Suvak v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs. Corp., 3:21-cv-00032
| Decision Date | 30 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-00032 |
| Parties | HARIKA SUVAK v. CATERPILLAR FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
By Order entered January 26, 2021 (Docket Entry No. 5), this pro se case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings.
Pending before the Court is the motion for partial dismissal (Docket Entry No. 16) filed by Defendant Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation, to which Plaintiff has responded in opposition. For the reasons set out below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that the motion be granted in part and denied in part.
Harika Suvak (“Plaintiff”) is a resident of La Vergne, Tennessee and is a former employee of Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation (“Defendant”), where she worked as an Information Services Analyst I - Information Systems Foundation Program (“ISFP”) in Defendant's Nashville office. Plaintiff asserts that she began working for Defendant on January 16, 2018, shortly after having her first child, and that she became pregnant with her second child during the Fall of 2018. She contends that she suffered various forms of discrimination and unequal treatment by Defendant, particularly at the hands of her supervisor, LaNessa Jackson (“Jackson”), because of her pregnancy and because she was a mother. She alleges that she was terminated from her job on November 8, 2019, as a result of Defendant's hostility towards her for having young children and for becoming pregnant while an employee.
After losing her job, Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination (“Charge”) against Defendant with the Tennessee Human Rights Commission (“THRC”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on January 27, 2020. See Charge (Docket Entry No. 17-1). In the Charge, Plaintiff check-marked boxes indicating that discrimination based on sex, retaliation, and “other - Pregnancy” were the basis for the Charge and asserted that she was discriminated against and treated in a disparate manner due to her sex and pregnancy. Id. at 2-4. The EEOC ultimately took no action on the Charge and issued Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter, dated October 27, 2020.
Plaintiff alleged in her Charge that:
On January 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit. See Complaint (Docket Entry No. 1). She subsequently filed an amended complaint and statement of claims that expounded on her allegations. See Amended Complaint (Docket Entry No. 6) and Statement of Claims (Docket Entry No. 7). Alleging that she suffered unlawful gender/sex discrimination, pregnancy and disability discrimination, and retaliation, Plaintiff brings her lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §' 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §' 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), (“PDA”), and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, T.C.A. §§ 4-21-101 et seq. (“THRA”). See Amended Complaint at 3-4. As relief, Plaintiff seeks back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff demands a jury trial.
Plaintiff sets out several claims in the Statement of Claims. She asserts that she was wrongfully terminated after she was placed on a PIP in February 2019 and again in May 2019 and that the PIPs were created as a basis to subsequently terminating her and purposefully included performance goals that were unattainable. See Statement of Claims at 1-2. (Claim 1). She asserts that she was wrongfully denied a promotion to an IS Analyst II position when four other employees hired in the “same batch” with her were promoted. Id. at 2. (Claim 2). She asserts that Defendant “failed to accommodate my needs and has always counted me working from home against me but allowed others.” Id. (Claim 3). She asserts that Jackson prevented her from working from home, used work absences as a reason to fail her on the PIP, and paid her a reduced bonus compared to other employees. Id. (Claim 4). She asserts that her termination was a form of retaliation against her because she complained to Defendant's human resources department about Jackson's discrimination. Id. (Claim 5). She asserts that her requests to be re-assigned to another team were denied, that she was not rotated to another team, and that she was constantly harassed and treated unequally compared to other analysts because of her pregnancy. Id. at 3. (Claim 6).[1]
In lieu of an answer, Defendant filed the pending early motion for partial dismissal. After Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought the entry of default against Defendant, she was given an extended time to file her response to the motion. Entry of a scheduling order has been reserved by the Court until resolution of the motion for partial dismissal.
Defendant seeks the dismissal of some of Plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant argues that: (1) Plaintiff's THRA claim is time-barred by the applicable one year statute of limitations; (2) some of Plaintiff's claims cannot be considered because they were not timely brought in her Charge; (3) some of Plaintiff's claims cannot be considered because the claims or the events underlying the claims were not raised as part of her Charge; and, (4) some of Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed because the allegations in her amended complaint do not establish a prima facie case for the claims. See Memorandum in Support (Docket Entry No. 17).
In her response (Docket Entry No. 32), Plaintiff asserts that she relied upon attorneys from a Florida law firm that she had retained to assist her in the administrative process and to properly draft her Charge. She argues that she was unaware of the statute of limitations for the THRA and unaware of any time or specificity requirements for filing an administrative charge and that her claims should not be dismissed on a “technicality” when she has evidence supporting the merits of her claims. Plaintiff contends that her Charge was sufficient to apprise Defendant and the EEOC of the totality of her claims and that any of her claims that were not specifically mentioned in the Charge can reasonably be viewed as growing out of what was alleged in the Charge. Attached to Plaintiff's Response are several pages of documents (Docket Entry No 32-1) and two audio files (Docket Entry No. 36) that she contends are evidence in support of her claims.[2]
In reply, Defendant essentially contends that nothing raised by Plaintiff in her response adequately rebuts the legal arguments set out in its motion. See Reply (Docket Entry No. 38).
Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is reviewed under the standard that the Court must accept all of the well pleaded allegations contained in the complaint as true, resolve all doubts in Plaintiff's favor, and construe the complaint liberally in favor of the pro se Plaintiff. See Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2006); Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1999); Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 11-12 (6th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff's factual allegations must be enough to show a plausible right to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-61 (2007). The complaint must contain either direct or inferential factual allegations that are sufficient to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Id.; Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1988). To state a plausible claim for relief, the alleged facts must provide “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Mik v. Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 743 F.3d 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Like many pro se plaintiffs faced with responding to a motion seeking the dismissal of all or part of a case Plaintiff here devotes much of her response to arguments that her underlying claims have merit and are supported by evidence. Indeed, Plaintiff's closing...
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