Sutton v. Missouri Dept. of Social Services
| Decision Date | 20 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 14852,14852 |
| Citation | 733 S.W.2d 830 |
| Parties | Patricia SUTTON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Ofelia Manalang, Jefferson City, for defendant-appellant.
Terry Daley Schwartze, Rolla, for plaintiff-respondent.
In May 1984 respondent Patricia S. Sutton began receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), § 208.040, 1 et. seq., on behalf of a four-person "assistance group" or "filing unit," consisting of respondent herself and her three daughters, Charissa, 9, Kimberly, 6, and Angela, 1, all living in the same home. Angela is a half-sister of Charissa and Kimberly.
On September 29, 1985, Angela's father died and, by reason of and upon his death, Angela began receiving a monthly insurance benefit of $377.10 under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). This benefit increased to $388.70 in December 1985. Such benefits are sometimes referred to as "Old-Age Survivor's & Disability Insurance" benefits, (OASDI), or "Title II" benefits.
The Division of Family Services of the Department of Social Services, ("the Division"), entered an order discontinuing respondent's AFDC benefits because the filing unit's monthly income, consisting of Angela's Title II benefits of $388.70, exceeded the "$320 four-person AFDC percentage of need expense standard." The order, entered after notice and evidentiary hearing, was prompted by Angela's receipt of the Title II benefits.
Sutton appealed to the Circuit Court of Pulaski County and that court reversed the decision of the Division and reinstated her AFDC benefits. The Division appeals.
This court, in reviewing this contested administrative case, reviews the decision of the agency, not the judgment of the trial court. Fleming Foods of Missouri, Inc. v. Runyan, 634 S.W.2d 183, 184 (Mo. banc 1982); § 208.100.5; § 208.110. The scope of judicial review may extend to a determination of whether the action of the agency is, among other things, in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, is unsupported by competent and substantial evidence upon the whole record, or is, for any other reason, unauthorized by law. Pummill v. Missouri Div. of Family Services, 674 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Mo.App.1984); § 536.140.2.
It is the position of the Division that the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 494, and federal regulations implementing that Act insofar as it affects AFDC benefits, are binding upon the Division, § 208.190, and justified the order discontinuing respondent's AFDC benefits. Respondent concedes, with commendable candor, that the evidence is not insufficient to support the decision of the Division. Respondent seeks to challenge the Division's action on the grounds that it was based upon an improper construction of the Deficit Reduction Act and that it violated Angela's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
As part of its effort to reduce the federal deficit through the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Congress amended § 402(a)(38) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) (1982 ed. Supp. III) to read, in pertinent part:
"A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must--
* * *
(38) provide that in making the determination under paragraph (7) with respect to a dependent child and applying paragraph (8), the State agency shall (except as otherwise provided in this part) include--
(A) any parent of such child, and
(B) any brother or sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets the conditions described in clauses (1) and (2) of section 606(a) of this title, if such parent, brother, or sister is living in the same home as the dependent child, and any income of or available for such parent, brother, or sister shall be included in making such determination and applying such paragraph with respect to the family (notwithstanding section 405(j) of this title, in the case of benefits provided under subchapter II of this chapter) ..." 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) reads, in pertinent part:
"The term 'dependent child' means a needy child (1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home ... or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) ..."
In Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 107 S.Ct. 3008, 97 L.Ed.2d 485 (1986), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the amended form of 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38), which, in effect, requires "that a family's eligibility for [AFDC] benefits must take into account, with certain specified exceptions, the income of all parents, brothers and sisters living in the same home." Bowen v. Gilliard, supra, at 3011. The principal issue in Bowen v. Gilliard was whether that requirement "violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it is applied to require a family wishing to receive AFDC benefits to include within its unit a child for whom child support payments are being made by a noncustodial parent." Bowen v. Gilliard, at p. 3011. The court held there was no such violation.
There is a factual difference between Bowen v. Gilliard and the case at bar, in that Angela's monthly income of $388.70 is in the form of Title II benefits and the income of the child in Bowen v. Gilliard, which adversely affected the filing unit's AFDC income, was in the form of child support from her living father. This difference, however, is an immaterial one. In Gorrie v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 508 (8th Cir.1987), cited with approval in Bowen v. Gilliard, p. 3013, fn. 5, the court said, at p. 516:
"The statute [42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38) ] and its legislative history indicate that Congress intended that all coresident siblings of a dependent child applying for AFDC and their income, including Title II Social Security benefits and child support, should be counted in determining need and thus eligibility for AFDC assistance."
Other cases holding that Title II benefits are accorded the same treatment as child support in determining entitlement to AFDC benefits include Showers v. Cohen, 645 F.Supp. 217 (M.D.Pa.1986); Ardister v. Mansour, 627 F.Supp. 641 (W.D.Mich.1986); Huber v. Blinzinger, 626 F.Supp. 30 (N.D.Ind.1985); Creaton v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 26 (C.D.Cal.1985); Oliver v. Ledbetter, 624 F.Supp. 325 (N.D.Ga.1985); Park v. Coler, 143 Ill.App.3d 727, 97 Ill.Dec. 648, 493 N.E.2d 130 (1986); Walker v. Karpan, 726 P.2d 82 (Wyo.1986).
In Bowen v. Gilliard, supra, the Court pointed out that the AFDC program, based on a scheme of cooperative federalism, was established by Title IV of the Social Security Act of 1935 to provide financial assistance to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives who live with and care for them. The federal program reimburses each State which chooses to participate with a percentage of the funds it expends. In return the State must administer its assistance program pursuant to a state plan that conforms to applicable federal statutes and regulations.
Prior to 1984 there was no federal requirement that all parents and siblings be included in an AFDC filing unit. If a teenage child had significant income of her own, perhaps from wages or from support payments from an absent parent, the other members of her family could exclude her from the filing unit in order to avoid disqualifying the entire family from AFDC benefits or reducing its level of benefits.
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 forced families to include in the filing unit children for whom support payments were being received and its practical effect was that many families' total income was reduced. The burden of the change was mitigated somewhat by a separate amendment providing that the first $50 of child support collected by the State must be remitted to the family and not counted as income for the purpose of determining its benefit level. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1982 ed. Supp. III); 42 U.S.C. § 657(b)(1) (1982 ed. Supp. III). 2
In Bowen v. Gilliard, the court said at p. 3013:
In Bowen v. Gilliard, the AFDC recipients, whose benefits had been adversely affected by the amendments contained in the Deficit Reduction Act, argued that the district court's construction of those amendments, which produced that effect, was an improper construction. The Supreme Court said, at p. 3013, fn. 5:
In Gilliard v. Kirk, supra, 633 F.Supp., which contains the approved analysis of the Deficit Reduction Act, the court said, at p. 1546:
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Hohensee v. Division of Medical Services
...a contested administrative case, we review the decision of the agency, not that of the circuit court. Sutton v. Missouri Dep't of Social Serv., 733 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Mo.App. S.D.1987)(citing Fleming Foods of Missouri, Inc. v. Runyan, 634 S.W.2d 183, 184(Mo. banc 1982)). Our review is limited......