Swain v. State
Decision Date | 12 December 1919 |
Docket Number | 1486. |
Citation | 101 S.E. 539,149 Ga. 629 |
Parties | SWAIN v. STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
The court permitted a witness for the state to testify that the defendant, George Swain, drove up to the scene of the killing, and his wife said, "La, yonder is George." This evidence was admissible as a part of the res gestæ, as against the objections that it was hearsay, not spoken in the presence of the defendant, and that it was the saying of the defendant's wife, who was not a competent witness as against the accused. Marcus v. State, 149 Ga. 209 99 S.E. 614(7), and authorities cited; 1 Wharton's Crim Ev. 511. And see Woolfolk v. State, 85 Ga. 101, 102 11 S.E. 814.
The court permitted a witness for the state to testify that "Nick Swain [[[[[[jointly indicted with the accused, but not on trial], when the shooting was taking place, came up near the cotton house and hallooed, 'Pour it into him'; hallooed this all the time the shooting was taking place." This evidence was not inadmissible on the ground "that Nick Swain was not on trial, and that anything said or done by Nick Swain at the time referred to by the witness was inadmissible as evidence as against the movant"; the same being res gestæ declarations.
The court permitted a witness for the state to testify as follows: This evidence was admissible to ascertain motive and explain conduct of the accused (Penal Code 1910, § 1023), and was not inadmissible on the ground that the wife could not testify against the husband. Marcus v. State, supra.
When, in a prosecution for homicide, dying declarations are sought to be admitted, the court must first determine from preliminary evidence whether prima facie they are competent as such and were made under circumstances entitling them to admission. There being evidence that the deceased was "conscious that he was going to die," that he said "he was killed," the attending physician having sworn that he was in the article of death, and that he did die the next morning after having been shot, the court did not err in admitting the evidence. Washington v. State, 137 Ga. 218, 222, 73 S.E. 512.
After having admitted the dying declarations referred to in the next preceding headnote, it was for the jury to finally pass on the question whether or not such declarations of the deceased were actually made and were conscious utterances in the apprehension and immediate prospect of death. A charge which did not so instruct the jury, but may be so construed that the jury might infer that they must take such declarations as evidence in the case, without a qualification that they must finally determine whether such declarations were made, and, if so, whether they were made at a time when the deceased was in the article of death and conscious of...
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