Swan v. City of Hueytown, No. 1031058 (AL 11/5/2004)

• Decision Date: 05 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1031058.,1031058.
• Parties: Michael Swan v. City of Hueytown.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

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Michael Swan v. City of Hueytown.

No. 1031058.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Decided November 5, 2004.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division (CV-02-626)

LYONS, Justice.

Michael Swan appeals from a summary judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court in favor of the City of Hueytown based on Hueytown's defense of municipal immunity. We reverse and remand.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

On May 3, 2000, Michael Brandon Swan was a passenger in a pickup truck being driven by another person. Officer Ben Williams of the Hueytown Police Department pulled the vehicle over for a traffic stop. According to Swan, Officer Williams asked Swan for his driver's license, and Swan complied with Williams's request. Officer Williams testified in his deposition that he does not remember whether he took Swan's driver's license. Officer Williams radioed Swan's identifying information to the police dispatcher, who ran the information through the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC") database.¹ The dispatcher told Officer Williams that the City of Birmingham had warrants outstanding on a Michael Swan.

Officer Williams then placed Swan under arrest and transported him to the Hueytown jail. Later, a Birmingham police officer arrived at the Hueytown jail and transported Swan to the Birmingham jail. After Swan had been waiting at the Birmingham jail, an officer informed Swan that there was in fact no valid outstanding warrant for his arrest. Accordingly, the Birmingham officer transported Swan back to the Hueytown jail, where he was released. Swan's incarceration lasted approximately four hours.

On May 3, 2002, Swan sued the City of Hueytown, alleging assault and battery, unlawful arrest and imprisonment, conversion of personal property, negligence, unskillfulness, and wantonness.² During the course of the litigation, an arrest warrant issued by the City of Birmingham for a "Michael Swann" (with two n's) was produced, indicating a possible mistake on the part of the Hueytown police in arresting Swan. Hueytown moved for a summary judgment based on its claims of peace-officer immunity pursuant to § 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975, and substantive immunity pursuant to § 11-47-190, Ala. Code 1975. The trial court, relying solely on § 6-5-338, granted Hueytown's motion, and Swan appealed.

II. Standard of Review

In reviewing an order granting a motion for a summary judgment, we apply the same standard the trial court applied in ruling on the motion. Hoover, Inc. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 833 So. 2d 32, 34 (Ala. 2002).

"`"To grant such a motion, the trial court must determine that the evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. When the movant makes a prima facie showing that those two conditions are satisfied, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present `substantial evidence' creating a genuine issue of material fact."'"

833 So. 2d at 34 (quoting Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So. 2d 829, 833 (Ala. 2001), quoting in turn Ex parte Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 742 So. 2d 182, 184 (Ala. 1999)). "[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So. 2d 870, 871 (Ala. 1989).III. Analysis

A. Immunity Pursuant to § 6-5-338

i. Actions of Arresting Officer

Swan argues that his injuries resulted from Officer Williams's "failure to inspect and determine the true identity of the arrestee ...." (Swan's brief at 21-22.) Hueytown argues it is immune from liability pursuant to § 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975. Section 6-5-338 provides, in relevant part:

"(a) Every peace officer, except constables, who is employed or appointed pursuant to the Constitution or statutes of this state, whether appointed or employed as such peace officer by the state or a county or municipality thereof, or by an agency or institution, corporate or otherwise, created pursuant to the Constitution or laws of this state and authorized by the Constitution or laws to appoint or employ police officers or other peace officers, and whose duties prescribed by law, or by the lawful terms of their employment or appointment, include the enforcement of, or the investigation and reporting of violations of, the criminal laws of this state, and who is empowered by the laws of this state to execute warrants, to arrest and to take into custody persons who violate, or who are lawfully charged by warrant, indictment, or other lawful process, with violations of, the criminal laws of this state, shall at all times be deemed to be officers of this state, and as such shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties.

