Suspension of Huffer from Circleville High School, In re

Citation47 Ohio St.3d 12,546 N.E.2d 1308
Decision Date22 November 1989
Docket NumberNo. 88-1397,88-1397
Parties, 57 Ed. Law Rep. 558 In re Appeal of SUSPENSION OF HUFFER FROM CIRCLEVILLE HIGH SCHOOL.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. A case is not moot if the issues are capable of repetition, yet evading review. (State, ex rel. The Repository, v. Unger [1986], 28 Ohio St.3d 418, 28 OBR 472, 504 N.E.2d 37, approved and followed.)

2. A school board has the authority to establish a rule which allows school administrators to suspend students for being "under the influence" of alcohol while attending school or a school activity.

Mark E. Huffer, appellee, was ordered suspended from Circleville High School by the Circleville City School District Board of Education, appellant, because Huffer had attended high school wrestling practice on January 29, 1986 while "under the influence" of alcohol.

The facts show that on January 29, 1986, Huffer had visited a college during school hours as part of his school-approved "college visitation day." While Huffer visited the college, he drank two beers. After 3:45 p.m., Huffer returned to his high school to attend wrestling practice. At practice, Huffer wrestled with the assistant coach who smelled alcohol on Huffer's breath and reported this to the head coach. The head coach questioned Huffer who admitted that he had consumed a couple of beers while at the college.

The high school principal was notified and on January 30, 1986, the principal met with Huffer and gave Huffer written notice of the principal's intention to suspend Huffer from school for attending wrestling practice after admitted use of alcohol.

The principal also sent Huffer's parents a letter notifying them of Huffer's suspension from school 1 and from extracurricular activities because of Huffer's admitted use of alcohol. The letter explained the parents' right to appeal this decision to the board of education. At the request of the parents, the principal postponed Huffer's suspension pending the results of the appeal. The school board's policy pertaining to student drug and alcohol use, Policy No. 622, is included in the Circleville High School student handbook and posted in the high school's front hall.

On February 21, 1986, the board of education heard Huffer's appeal. Huffer did not appear, but was represented by his father. Pursuant to R.C. 3313.66(E), 2 the school board voted to affirm the principal's order to suspend Huffer because he violated Policy No. 622 since he was "under the influence" of an alcoholic beverage.

Huffer appealed the board's decision to the Court of Common Pleas of Pickaway County based on R.C. 2506.01. 3 The standard of review is established in R.C. 2506.04. 4 On January 7, 1987, the common pleas court found that Policy No. 622 was overbroad because it did not comply with the motor vehicle law's definition of "under the influence." See R.C. 4511.19. The common pleas court also held that Policy No. 622 was unreasonable because it considered a student to be "under the influence" who was not disruptive, but only had alcohol on his breath. The common pleas court reversed the board's order suspending Huffer from high school, although the court affirmed Huffer's suspension from the wrestling team.

The board appealed this decision to the court of appeals which, on June 7, 1988, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The appellate court also found that Policy No. 622 was unreasonable and overbroad. There was a vigorous dissent from this decision. Since Huffer did not timely appeal his suspension from extracurricular activities, the court refused to address that issue.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Roy H. Huffer, Jr., for appellee.

Squire, Sanders & Dempsey and David W. Alexander, for appellant.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

I

The first issue before us is whether this case is moot since Huffer has graduated from high school.

In State, ex rel. The Repository, v. Unger (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 418, 420, 28 OBR 472, 474, 504 N.E.2d 37, 39, we held that a case is not moot if the issues are " ' " 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " ' "

Likewise, if a case involves a matter of public or great general interest, the court is vested with the jurisdiction to hear the appeal, even though the case is moot. Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 28, 30 OBR 33, 505 N.E.2d 966. 5

The issue of the authority of local school boards to make rules and regulations is of "great general interest." The issue before us is certainly "capable of repetition," yet it may "evade review," since students who challenge school board rules generally graduate before the case winds its way through the court system. For these reasons, we decide this issue of school board authority.

