Sutton v. Aiken
| Decision Date | 28 February 1879 |
| Citation | 62 Ga. 734 |
| Parties | Sutton. v. Aiken, trustee. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Trusts. Title. Husband and wife. Notice. Before Judge Tompkins. Mcintosh Superior Court. May Term, 1878.
Aiken as trustee for his wife, brought ejectment against Sutton for four acres of land. Subsequently plaintiff amended by adding a demise from his said wife, and by alleging that he and his said wife jointly made a deed of the premises to one Epping, the consideration of which was the payment of a debt due by said Aiken to said Epping, and thus illegal and the sale void; that Epping was afterwards repaid said debt by the sale of other property and promised to reconvey, which he has failed to do; and that when defendant proposed to purchase from Epping, he was informed of these facts.
The defendant pleaded as follows:
1. The general issue.
2. That he bought the premises in good faith and for a consideration, and being in possession bona fide and under claim of right, he had put on the land improvements worth $1,000, of which he claimed the benefit.
3. That the conveyance from Aiken and wife to Epping was not in payment of any debt due by Aiken to Epping, but in pursuance of a bona fide sale from Mrs. Aiken to Epping for money paid by Epping at the request of Mrs. Aiken, and without any promise on the part of Epping to reconvey.
The plaintiff showed a chain of title terminating in himself, the last deed being from Rhett to him, "trustee for Fannie M. Aiken, " dated November 2d, 1868. In this *conveyane there were no words to create any trust except the description of the grantee as "trustee for Fannie M. Aiken."
The defendant introduced a deed from Aiken, trustee for his wife, and his said wife, to Epping, dated June 13, 1870, covering the land embraced in the conveyance from Rhett, consideration $1,629.00. Also, deed from Epping to Sutton, covering the land sued for, dated June 5, 1873.
The defendant testified that he bargained for the land with Epping, and agreed to pay $300.00. That before he obtained the deed, or built a house or fence, he received notice from plaintiff that it belonged to his wife; that he so informed Epping, who told him that it was all right, and he took his title. That before plaintiff gave him notice, he went upon the land with intent to take possession, and, as a preparation for building, cut away brush, dug drains, and otherwise began to clearup the place. That his bargain was closed before the notice, but he had not paid for the land, or taken possession otherwise than as stated.
Holmes testified that he purchased from Epping a part of the land sold by Rhett to Aiken, trustee, for $1,600.00; that he afterwards obtained a confirmation from Mr. and Mrs. Aiken.
Wylly testified that he rented from Epping the part he sold to Holmes before the latter bought, for eighteen months, at $50.00 per quarter; that he paid him about $175.00 and owes him the balance.
Plaintiff, in rebuttal, testified, that the property was conveyed to Epping to secure the repayment of money advanced by him to the United States marshal on an execution against Aiken & Goodrich, of which firm plaintiff had been a member; that Epping took up the execution at fifty cents on the dollar; that Mrs. Aiken only consented to sign the deed upon the understanding that Epping would reconvey when reimbursed; that this arrangement was not sought by Epping, but was proposed to him; that witness served written notice of his wife's title on Sutton; that Epping has already received more than he advanced.
*Epping testified, in brief, as follows: The conveyance to him was not made for the purpose of paying or securing any debt due to him by Aiken, but in pursuance of a bona fide sale for the consideration named in the deed. The money was paid at the request of Aiken and wife to a United States deputy marshal, who, as he was informed, held an execution against Aiken. The land sued for is part of the tract. When he bought Aiken was largely indebted to him, so that when called on for further assistance, he declined. Under the most urgent pressure from Mr. and Mrs. Aiken, the latter appealing to bis wife, witness agreed to buy the property. He sold the main portion for $1,600.00, but is still considerably out of pocket by the transaction. The account is about as follows: Received from Holmes, $1,600 00; rent, $65.00; from Sutton, $125.00=$1,790.00. Paid for property, $1,629.00; taxes and insurance, $140.00; interest, $400.00; lawyer's fees $121.00= $2,290.00, leaving balance of about $500.00 unpaid. Did not promise to reconvey as soon as he was indemnified, before deed was made. Afterwards he was several times approached by Mrs. Allen on the subject, but does not remember making any such promise. Would willingly, however, have reconveyed up to time property was sold, whenever Aiken or wife would have re-imbursed him. They were both apprised of the sales to Holmes and Sutton before they were made.