"(b) This section is intended to extend immunity only to peace officers and governmental units or agencies authorized to appoint peace officers. No immunity is extended hereby to any private non-governmental person or entity, including any private employer of a peace officer during that officer's off-duty hours."

Section 6-5-338 immunity, if applicable, extends not only to the individual officers, but to the governmental units employing those officers as well. Telfare v. City of Huntsville, 841 So. 2d 1222, 1227 (Ala. 2002) ("Subsection (b) makes it clear that this immunity is extended to `governmental units or agencies authorized to appoint [law-enforcement] officers.'").

Section 6-5-338 gives municipal law-enforcement officers the same immunity afforded "officers of this state." The rules regarding such immunity were restated in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000). Therefore, the Cranman standard governs our analysis of § 6-5-338. See Howard v. City of Atmore, [Ms. 1021312, Dec. 12, 2003] So. 2d, (Ala. 2003) ("Since Cranman, we analyze immunity issues in terms of `State-agent' immunity, rather than `under the dichotomy of ministerial versus discretionary functions.' ... Thus, we will address the applicability of peace-officer immunity under the principles set forth in Cranman.") (quoting Ex parte Hudson, 866 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Ala. 2003)); but see Lee v. Minute Stop, Inc., 874 So. 2d 505, 514 (Ala. 2003) ("Cranman applies to State-agent immunity, not to the immunity granted to police officers by § 6-5-338, Ala. Code 1975, but, assuming without deciding that the Cranman principles applied, we believe that the municipal police officers would be immune under the facts of this case."). So while § 6-5-338, which was adopted before Cranman was decided, speaks of "discretionary function[s]," our analysis is based on the factors defining the parameters of State-agent immunity as set forth in Cranman.

In Cranman, we restated the law of State-agent immunity as follows:

"A State agent shall be immune from civil liability in his or her personal capacity when the conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is based upon the agent's

"(1) formulating plans, policies, or designs; or

"(2) exercising his or her judgment in the administration of a department or agency of government, including, but not limited to, examples such as:

"(a) making administrative adjudications;

"(b) allocating resources;

"(c) negotiating contracts;

"(d) hiring, firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising personnel; or

"(3) discharging duties imposed on a department or agency by statute, rule, or regulation, insofar as the statute, rule, or regulation prescribes the manner for performing the duties and the State agent performs the duties in that manner; or

"(4) exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons; or

"(5) exercising judgment in the discharge of duties imposed by statute, rule, or regulation in releasing prisoners, counseling or releasing persons of unsound mind, or educating students."

Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405 (first emphasis original; second emphasis added). Accordingly, we must determine whether the conduct forming the basis of this action fits within the relevant category of the Cranman standard.

Paragraph 4 of the Cranman standard provides immunity to officers "exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State, including, but not limited to, law-enforcement officers' arresting or attempting to arrest persons." 792 So. 2d at 405 (emphasis added). At first glance, Officer Williams's conduct might appear to fit into this category. However, it is not only the decision to arrest that Swan states as the basis of Hueytown's liability, but also Officer Williams's alleged negligence in gathering and processing information that led up to the arrest. Therefore, the issue becomes whether Officer Williams was "exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State" in gathering information to be run through the NCIC database, and in subsequently processing the results of that NCIC check. Because the Cranman standard necessarily requires us to determine if the agent in question exercised judgment, cases applying the discretionary/ministerial dichotomy are helpful, but only if considered within the framework supplied by Cranman. This Court has defined discretionary functions as "those acts as to which there is no hard and fast rule as to the course of conduct that one must or must not take and those acts requiring exercise in judgment and choice and involving what is just and proper under the circumstances." Wright v. Wynn, 682 So. 2d 1, 2 (Ala. 1996). It could be argued that there is no hard and fast rule as to how a law-enforcement officer is to proceed when gathering and relaying information to complete an NCIC check on a person the officer has stopped and how to...