II

Ohio has a rich tradition of local control of its public school districts. Section 3, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution states that "[p]rovision shall be made by law for the organization, administration and control of the public school system of the state * * * provided, that each school district * * * shall have the power by referendum vote to determine for itself * * * the organization of the district board of education, and provision shall be made by law for the exercise of this power by such school districts." (Emphasis added.)

R.C. 3313.20 provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he board of education shall make such rules as are necessary for * * * the government of its * * * pupils of its schools * * *." R.C. 3313.47 declares, in part, that "[e]ach * * * local board of education shall have the management and control of all the public schools * * * in its respective district. * * * "

Ohio courts have spoken of the broad power of Ohio's boards of education based upon earlier versions of these statutes.

Brannon v. Bd. of Edn. (1919), 99 Ohio St. 369, 124 N.E. 235, in paragraph two of the syllabus, held that "[a] court has no authority to control the discretion vested in a board of education by the statutes of this state, or to substitute its judgment for the judgment of such board, upon any questions it is authorized by law to determine * * *." In Brannon, supra in paragraph three of the syllabus, the court found that "[a] court will not restrain a board of education from carrying into effect its determination of any question within its discretion, except for an abuse of discretion or for fraud or collusion * * *." (Emphasis added.)

In Greco v. Roper (1945), 145 Ohio St. 243, 30 O.O. 473, 61 N.E.2d 307, paragraph one of the syllabus, we held that " * * * a board of education is charged with the management and control of the public schools in its district and is vested with authority to make such rules and regulations as it deems necessary for its government * * *."

The United States Supreme Court in Bd. of Edn. of Rogers v. McCluskey (1982), 458 U.S. 966, 102 S.Ct. 3469, 73 L.Ed.2d 1273, held that the trial court must defer to the board of education's reasonable interpretation of its rule on mandatory suspension of students "under the influence of drugs."

In Wood v. Strickland (1975), 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 1003, 43 L.Ed.2d 214, the court found that federal courts should not substitute their judgment for school administrators' decisions, since the system of public education in this country rests upon the discretion and judgment of school administrators and school board members. Thus, the United States Supreme Court and Ohio courts have established that school boards have wide discretion in adopting rules and regulations for governing schools.

In this case, the Circleville Board of Education adopted Policy No. 622, which states that "[t]he Circleville Board of Education has defined * * * policies addressing substance use * * * to respond * * * to problem behaviors occurring in the school setting. * * * A student shall not knowingly * * * use, transmit, apply or be under the influence [fn.] of any * * * alcoholic beverage * * *. It is recognized that the determination of the school authorities may be distinct and separate from any determination of the courts."

The footnote to the above passage states:

"Under the influence is defined as manifesting signs of chemical misuse such as staggering, reddened eyes, odor of chemicals, nervousness, restlessness, falling asleep/dozing in class, memory loss, abusive language or any other behavior not normal for the particular pupil." (Emphasis added.)

Appellant argues that the school board, with its broad statutory grant of authority, adopted Policy No. 622 to combat the growing epidemic of alcohol and drug abuse plaguing young people today and that the rule is reasonably connected with the school board's responsibility of preventing such abuse in the school setting.

A school board certainly has the right to prohibit students' use of drugs and alcohol in the school setting. 6 We are all aware of the current drug and alcohol crisis and the need to educate young people as to the hazards of substance abuse. If a school board cannot establish a rule to stop the use of drugs and alcohol among its students absent the students' becoming disruptive, then the school administrators will be helpless to enforce and maintain discipline in our schools. Such a restriction would simply be unreasonable.

Appellee argues, however, that the board of education abused its discretion when it adopted Policy No. 622, which defines "under the influence" as exhibiting the odor of chemicals, reddened eyes, restlessness, nervousness, etc. Appellee asserts that the presence of one of these symptoms does not mandate that a student is "under the influence."

We agree that a student who has one of these symptoms is not necessarily "under the influence" of alcohol or drugs. However, these symptoms are a starting point in any investigation by a school administrator. During an investigation, the...

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