Other evidence was introduced not material here. The court charged the jury, in substance, that although a married woman could convey her separate estate, yet her ability to do so was subject to the restrictions stated in section 1, 783 of the Code; that if the jury should find that Mrs. Aiken, in joining with her husband as trustee in the deed to Epping, had made a contract of suretyship, or had assumed a debt of her husband, or had made the conveyance in extinguishment of a debt due by her husband to Epping, then the deed was void and Epping obtained no title; that the title to Sutton would not be void if hetook without notice of the rights or claims of Mis. Aiken.
*The jury found for the defendant. The plaintiff moved for a new trial upon the following grounds:
1. Because title was shown to be in plaintiff, which entitled him to recover, and the evidence did not show that title had ever passed out of him.
2. Because the court admitted in evidence the deed from Aiken, trustee, and wife to Epping.
3. Because the verdict was contrary to law and evidence. The motion was sustained and defendant excepted.
Jackson, Lawton & Basinger, for plaintiff in error, cited Code, secs. 2329, 3092; 1 Story's Eq. Jur., 399.
Rufus E. Easter, for defendant, cited Code, 3717, 3718, 1783, 1785, 2337, 1951; 54 Ga., 543; 53 Ib., 437; 59 Ib., 29, 380; 27 Ib., 479; 53 Ib., 353.
The verdict was for the defendant, and the court granted a new trial. Shall we reverse the order for a new trial, is the general question for decision.
1. There were two demises in the declaration, one from Aiken as trustee for his wife, and the other from Mrs. Aiken herself. In whom was the legal title prior to the conveyance to Epping? We think it was in Mrs. Aiken. In the conveyance from Rhett to her husband, a trust for her benefit was indicated by the bare fact that he was denominated in the deed her trustee. Section 2307 of the Code declares, And the preceding section, which is general as to all trust estates, declares, These provisions of the Code open *a fresh source in our law, from which the trust stream flows in its natural channel, if it did not do so before. What is more manifest to common sense than that a husband who, in the deed by which he acquires land, describes himself as the trustee of his wife, intends to take in that character, and for her benefit, not for his own? Moreover, in this case Mrs. Aiken was recognized as the beneficiary by Epping; for in the conveyance which he took from her and her husband, the latter was described as her trustee, and the former was expressly denominated cestui quetrust. Prior to the act of 1866, (Code, sec. 1754,) such a trust would perhaps have been executory, and would have continued on foot so long as the coverture existed, but that act, as has been several times decided, introduced a new rule of property in respect to married women, and a corresponding enlargement of their legal capacity. With reference to her separate estate, a female, married or single, is now on full equality with the male, except in a few particulars defined by statute. Save in those particulars, when her equitable rights are commensurate with those of the male, her legal rights ate also commensurate with his, and the difference of sex is utterly immaterial. Whenever the subtle action of law chemistry, perhaps I should rather say law-magic, for it resembles magic more than natural science, transmutes his equitable rights into legal rights, the...
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Taylor v. Allen
...illegality of such sales by the wife, and has always treated them as being absolutely void, and not simply voidable. The case of Sutton v. Aiken, 62 Ga. 734, was an action of ejectment brought for the wife against a purchaser. It appeared In that case that the wife and her husband Joined in......
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Taylor v. Allen
...illegality of such sales by the wife, and has always treated them as being absolutely void, and not simply voidable. The case of Sutton v. Aiken, 62 Ga. 734, was an of ejectment brought for the wife against a purchaser. It appeared in that case that the wife and her husband joined in a deed......