Sutton v. St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-5211.,04-5211.
• Citation: 419 F.3d 568
• Parties: Michael SUTTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL S.C., INC., and St. Jude Medical, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 568

419 F.3d 568

Michael SUTTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL S.C., INC., and St. Jude Medical, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04-5211.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: February 2, 2005.

Decided and Filed: August 23, 2005.

ARGUED: Carroll C. Johnson III, Law Offices of Carroll C. Johnson, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. James C. Martin, Reed Smith LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Paul Berry Cooper III, Deal, Cooper & Holton, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. James C. Martin, Donna M. Doblick, Reed Smith LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, DeWitt

M. Shy, Jr., Burch, Porter & Johnson, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellees.

Before: COLE and CLAY, Circuit Judges; HOOD, District Judge.^*

OPINION

HOOD, District Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Sutton appeals the November 26, 2003 order of the district court granting Defendants St. Jude Medical S.C., Inc.'s and St. Jude Medical, Inc.'s motion to dismiss for lack of standing. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court's order, and REMAND the case to the district court for further consideration.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Sutton brought suit on behalf of a proposed class of persons who underwent cardiac bypass surgery using a medical device called the Symmetry Bypass System Connector ("device"). Heart surgeons use this device during cardiac bypass surgery to attach saphenous vein grafts to the aortic surface of the heart without sutures. Sutton was implanted with the device during treatment for his heart condition. Defendants-Appellees St. Jude Medical, S.C., Inc., and St. Jude Medical, Inc. (collectively "St. Jude") are the designers, manufacturers, and distributors of the device. Sutton alleges that St. Jude failed to use reasonable care and was negligent in designing the device, and further, that the device is defective and unreasonably dangerous, and is sold and marketed without proper warnings. In addition, Sutton specifically alleges the following facts in his complaint:

(1) the device has "led to severe and disabling medical conditions resulting from collapse and scarring of the graft" in "numerous patients," necessitating removal of the device and/or monitoring for further harm, including death (Complaint at 6, ¶ 15; Joint Appendix at 10);

(2) St. Jude was informed of adverse consequences associated with the device through incident reports from cardiac surgeons, but despite these warnings, St. Jude continues to market and distribute the aortic connector (Compl. at 6, ¶¶ 16-17; J.A. at 10);

(3) as a result of having this allegedly defective and unreasonably dangerous device implanted in him, Plaintiff "has suffered economic losses and large medical expenses and has a device in his body which increases his risk for aortic bypass stenosis or occlusion and its resulting physical injuries" (Compl. at 6, ¶ 29; J.A. at 10).

Sutton brought a diversity suit on behalf of all persons in whom the device has been implanted.¹

Sutton, on behalf of the putative class of persons implanted with the device, seeks the imposition of a medical monitoring fund providing the following: (1) notice to all persons implanted with the device of its potential harm; (2) periodic medical examinations, including necessary studies and tests, to determine the extent of graft compromise and its progression, if any; (3) education for physicians about diagnosing and treating any scarring that may result from using the device; and (4) medical treatment to remove the device from all individuals exhibiting bypass graft compromise as a result of using the device.

Pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, St. Jude moved for dismissal of Sutton's complaint. St. Jude asserted Sutton lacks standing to pursue his action, and that he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Ruling that Sutton did not have standing, the district court dismissed his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.² Sutton timely appealed to this Court.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the district court's final judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review an order dismissing a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Joelson v. United States, 86 F.3d 1413, 1416 (6th Cir.1996). Any factual findings made by the district court while deciding a motion to dismiss are reviewed for clear error only. Jones v. City of Lakeland, 175 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir.1999) (overruled on other grounds) (quoting Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 161 (6th Cir.1993)).

B. Standing under Article III

Sutton brings suit on behalf of a class of as-of-yet uninjured device implantees. In order to satisfy the standing requirements of Article III of the Constitution, Sutton must meet three requirements. Failure to establish any one of them deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to hear the suit. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). First, Sutton must demonstrate he has suffered "an `injury in fact' that is both concrete and particularized and actual or imminent." Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of St. Jude. Id. Finally, Sutton must show that "it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision." Id.

The Article III standing requirements apply equally to class actions. The class representative must allege an individual, personal injury in order to seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). Sutton's general factual allegations may be sufficient to show standing when assessing the issue on a motion to dismiss. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The court must accept as true all such allegations contained in the complaint and must construe the complaint in favor of Sutton. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Greater Cincinnati Coalition for the Homeless v. City of Cincinnati, 56 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir.1995) (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)).

C. Standing Based Upon Increased Risk of Future Harm

Sutton makes three main factual allegations in his complaint: (1) the device is defective and unreasonably dangerous; (2) implantation of the device puts Sutton and class members at a substantially greater risk for developing restenosis and occlusion of the bypass graft; and (3) this increased risk necessitates both current and future medical testing and monitoring. The district court found Sutton's alleged injury "purely hypothetical" because he did "not provide[] the Court with any information from which to assess his allegedly increased risk of harm from implantation of the aortic connector." Sutton v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 292 F.Supp.2d 1005, 1008-09 (W.D.Tenn.2003). The thrust of the district court's decision was that Sutton failed to establish a sufficient risk of harm associated with the device to survive dismissal for lack of standing. We find the district court incorrectly attempted to evaluate the merits of Sutton's contention that he is entitled to medical monitoring costs. During the threshold standing inquiry, the district court should have accepted Sutton's allegations as true and construed the complaint in Sutton's favor. See Greater Cincinnati Coalition for the Homeless, 56 F.3d at 716.

Sutton argues that exposure to an increased risk of disease has been recognized by federal courts as an injury in fact sufficient to confer Article III standing. He likens exposure to the device to exposure to toxins such as nuclear emissions and asbestos. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 73-74, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978) (finding standing where plaintiffs had not yet manifested any physical injury as a result of exposure to nuclear emission); Carlough v. Amchem Prod., Inc. 834 F.Supp. 1437, 1454 (E.D.Pa.1993) (conferring standing from mere exposure to asbestos). The district court correctly stated that the device presently at issue differs from toxic substances in that the device provides a medical benefit to individuals "exposed" to it. The district court also properly noted that medical devices can be beneficial for some users while causing complications in others. For purposes of standing however, we hold the differences between exposure to toxic substances and allegedly defective products are immaterial.

In recent years, tort plaintiffs have increasingly sought, and have regularly been awarded, medical monitoring costs in both toxic tort and product liability cases. See Arvin Maskin, et al., Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for Deserving Plaintiffs or Tort Law's Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 521, 522 (2000) (citing Day v. NLO, 851 F.Supp. 869, 876 (S.D.Ohio 1994); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 206 W.Va. 133, 522 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1999)). A medical monitoring award aids presently healthy plaintiffs who have been exposed to an increased risk of future harm to detect and treat any resultant harm at an early stage. Ayers v. Jackson Township, 106 N.J. 557, 525 A.2d 287, 308 (1987).

The question of whether an increased risk of harm requiring current medical monitoring is a sufficient injury in fact to confer standing is one of first impression in this Circuit. The main basis found in the case law for allowing such claims to proceed is Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C.Cir.1984). Friends for All Children concerned a tort action on behalf of Vietnamese orphans for injuries suffered...