Swain v. Ga. Power & Light Co
| Decision Date | 03 May 1933 |
| Docket Number | No. 22685.,22685. |
| Citation | 46 Ga.App. 794,169 S.E. 249 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SWAIN. v. GEORGIA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
[COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED].
Error from Superior Court, Decatur County; B. C. Gardner, Judge.
Condemnation proceedings by the Georgia Power & Light Company against W. C. Swain. To review the judgment, after his motion for a new trial was overruled, condemnee brings error.
Affirmed.
The Georgia Power & Light Company instituted proceedings to condemn an easement to flow back water upon and inundate 136.52 acres of W. C. Swain, including the right to deforest the same. An appraiser was selected by the condemnor and one by the condemnee, and these two selected a third. From their award the condemnee appealed to the superior court. On the trial it appeared that a part of the land, to wit, 113.88 acres, had been theretofore acquired by the condemnor for the purpose of inundation, but not for deforestation, and that in the present proceeding the condemnor sought only the right to deforest the 113-acre tract, and that as to the remaining 22.64 acres it sought both the right to inundate and to deforest. The court instructed the jury to bring in their verdict with reference to each parcel of the land separately, finding as to the timber on the larger tract and as to damages for the right to inundate and deforest the smaller tract. Accordingly, they returned this verdict: "We, the jury, find for the condemnee $181.12 on 22 acres of land." Then followed the signature of the foreman. Thereunder the verdict further read: "We, the jury, find for the condemnee as to the timber on the 113 acres $11S.8S, " and thereunder also appeared the signature of the foreman. The condemnee filed a motion in arrest of judgment, which was overruled, and to this judgment the condemnee excepts. The condemnee filed a motion for new trial on grounds dealt with In the following decision. The court overruled the motion for a new trial, and to this judgment the condemnee excepts. '
P. D. Rich, of Bainbridge, for plaintiff in error.
A. B. Conger, of Bainbridge, for defendant in error.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court.
1. "Verdicts are to have a reasonable intendment, and are to receive a reasonable construction, and are not to be avoided unless from necessity." Civil Code 1910, § 5927. The presumptions are in favor of the validity of the verdict of a jury, and, if possible, a construction will be given that will uphold it. Southern R. Co. v. Oliver & Morrow, 1 Ga. App. 734, 58 S. E. 244; David v. Marbut-Williams Lumber Co., 32 Ga. App. 157, 159, 122 S. E. 906; Atlantic & B. R. Co. v. Brown, 129 Ga. 622, 59 S. E. 278. A verdict is certain which can be made certain, by what it contains itself or by the record. Giles v. Spinks, 64 Ga. 205, 206; Rouse v. Chance & Hopkins, 27 Ga. App. 256, 108 S. E. 65. Where a verdict may, by a reasonable construction, be understood, and a legal judgment entered thereon, it is sufficient, under the above section of the Code. Peninsular Naval Stores Co. v. State. 20 Ga. App. 501, 93 S. E. 159. Verdicts are to be construed in the light of the pleadings, the issues made by the evidence, and the charge of the court. Tifton, T. & G. R. Co. v. Butler, 4 Ga. App. 191, 60 S. E. 1087; Harvey v. Head, 68 Ga. 247; Seifert v. Holt, 82 Ga. 757, 762, 9 S. E. 843; McMillan v. Rodgers, 32 Ga. App. 647, 124 S. E. 354. In the case of Moore v. Brewer & Co., 94 Ga. 260 (6), 21 S. E. 460, It was held that a verdict, divided into two parts and separated by only a small space of about one inch, as in the instant case, was legal.
(b) The verdict in this case, divided in substantially the manner in which the court instructed the jury to return it, is easily understood when construed in connection with the evidence in the case and the charge of the court, and a proper judgment was entered thereon. In these circumstances the verdict was not void for any of the reasons urged, and the court properly overruled the motion in arrest of judgment.
2. The evidence in this case showing that a portion of the premises involved had been previously conveyed by the condemnee for the purpose of inundation only, and that he had been compensated therefor, it was not error to permit counsel for the condemnor to ask the condemnee on cross-examination if in arriving at the value at which he placed his land in the present case he took into consideration the fact that the condemnor was already in possession of a portion thereof for the purpose of inundation.
3. The condemnor having condemned the entire tract of land for deforestation purposes, it was not error for the court to refuse to permit the condemnee to testify that he had asked the condemnor to let him have the timber on the premises condemned; that certain employees of the condemnor had agreed that he could have it; that the arbitration was on this basis; and that the condemnor had refused to let him have the timber, but had sold the same for cross-ties. This evidence was not admissible for the purpose of showing the value of the timber.
4. The court permitted a witness for the condemnee, on cross-examination, to testify that he did not know much about the timber; that he had not cruised it: that he had seen it; that he would not give $25 for the pine timber; and that he did not know the value of the cypress timber. While this evidence was of very...
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