Sutton v. Sutton
| Decision Date | 09 August 1967 |
| Parties | , 220 Tenn. 410 Shirley Ann Fremont SUTTON, Plaintiff-in-Error, v. David SUTTON, Defendant-in-Error. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
J. H. Reneau, III, Celina, for plaintiff in error.
Jacky Bellar, Carthage, and James W. Chamberlain, LaFayette, for defendant in error.
Plaintiff-in-error, Shirley Ann Fremont Sutton, filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Macon County, against David Sutton seeking a modification of a divorce decree entered by that court, wherein she was the defendant, and which decree awarded custody of their minor child to her husband, Billy Gregory Sutton. She was joined in the petition by her father, Jim Tom Fremont, and her mother, Virgie Fremont.
The petition alleged the Circuit Judge of Macon County entered a decree granting Billy Gregory Sutton, the original complainant an absolute divorce from petitioner, Shirley Ann Fremont Sutton, and awarded custody of their minor son, James Gregory Sutton, to his father, on October 4, 1965.
It was alleged that subsequent to the divorce decree and on August 16, 1966, the father, Billy Gregory Sutton, was accidently killed.
The petition further alleged prior to the death of the father he had left the child in the care of his brother, David Sutton, the defendant.
It was then alleged that since the death of Billy Gregory Sutton petitioner had endeavored to secure custody of her child from defendant, David Sutton, but he had refused to permit her to take the child and stated he and his wife intended to keep the child in their custody.
The prayer of the petition was for a modification of the divorce decree granting to petitioner the exclusive custody of the child, or, in the alternative, to her parents.
The defendant filed a demurrer to the petition on the ground the Circuit Court of Macon County did not have jurisdiction of the cause.
The trial judge sustained the demurrer. He was of the opinion the court lost jurisdiction of the matter by the death of the father.
Petitioner has appealed to this Court and has assigned as error the action of the trial judge in sustaining the demurrer.
We are of the opinion the assignment of error must be sustained.
T.C.A. Section 36--828 provides:
The effect of T.C.A. Section 36--820 and Section 36--828 is the Court which in a divorce, annulment or separate maintenance action awards custody and support of a child retains all decrees for custody and support within the control of the court to make such future changes or modifications as the exigencies of the case may require. Cravens v. Cravens, 30 Tenn.App. 487, 207 S.W.2d 593 (1942); Davenport v. Davenport, 178 Tenn. 517, 160 S.W.2d 406 (1942); Coleman v. Coleman, 190 Tenn. 286, 229 S.W.2d 341 (1950).
The exclusive jurisdiction of the question as to whom the custody of a child should be awarded is in the court wherein the divorce was granted and the custody of the child first awarded. Coleman v. Coleman, supra; Johnson v. Johnson, 185 Tenn. 400, 206 S.W.2d 400 (1947); Williamson v. Laughlin, 192 Tenn. 580, 241 S.W.2d 576 (1961).
Defendant, however, insists the cases above cited contemplate retention of the divorce decree during the lives of both parents for the purpose of any future modification of an award of the custody of a child.
Defendant further insists the exclusive remedy of petitioner is by petition for the writ of habeas corpus. It is argued this State has recognized the majority rule prevailing in our sister states that the court of original jurisdiction does not retain jurisdiction to modify an award of custody after the death of one of the parents. In support of this insistence, defendant cites and relies upon the cases of Stubblefield v State ex rel. Ejelstad, 171 Tenn. 580, 106 S.W.2d 558 (1937); and State ex rel. Parker v. Parker, 191 Tenn. 564, 235 S.W.2d 580 (1951).
We cannot agree. In the Stubblefield case, the mother and father of the child, Mary and Sidney Fjelstad, lived in New York. Mrs. Fjelstad left her husband and went to Memphis on the pretext of visiting some relatives. She took the child, Diana, with her. Later she went to Arkansas and obtained a divorce and the custody of the child, Diana. She returned to Memphis and she and Diana lived with the great grandfather and great uncle of Diana, T. F. Stubblefield and Grover Stubblefield, respectively.
After the death of the mother, the father came to Memphis and filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus for...
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...of the parties, the order or decree to remain in the court's control; ...(Emphasis added). * * * * * In Sutton v. Sutton, 220 Tenn. 410, 417 S.W. 2d 786 (Tenn. 1967), the Circuit Court of Macon county had awarded custody of a minor child to the father by a divorce decree. Id. at 787. Upon t......
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Kesser v. Kesser, No. W2003-02392-COA-R3-CV (TN 1/27/2005)
...of such matters until the children reach majority." Kane v. Kane, 547 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tenn. 1977); see also Sutton v. Sutton, 417 S.W.2d 786, 787 (Tenn. 1967) (noting that this jurisdiction is exclusive). As enunciated by our supreme When the husband and wife contract with respect to the l......