Suter v. Stuckey
Decision Date | 14 November 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 9, September Term, 2007.,9, September Term, 2007. |
Citation | 935 A.2d 731,402 Md. 211 |
Parties | Judith SUTER v. Darryl A. STUCKEY. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Judith A. Wolfer (Sheree L. Price and Deena Hausner of House of Ruth, Baltimore), on brief, for petitioner.
Gregory C. Powell, Riverdale, on brief, for respondent.
Argued Before BELL, C.J., RAKER, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE, ALAN M. WILNER (Retired, specially assigned) and DALE, R. CATHELL (Retired, specially assigned), JJ.
This case arises out of a final protective order issued by the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince George's County, at the request of Judith Suter, petitioner. We granted certiorari to consider the following question:
"In a domestic violence protective order proceeding originating in the District Court, is a respondent estopped from appealing to the circuit court a protective order entered by consent?"
Suter v. Stuckey, 398 Md. 314, 920 A.2d 1058 (2007).
Judith Suter filed a petition for a temporary protective order ("TPO") in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince George's County, on April 13, 2006. In the petition for protection from domestic violence, Ms. Suter indicated that Darryl Stuckey, the respondent, punched her, slapped her, detained her against her will and "pointed his gun in [her] face and threaten[ed] to shoot" her. Petitioner described the triggering events as follows:
Ms. Suter requested a wide spectrum of relief. In addition to asking for the court to order Stuckey to refrain from abusing, threatening, harassing, contacting or attempting to contact her, she asked that Stuckey be ordered to stay away from her residence, her daughter's school and her place of work. Ms. Suter asked also that Stuckey be ordered to attend counseling and to pay emergency family maintenance. Finally, Ms. Suter asked that she be awarded use and possession of the family car.
That same day, the Court issued the TPO, essentially granting the relief requested by Ms. Suter and scheduling a final protective order hearing on April 20, 2006. Five days later, the court entered a final protective order by consent pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 4-506(c) of the Family Law Article.1
On May 17, 2006, respondent Darryl Stuckey noted an appeal to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Respondent based his appeal partly on Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 4-507(b) of the Family Law Article,2 which provides for a de novo appeal in the Circuit Court from a District Court grant or denial of relief based on a petition for a final protective order. Section 4-507(b) reads as follows:
Stuckey also based his appeal on Maryland Rule 7-102(a) (2007), which governs appeals from the District Court to the Circuit Court.3
In the Circuit Court, Ms. Suter filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing the appeal was time-barred and Stuckey was estopped from appealing a consent judgment. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss and affirmed the Final Protective Order. Suter filed a motion for a new trial and/or motion to amend judgment on August 22, 2006, which was denied.
Stuckey requested an in banc review of the Circuit Court ruling, pursuant to M d Rule 2-551.4 Respondent again argued that § 4-507(b) and Md. Rule 7-102(a) entitled him to a de novo hearing in the Circuit Court. Ms. Suter argued that no appeal lies from a consent judgment.
The panel ruled that based on statutes governing appeals from the District Court to the Circuit Court in domestic violence protective order cases, Stuckey was entitled to a de novo appeal. In its written opinion and order, the panel first found the cases cited by Ms. Suter "not applicable" because those cases involved "[a]ppeals from the Circuit Court to the Court of Special Appeals" which are on the record appeals, not de novo appeals. The panel reasoned as follows:
The in banc panel found Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 12-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,5 "controlling and dispositive." Section 12-401 states, in pertinent part, as follows:
The in banc panel concluded that the case sub judice was an example of "every other case" that would be tried de novo under the section because appeals from a domestic violence protective order are not noted in the companion exceptions. The panel concluded also that Md. Rule 7-102 and § 4-507 support the finding that Stuckey was entitled to a de novo appeal. The panel reversed the Circuit Court and remanded the case for a trial de novo.
This Court granted Ms. Suter's petition for writ of certiorari. Suter v. Stuckey, 398 Md. 314, 920 A.2d 1058 (2007).
We address first the threshold question of whether this case is moot. A case is moot when there is no longer an existing controversy when the case comes before the Court or when there is no longer an effective remedy the Court could grant. Dept. of Human Resources, v. Roth, 398 Md. 137, 143, 919 A.2d 1217, 1221 (2007); Attorney Gen. v. A.A. County School Bus, 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979). The protective order at issue here expired under its own terms on April 18, 2007. Section 4-506(g)(1) of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl.Vol.), provides that "all relief granted in a final protective order shall be effective for the period stated in the order, not to exceed 12 months."6 Section 4-507 allows an extension or modification of the protective order only "during the term of the protective order." Now that the order has expired, the Court may not modify it. Even were we to agree with respondent, there is no possible relief that could be granted. This appeal is therefore moot.
Ordinarily, our inquiry would end here. Roth, 398 Md. at 143, 919 A.2d at 1221 (2007); see also State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 82, 553 A.2d 672, 677 (1989); Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 562, 510 A.2d 562, 565 (1986); State v. Ficker, 266 Md. 500, 506-07, 295 A.2d 231 (1972) (). Under certain circumstances, however, this Court has found it appropriate to address the merits of a moot case. Roth, 398 Md. at 143, 919 A.2d at 1221. If a case implicates a matter of important public policy and is likely to recur but evade review, this court may consider the merits of a moot case. Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250, 674 A.2d 951, 954 (1996) (); Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43, 111 A.2d 379, 382 (1954) (...
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