Sutton v. State

Decision Date23 November 1892
Citation20 S.W. 564
PartiesSUTTON v. STATE.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals

Appeal from district court, Ft. Bend county; WILLIAM H. BURKHART, Judge.

Frank Sutton was convicted of an assault with intent to murder, from which judgment the defendant appeals. Affirmed.

T. E. Mitchell, for appellant. R. L. Henry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

DAVIDSON, J.

Appellant was convicted of an assault with intent to murder, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for two years. Shortly prior to calling the cause for trial, the grand jurors came before the court, and made a final report for the term, in which they sharply criticised, and in a caustic manner indulged in some observations in relation to, criminal trials in Ft. Bend county, and that juries had been very remiss in the discharge of duty in enforcing the law in criminal prosecutions. After the reading of said report was finished, this cause was called for trial, and the jury ordered to take their appropriate places. Four of said jurors were present, and heard the reading of said report. The bill of exceptions recites that defendant objected to said four jurors, because they had heard said reading of said report, and because they were probably influenced and prejudiced thereby against defendant. It is not stated that they were questioned in reference to this matter. The objections stated were overruled by the court, and the defendant promptly challenged all four of them. During the further progress of impaneling the jury, he exhausted his peremptory challenges. After the defendant had so exhausted his peremptory challenges four jurors "were impaneled over his objection, the sole reason urged being that he had exhausted all his peremptory challenges." The bill states no ground of objection to any of said jurors. It is not sufficient to simply state in a bill of exceptions that the jurors were objectionable. It must go further, and state some "cause" as the ground for challenge which would likely affect his competency or his impartiality in the trial of the case. "Without some such showing, it is idle simply to say that a juror is objectionable." Hudson v. State, 28 Tex. App. 323, 13 S. W. Rep. 388; Nalley v. State, 28 Tex. App. 387, 13 S. W. Rep. 670; Rippey v. State, 29 Tex. App. 37, 14 S. W. Rep. 448; Blackwell v. State, 29 Tex. App. 195, 15 S. W. Rep. 597.

2. The charge on self-defense is sufficient, and more favorable to defendant than demanded by the testimony,...

To continue reading

Request your trial
10 cases
  • Lacy v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • March 29, 1939
    ...Tex.App. 323, 13 S.W. 388, 389: "Without some such showing, it is idle simply to say that a juror is objectionable." See Sutton v. State, 31 Tex.Cr.R. 297, 20 S.W. 564 and cases therein cited; Johnson v. State, 108 Tex. Cr.R. 499, 1 S.W.2d 896; Grille v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 20 S.W.2d 424; S......
  • Holt v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • March 25, 1942
  • Robertus v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • November 13, 1931
    ...of such juror was calculated to injure appellant's rights and did probably produce such injury. This was not done. Sutton v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 297, 20 S. W. 564; Lane v. State, 29 Tex. App. 310, 15 S. W. 827; Williamson v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 225, 36 S. W. 444; Mays v. State, 36 Tex. ......
  • Rogers v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • April 6, 1927
    ...there was a liklihood of injury to him from the service of such juror. See authorities quoted in original opinion; also Sutton v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 297, 20 S. W. 564; Lane v. State, 29 Tex. App. 310, 15 S. W. 827; Williamson v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 225, 36 S. W. 444; Mays v. State, 36 ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT