which was approximately ten to fifteen minutes before her first class began.
Appellant arrived at Kaiser at approximately 8:15 a.m., but did not pick up any money from the other teachers since it was decided that she would get a meat tray for Buzzanco and then would collect the money after she knew the cost of the meat tray. However, appellant did have some of the teachers and staff sign the sympathy card.
At no time was appellant instructed by anyone from Champion to go to Kaiser on November 14, 1985. Appellant went exclusively of her own volition. Kaiser is on appellant's way to Central. Appellant left her home early that morning so that she could handle the duties for the Fund. Appellant was leaving Kaiser to go to Central, which is approximately one to one-half mile from Kaiser, when she had her accident. It was raining, and at approximately 8:30 a.m. on November 14, 1985 appellant missed a step as she was walking out the doors of Kaiser.
Appellant injured her right ankle and suffered minor bumps and bruises as a result of the fall. It is agreed that these injuries were a direct result of the fall on November 14, 1985. Appellant was on crutches for approximately six weeks and returned to work around January 6, 1986. Appellant was on crutches and had to be driven to and from work the first two weeks of her return.
On January 6, 1986, appellant filed a claim with the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. After appellant's claim was disallowed on March 25, 1986, she appealed to the Canton Regional Board of Review (BOR). The BOR affirmed the March 25, 1986 decision. Appellant then filed an appeal to the Ohio Industrial Commission, but the appeal was refused on August 5, 1986. On October 2, 1986, Appellant appealed to the trial court. On August 26, 1987, the trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the Board. Appellant did not receive a copy of the trial court's judgment entry until November 6, 1987, therefore appellant did not file her notice of appeal to this court until November 17, 1987. Appellees motioned to dismiss this appeal, but on January 19, 1988, this court overruled appellees' motion pursuant to Moldovan v. Cugahoga Cty. Welfare Dept. (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 293.
The appellant made the following assignment of error:
The Common Pleas Court erred in granting The Summary Judgment Motion for the Industrial Commission and Champion Local Board of Education and denying the Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Appellant's assignment of error is not well taken.
On appeal to the common pleas court, the matter proceeds as a trial de novo and summary judgment proceedings are appropriate. Price v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 131.
We find in a review of the stipulations submitted to the trial court in this matter that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact as a matter of law. Appellant was outside the scope and zone of her employment when the injury occurred.
Appellant argues that her injury should be covered by workers' compensation because it falls within the requirements of R.C. 4123.01(C) which states:
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Appellees argue, and the trial court held, that:
Whether there is a sufficient "causal connection' between an employee's injury and his employment to justify the right to participate in the Workers' Compensation Fund depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accident, including, (1) the proximity of the scene of the accident to the place of employment, (2) the degree of control the employer had over the scene of the accident, and (3) the benefit the employer received from the injured employee's presence at the scene of the accident." Lord v. Daugherty (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 441, paragraph one of the syllabus.
"As a general rule, where an employee, having a fixed and limited place of employment, sustains an injury while traveling to and from his place of employment, such injury does not evidence the required causal connection to the employment; it therefore does not arise out of and in the course of his employment and is not compensable. Lohnes v. Young (1963), 175 Ohio St. 291; Simerlink v. Young (1961), 172 Ohio St. 427; Indus. Comm. v. Gintert, supra; Indus. Comm. v. Baker (1933), 127 Ohio St. 345. An employee is no longer subject to strict application of this general rule once he reaches the premises of his employer. Injuries sustained while the employee is within this "zone of employment" may be compensable under the Act. Marlow v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 18; Gregory v. Indus. Comm. (1935), 129 Ohio St. 365; Kasari v. Indus. Comm. (1932), 125 Ohio St. 410; 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 4-3, Section 15.11.
Compensability, however, is not in every instance limited to injuries sustained on the employer's premises. In Indus. Comm. v. Barber (1927), 117 Ohio St. 373, this court recognized that an employee could enter upon the course of his employment prior to entering the inclosure of his employer (injury sustained while employee was traveling the sole access route to his place of employment, that being a street under the employer's control, held compensable)." Bralley v. Daugherty (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 302, 303.
Appellant argues that she was within the "zone of employment" when the accident occurred. The injury occurred at approximately 8:30 a.m. at Kaiser whereas appellant begins work between 8:40 and 8:50 a.m. at Central. The parties have stipulated that Central is " * * * approximately one to one-half miles from Kaiser * * *." Neither appellant nor appellee cite case law which disposes of this issue.
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